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ABSTRACT
&
The present  study o r i g i n a t e d  as a general a t tempt t o  c l a r i f y ,  
the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f ’ observed o r d e r ly  dev ia t ion s  from the p r i n c i p l e s  
of  s o - c a l l e d  ' r a t i o n a l '  dec! sl.on-maki nq put fo r th  in the theon/  of  
p r o b a b i l i t y  and t h ^ t t i ^ o r y  of games. The paradigm employed was a 
simple zero-sum game, on which both p r o b a b i l i t y  tVieory and game 
theory  converge in p r e s c r i b i n g ' a  random ’ r a t i o n a l '  s o l u t i o n ,  so t h a t  
the r e s u l t s  obtained were a ls o  comparable with the l i t e r a t u r e  on^random 
s e r ie s  g e n e r a t io n ,  probabi I i t y - l e a r n l n g ,  and gambling.  More '
s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  t h i s  study attempted th e  re co n s t ru c t io n  of c e r t a i n  
i n v a r i a n t  c o g n i t l v e  processes, in p a r t i c u l a r  the r e f l e c t i v e  cont ro l  
process evidence f o r  which was found In a number of  S o v ie t  experiments.
Eighty  female undergraduates acted the  r o l e . o f  H l d e r ,  and twenty  
others were Guessers in games c o n s is t in g  o f  200 plays each. Each 
Hlder  e i t h e r  played a bona f i d e  Guesser or one of  th ree  programmed
' r
s t r a t e g i e s ,  one being random, and th e  o th e r  two ' d r i b  l i n g s ’ , i . e . ,
*
r e f l e c t i v e  contro l  h e u r i s t i c s  which has been successful  in the Soviet  
s t u d ie s .  The p layers  were kept  I s o la t e d  from each o th e r  and Hlders  
were given one o f  two se ts  o f  I n s t r u c t i o n s :  t h a t  they were p la y in g
ag a in s t  bona f i d e  G b e s s e r s / o r  t h a t  they were p la y in g  a g a in s t  an 
automaton, the  hypothesis being t h a t  r e f l e c t i v e  cont ro l  was e f f e c t i v e  
only when those c o n t r o l l e d  represented t h e i r  opponents'  as mechanical ,  
or  o therw is e  non-human. v
i l l
£ ;
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V
The re s u f ts  were considered a t  sevenal.  leve ls  of  a n a l y s i s : ,  from 
tt je po ih t^crf . view o f  moves; a f  s t r a t e g i e s ;  of co n d i t ion a l  p ro p e n s i t i e s  
def ined  in a ' 4 - s t a t ^  Ma-rkov chain model; and from the  p o in t  of  view 
of ind ices  o f  s t r a t e g i c  .dependency. The r e s u l t s  of  the a n a l y s e s  ar e
* i
not e a s I l y  summarized. In general  p la yers  w e r e n o t  f r a t i o n a l 1 ; ‘ and 
1
■where they ,w ere  ’ r a t i o n a l ’ , only the'mean p la y e r  was ’ r a t i  ona I ’ , -and 
th e re  were very large i n d iv id u a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  in mast o f  the v a r i a b le s  
considered.  The Tac t  t h a t  4 .of the 20 bona f i d e  g am e s . fa i le d  to  reach 
’ s t e a d y - s t a t e s ’ f u r t h e r  corroborated  the o v e r a l l  conclusion t h a t  w i t ^  
nessed was a g re a t  deal o f  i n t e r a c t i o n  bear ing  no r e l a t i o n  to  
normative dec is ion  t h e o r i e s ,  artd which can 'o n ly  be tevl dence o f  " c l a y -
l  *
f u l l n e s s " .  The h iq h e r - o r d e r  measures proved t o  be the  most s e n s i t i v e ,
-V ^
/  -both to  the independent^var iab ies and t o  other  dependent v a r i a b l e s .
4
At the level  of  moves, o r  cho ices ,  t h e r e  was, In c o n t r a s t ,  not  a g re a t
t  . • f"
deal t o - b e  s a i d .  The f i r s t  50 fyhays seemed t o  produce a kind o f
, ’ ■ , (
in n o cu la t io n  e f f e c t  through t l je  r e s t  o f  the garrte, and the t h i r d  block
, ' ‘ ■ s
o f  50 was., c u r i o u s l y ,  the s i t e  o f  q u i t e  a ' b i t  of f l u c t u a t io n .  The
* i  1
dr ib  l ings were n e i t h e r  successes nor f a i l u r e s ,  but  players respohded
t o  them d i f f e r e n t i a l l y  a t  the h i g h e r - o r d e r  l e ve ls  o f  a n a ly s i s .  A 
*
post-game q u e s t io n n a i r e  showed-the Importance-of  being aware o f  a 
d e c is io n -m a k e r ’s own motives f o r  i n t e r p r e t i n g  h is  cho.ice protocjMs  
and s t r a t e g i c  b ias es .  ■ ’ ' *
The quest.lonnai re a lso  i l l u s t r a t e d  how.^he i n t u i t i v e  concept, o f  
" r a t i o n a l i t y "  was s tc j jG tura l  iy more complex', and qua I i t a t i v e l y  d i f f e r e n t  
from formal ’ r a t i o n a l i t y '  in game t h e o r y .  I t  was suggested t h a t  a
I v
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ques”t  ionnai re  w ith  b e t t e r  f i d e l i t y  would uncove'r the e f f e c t s  of  
p e r s o n a l i t y  or  c o g n i t i v e  s t y l e  v a r ia b le s  wi th  g r e a te r  c l a r i t y .
1 V
F i n a l l y ,  a O - f a c t o r  ana lys is  on the con d i t io n a l  p ro p e n s i t ie s  resu lt ed  
in th e  narTtinq of three  major types o f - p l a y e r s .  ,The o v e r a l l  im p l ica ­
t i o n  of t h i s  c l u s t e r i n g ,  and i t s  e f f e c t s  on the* q u e s t io n n a i re  responses,  
was t h a t  behaviour in r e l a t i v e l y  simple choice  s i t u a t i o n s  may be 
much more a fu nct io n  of  p e r s o n a l i t y . v a r f a b l e s  than the sc&t o f  c o g n i t i v e  
processes normative t h eo r ie s  o f  dec is ion  focus on, or "the s o r t  of  
independent v a r ia b le s  experimenters t y p i c a l l y  assume are I n { o p e r a t i o n .
')  '  
i •
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CHAPTER I
1NTRODUCTI ON
Formal Game Theory and Experimental  Games
Ori g in a t in g  with von Neumann and Morgenstern's 1"944 Theory of  
Games and Economic Behaviour ,  game theory  Is proper ly  a branch of  
mathematics. psycholog! cal I y 'construed ,  game theory purports  to  
descr ibe ' r a t i o n a l  c o n f l i c t '  between two o r  more p la y e r s .  In game 
th e o ry ,  and fo r  the remainder of  t h i s  paper,  the a d j e c t i v e  ' r a t i o n a l '  
r e f e r s  on ly  t o  choice behaviour which leads to the max imizat ion of  
' • u t i l i t y ' .  But s ince u t i l i t y  Is de f ined  as whatever a ’ r a t i o n a l '  
p la y e r  maximizes, the axiom o f  ' r a t i o n a l  cho ice '  Is obv iously c i r c u l a r  
The game t h e o r i s t  Is  not concerned however, because he assumes t h a t  
u t i l i t y  funct ions can somehow be independently s p e c i f i e d ,  on a t  l e a s t  
an i n t e r v a l  s c a le .
For the psych o lo g is t  I n v e s t i g a t i n g  choice behaviour as I t  occurs,  
on the o th e r  hand, t h i s  c i r c u l a r i t y  presents a ser ious problem. Often  
the best  he can do Is t o  simply assume t h a t  the se t  o f  symbol ic ,  token 
o r  monetary payoffs f o r  which p la ye rs  compete represents a ready-made
I n t e r v a l  sca le  o f  u t i l i t i e s .  I f  t h i s  assumption cannot be s a t i s f i e d ,
v W
then I t  remains an a r t i c l e  o f  f a i t h ,  q u i t e  enough f o r  the bas is a f  a
deduct ive mathematical  system, bu t  not  enough to  J u s t i f y  d e t a i l e d  
g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  from the  lab o ra to ry  gaming experiment t o  ' r e a l - l i f e '  
games.
Consider the  game given In M a t r i x  I ,  the  general two-person 2x2 
game. The p la y e r s ,  Row and Column, choose Independently and
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2
simultaneously  between Rl and R2, Cl and C2, r e s p e c t i v e l y .  There are  
then four  J o i n t  outcomes p o s s ib le ,  R IC I ,  RIC2,  R2CI , and R2C2. The 
pai red values w i t h i n  each c e l l  o f  the m a t r i x  represent  the nayof fs  to  
Row and Column r e s p e c t i v e l y .  J f - t h e  sum o f  the payoffs to both Row
M a t r i x  1 *






a ,b c ,d
e , f g,h
and Column Is a constant  across a l l  fo u r  outcomes ( I . e . ,  i f  a+b=c+d=
e+ f=g+h) ,  then M a t r ix  I Is c a l l e d  a constant-sum game, o r  a zero-sum
game. In a lW such s i t u a t i o n s  Rows' i n t e r e s t s  are d i r e c t l y  opposed t o  •
Column's, and unambiguous s o lu t io n s  o b t a i n .
However,, the type o f  game which has rece iv e d  the most exper imenta l  
a t t e n t i o n  Is the  s o - c a l l e d  mixed-motive game, In w h ic h . th e  sum o f  the  
payoffs t o  Row and Column var ies  across the j o i n t  outcomes. These 
non-constant  or  non-zero-sum games h a \^  n o t  been unambiguously solved  
t o  the s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  a l l  t h e o r i s t s .  Never theless the express ion  
"mixed-motive" Is  a p p l ic a b le  because In a non-constant-sum environment  
t h e r e  Is only p a r t i a l  c o n f l i c t  o f  I n t e r e s t  between players  alongside  
some degree o f  I n t e r e s t  o v e r la p ,  and presumably such choice c o n d i t io n s  
are more p sycho lo g lc a ! ly r e a I I s t I c  than t h e  pure c o n f l i c t  of th e  z e r o -  
sum game.
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There has b.een a r e l a t i v e  p a u c i t y ’ q f  reported  experiments  
. i n v o lv in g  constant-surn games. GCiy'er & P e r k e l ' s  1972 b ib l io g rap h y '  
on .gaming contains some 900 s tu d ie s ,  and-only a handful  o f  these
% concern themselves w it h  two-person constant-sum games. There have
been hundreds of  s tud ies  on P r i s o n e r ’ s Dl'lemma- a lone ,  and more 
r e c e n t ly  a t t e n t i o n  has s h i f t e d  to  o th e r  games w i t h  f o r c e -  and t h r e a t -  
vu ln erab le  e q u i l i b r i a .  (For o u t l in e s  of  the taxonomy o f  games see ■ 
Rapoport & Guyer, 1966, and Rapoporf,  1967) .
' V  ,
A number of  I n t e r p r e t i v e  problems are assoc ia ted  w i th  mixed-motive  
gaming. F I r s t  o f  a l l ,  does an exper im enta l  game l i k e  Chicken (see 
f o r  example Deutsch & L ew lc k l ,  1970, or  Rapoport & Chammah, 1966) ,  
played f o r  pennies in a l abo ra to ry  a c t u a l l y  captu re  the nsvchtfltoql ca I
essence of  i t s  proto type  olayed on the highway f o r  l i f e ,  and death?’
„ Analogies between-expertmental  environments and ’ r e a l - l ^ f e ’ s i t u a t i o n s  
a re  too o f ten  t a c i t l y  assumed t o  be s t r o n g .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  o p e ra t io n a ­
l i z i n g  concepts l i k e  ' t h r e a t . ' ,  ' t r u s t 1, ' c o o p e r a t i o n 1, ' a l t r u i s m ' ,  and 
' s u s p i c i o n 1 Is not  alone any guarantee t h a t  such d e f i n i t i o n s  are vaTid .
Never the less ,  i t  Is understandable t h a t  mixed-motive behaviour  
appears t o  be.more p s y c h o lo g ic a l ly  i n t e r e s t i n g  than pure c o n f l i c t  s ince
ambiguous and b i f u r c a t e s  In to  I t s  In d iv id u a l  and c o l l e c t i v e  forms.
Thus th e  s i m i l a r  b i f u r c a t i o n  I n ' t h e  exper imenta l  gaming l i t e r a t u r e  between
o f t e n  been viewed as an I n d iv id u a l  problem-so lv in g  t a s k ,  in v o lv in g  the  
rec o g n i t io n  o f  s t o c h a s t i c  p a t t e r n s ,  the g enera t io n  o f  random s e r i e s ,  
sampling,  h y p o t h e s is - t e s t i n g ,  and the r e v is i o n  o f  es t im a tes ;  w h i le
«
In the former the formal concept  o f  ' r a t i o n a l i t y 1 ceases t o  be un-
a c o g n i t i v e  and a so c ia l  emphasis: th e  constant-si im game has most
\
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the non'-constant-sum game has been approached from the p ers p e c t iv e  
o f  in te rp e rso n a l  communication, s o c ia l  I n t e r a c t i o n ,  and c o n f l i c t  
' r e s o lu t io n .
The arqument being made here Is t h a t  I n t u i t i v e  not ions as to  the
psycholog ica l  essence o f  gaming paradigms,  the w id er  Im p l ic a t io n s  of
game behaviour ,  and the ap p ro o r la te  o r i e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  research er ,
may have been formed too h a s t i l y .  P re v io u s ly  constant-sum gaming
experiments have focused on r a t h e r  gross t e s t s  o f  the  ' r a t i o n a l i t y ’
axiom, as I f  game theory  were a c t u a l l y  p r e s c r i p t i v e ,  and n o t  simply
norm at ive .  The present  th es is  Is an at tempt t o  redeem the co n s ta n t -
sum game as a research too l  f o r  ' i n t e r e s t i n g  Psychology' .
S t ra te g y  In a Pure C o n f l i c t  S i t u a t i o n :  the  Two-Person Constant-Sum
Game o f  But ton-Button
1
Simple 2x2 B u t to n -B u t ton ,  named and discussed b r i e f l y  by 
Rapoport ( 1 9 6 6 ) ,  Is e q u i v a l e n t  t o  Matching Pennies (von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1944 ) .  I t  is a f a m i l i a r  c h i l d r e n ' s  game, and Is o f t e n  
played by a du l ts  In o r d e r  to  I n i t i a t e  a l a rg e r  game In the  same manner 
'as the toss in g  o f  a .coin.  The two p layers  a re  H ld er  (H_) and Guesser 
( G ) . H ld e r  conceals a button In one o f  h is  f i s t s ,  and Guesser t r i e s  
t o  guess in which f i s t  the  button Is hidden.  I f  (3 Is c o r r e c t ,  he 
wins and H_ loses;  converse ly ,  1 f G Is wrong, H wins and G loses.
2x2 But ton-But ton  Is represented In e x te n s iv e  form by a t r e e  In 
Figure  I ,  and In norma I form as M a t r i x  2 .  The payoffs are I f o r  a 
win and 0 f o r  a lo s s .







( 1, 0 ) ‘: G w ln s , H I oses
( 0 , 1 ) :  G loses , H wlns
( 0 , 1 ) :  G Io s e s , H wlns
( I ,0 )  : G w in s ,  H loses
The 2x2 But ton-B ut ton Game Tree.
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.• M a t r ix  2
. X
2x2 B ut ton-But ton  In Normal Form
H l d e r ' s  S t ra teg y  
R L




■ The sum o f . t h e  payof fs  In earch outcome is I ,  and t h e r e f o r e  2x2 
Button-Button is a constant-sum game. In t h i s  case there  Is
p e r f e c t  compet i t ion and pure c o n f l i c t  between jH and G. Note also  t h a t
i -
M a t r i x  2 Is symmetric about I t s  d iag o n a l ,  and thus the game appdars 
< »
Id e n t i c a l  to both p la y e rs ;  n e i t h e r  has any s t r a t e g i c  advantage and the  
Dayoffs are equa l .
y Simple 2x2 Button-Button as. described Is a t r i v i a l  game from the
* p o in t  o f  view o f  game t h e o ry ,  and has been presented on ly  tg_J I Iu s t r a f e  
the 4x4 v a r i a n t  t o  be examined p r e s e n t l y .  A c t u a l l y ,  I t  tu rn s  out  t h a t  
4x4 Button-Button w i th  simple payoffs Is  a lso  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  t r i v i a l ,  
but the hypothesis Is  t h a t  I t  Is p s y c h o lo g ic a l ly  more I n t e r e s t i n g .
I f ,  a f t e r  H^concefils th e  but to n ,  he at tempts to  in f lu en ce  (3Ts *
guess by t e l  11 ng G_ wh I ch o f  his f i s t s  to  choose, then the number o f  
s t r a t e g i e s  a v a i l a b l e  to each p la y e r  doubles, and 2x2 But ton-Button  
becomes 4x4 B u t ton-B ut ton .  As shown In Figure 2 ,  H_ makes two conse­
c u t i v e  choices:  where to  hide the  b u t ton ,  and w h at ,a dv ic e  to  g ive
t o  G. G s t i l l  has o n ly  one choice t o  make. r J  '




(1 , 0 ) 
(0, I ) 
( 1, 0 ) 
( 0,1 ) 
(0, I) 
( 1, 0 ) 
(0 ,  I ) 
( 1, 0 )
Ftgure 2.  The 4x4 Button-Button Game Tree.
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In e f f e c t ,  H id er  chooses 'from the fo l l o w in a  4 s t r a t e g i e s  avai lab le  
to him. With TR and TL, H is g iv in g  G t ru e  In fo r m a t io n ,  and with FR 
and FL, H_ Is g iv in g  G f a l s e  in fo rm a t io n .
1. TR: Conceal the button in the r i g h t  f i s t ,  and advise
£  to -guess r i g h t .
v 1
2. FL: Conceal the button in the r i g h t  f i s t ,  anld advise
G to auess l e f t .  „ • \
*  ,
3. TL: Conceal the but ton In the l e f t  f i s t ,  and advise
■ G fo guess l e f t .  /
4. FR: Conceal th e  button in the l e f t  f i s t ,  and advise
G to  guess ri  g h t .
Even though Guesser has only one choice to  make, there  are
4 s t r a t e g i e s  governing t h a t  choice,  2 condi t lonat- '  upon H's adv ice ,  and
2 u n c o n d i t io n a l .  B In d ic a te s  b e l i e f ,  and D in d ic a te s  doubt.
1. B:' Follow H ’s advice.
— V
2 .  D: Guess op posi te t o  what H_ advises.
3. L: Guess l e f t ,  regardless of  H_’ s a dv ic e .
4 .  R: Guess r i g h t ,  regardless  of  H ’ s adv ice .
This v a r i a n t  o f  But ton-But ton In which H_ communl cates wi th  G
in an a t tempt to In f lu e n c e  his guess, l i k e  2x2 B ut ton-Button ,  Is
*
constant-sum and symmetr ic ,  as shown in M a t r i x  3.
M a t r ix  3
4x4 Button-Button In Norma! Form 
• ^
/
H ’ s S t ra tegy
FR TL TR FL
G's S t ra tegy  L 1,0 i',o 0,1 0,1
D 1,0 ; o , i 0,1 1,0
R 0,1 0,1 1,0 ! ,0
B. 0,1 1,0 i.,o .0 ,1
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f  .
J The Mlnlmax Theorem and thfe Concept o f  th e  N a t i o n a l  * and the  
’ S t r i c t l y  R a t i o n a l 1 P la yer
Consider M a t r ix  4 as the  general  form o f  th e  constant-sum game,
a zero-«sum came where Rcw's payoffs are a, b, c,  and d, and Column’ s
correspond Inn payoffs are - a ,  ~b, - c ,  and - d .
M a t r ix  4
*  ♦
The General Form o f  the Two-Person Constant-Sum 2x2 Game
I f  a£  c and b^ d, then Rl Is sa id to  dominate R 2 ,  and I f  - a , >  -b  
and - c > - d ,  then Cl dominates C2. Game theory s t a t e s  t h a t  a ’ r a t i o n a l '  
p la y e r  w i l l  never choose a s t ra te g y  which is dominated by another.
This seems I n t u i t i v e l y  reasonable .
»
I f  a p layer  does not  ha ve a dominat ing s t r a t e g y ,  b u t  h is  opponent
does, then a ’' r a t i o n a l '  p l a y e r  always assumes t h a t  his opponent w i l l
choose t h a t  dominat ing s t r a t e g y ,  and he behaves a c c o rd in g ly .  For
example,  I f  c and b< d, then Row does not  have a dominat ing s t r a t e g y .
o
But I f  In a dd i t io n  -b  j - a ,  and - d > - c ,  then C2 d.oml nates C l ,  and "* •
t h e r e f o r e  a ’ r a t i o n a l ’ Ffow p la y e r  w l I ! always choose R2, assuming t h a t .
Column w i l l  always choose C2. Two ’ r a t i o n a l ’ p lay ers  w i l l  thus end 
• . o
up In the R2C2 outcome on every p l a y .  This a lso  seems s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d .
The more I n t e r e s t i n g  case occurs when n e i t h e r  p la y e r  has a
- a
dominat ing s t r a t e g y .  In t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  the mlnlmax theorem s p e c i f i e s  
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v  w i l l  a.Iways choose t h e i r  s+ra+ea!es so as to Include t h a t  sadd lep o ln t ,  
A, sadd 1 eDol nt  Is- def ined* I f  a .payoff Is both mli9&mal In I t s  row and 
maximal In i t s  column. In M a t r i x  5 f o r  example,  n e i t h e r  p la y e r  has a 
domlnat lncXs^rateay^ b u t - t h e  outcome R2CI Is a s a d d l e p o l n t ,  and
t
t h e r e f o r e  a ' r a t i o n a l '  Row p la y e r  woul-d always choose R2, and a 
' r a t  Iona I ' Co Iumn p 1ayer C l .
M a t r i x  5 * ^
A 3x3 Game with a Saddlepoin t  . *
Co I umn -•
Cl C2 C3
• Rl - 3 10 -4
■ Row R2 -1 - 6 0
f
■ R3 -5 -6 3
The mlnlmax theorem Is obv ious ly  prudent  because i t  assures a
k i
' r a t i o n a l ' p laye r  a payoff  which is the best  of the w ors t  he can^
»
e xp ec t ,  t h a t  i s ,  a guaranteed minimal p a y o f f ,  regardless  o f  what the  
opponent does. In game-Matr lx  5, Row knows the worst he can do is to  
' g e t  a -1 p ay o f f  i f  he chooses R2, and Column cannot do any worse than 
+ 1 I f he chooses Ci . Moreover,  the ' r a t i o n a l ' ,  p la y e r  assumes t h a t  his 
opposent  I s  e q u a l l y • ' r q t l o n a I  1, and t h i s  assumption o f  mutual 
' r a t i o n a l i t y '  forms the basis o f  the mini max theorem.
Now in both 2x2 ( M a t r i x  2) and 4x4 Button-Button ( M a t r i x  3 ) ,
t .
n e i t h e r  H Id e r  nor Guesser fjas a dominat ing s t r a t e g y ,  and th e r e  e x i s t  no 
s a d d le p o l n t s . In t h i s  e v e n t  the mlnlmax theorem d ic t a t e s  a mixed 
s t r a t e g y  which,  l i k e  a pure s a d d le p o ln t  s t r a t e g y ,  guarantees a p la yer
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' a c e r t a i n  ml.nlmal p a y o f f ,  I r r e s p e c t iv e '  o f - t h e  choices made by the  
• o t h e r  p l a y e r .  "’■A mixed s t r a t e g y  s p e d  f l  es the frequency w i th  which
each s t r a t e g y  Is t o  be chosen In the long run.
.. In 2x2 Button-Button the I ntul  t l  ve not l  on -of the aame's s o lu t io n
*■ » ' v; '
coincides w ith  the formal mlnlmax s o l u t i o n . '  I t  stands_to  'reason
t h a t  both H and'G should avoid being p r e d ic t a b le  in thei ' r  choices .
T h ere fo re -b o th  H and _G'ouaht to  choose the r l q h t  and l e f t  f i s t  wi th
the same o v e r a l l  f reauency and in no p a r t i c u l a r  o rd er .  Such a
s t r a t e o y i mlx'ture is' represented as ( R , l )  = ( 1 / 2 ,  1 / 2 ) .  A p la y e r  can
achieve t h i s  mix ture  by toss ing  a . h a i r  co in ,  and thereby guarantee
■ himsel f  a mean payof f  of 1/2^. •
.' ' The mi n i max'theorem comes t o / t h e  same cone! us 1 on mathemati ca 1 ly .
' I f  we s u b s t i t u t e  the .values o f - t h e  payof fs In M a t r ix  2 in t o  t h e ’
general s o l u t io n  of  the 2x2 zero-sum game, we obta in  <R,L)  = < 1 /2 ,  1/2)
*  CR> = d -c
(a d ) - ( b c) ' '
(L)  = d-b:
(a d ) - ( b c) '
A H id er  using t h i s  mix ture  is guaranteed a mean payoff  o f  1 /2 ,  even
1
I f  Guesser always guesses the same hand.. This Is p r e c i s e ! V , ’the counter  
I n t u i t i v e  aspect  o f  the mlnlmax theorem. I f  Guesser is not  ' r a t i o n a l '  
and Is t h e r e f o r e  p r e d l c t a b l e , - t h e n  H ld e r  ought t o .b e  ab le  t o  use t h i s
p r e d i c t a b i l i t y  to  e x p l o i t  Guesser to  h is  own advantage-; b u t  . . a .
1 ' ' * r% . ' 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y ,  H ld e r  does a l l  h is  reasoning by ' In spect ion of  the,game  
*  *
___________________________  . J,  •
^Ana+ol Rapo*port, Two-Person Game Theory,  Ann ■'"Arbor: The U n i v e r s i t y
of . Michigan Press,  1970 , 81.
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matr ix  before the onset  o f  the qame a c t i v i t y 1, and e f f e c t i v e l y  ignores
Guesser’ s ’ I r r a t i o n a l i t y ’ . The ’ s t r i c t l y  r a t i o n a l ’ p la y e r  Is
conserva t iv e  In t h a t  he Is not tempted to  e x p l o i t  over I t e r a t e d  clays  —
an obvious ly  Weak o r  vu ln erab le  opponent.  At the same t im e ,  a
<
’ s t r i c t l y  r a t i o n a l " ’ c I ayer-p r o t e c t s  h im s e l f  from e x p l o i t a t i o n  I f  he 
remains with  a mlnlmax mixture..
Now I t  can be argued t h a t  th e  ’s t r i c t l y  r a t i o n a l ’ p l a y e r  may not  
always maximize his t o t a l  p a y o f fs ,  and t h i s  o b j e c t i o n  would seem to  
be doubly sus ta ined  In the 4x4 game o f  B u t to n -B u t to n .
For both H_ and G, the mlnlmax s o lu t io n  gf  M a t r ix  3 Is a fami ly »■ 
o f  mixtures of the  form ( x , y , x , y ) ,  such t h a t  x+y = 1/2,  and x and y 
are I n d e p e n d e n t T h a t  I s ,  f o r  G, (L)  = (R) = x , , and (0 )  = (B) = y.  For *■
H_, (FR)=(TR) = x ,  a n d ' ( TL )= ( FL) = y .  The on ly  c o n s t r a in t  on both
players  Is t o  avo id  gen era t ing  recogn izab le  choice redundancies t h a t  
can be used to  ' t h e i r  disadvantage by the  I c. opponents.
» l
A prominent  member o f  the. ( x , y , x , y )  fam i ly  may be ( 1 / 4 ,  1 /4 ,  1 /4 ,  
1/4 )  due t o  I t s  .symmetry, A Guesser f o l lo w in g  t h i s  s t ra t e g y  mixture  
would choose L u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y  on 1/4 o f  the p lays ,  R u n c o n d i t io n a l l y  on 
1/4,  would b e l i e v e  H_’s advice on 1 /4 ,  and doubt Ĥ ’ s advice on 1/4 o f  
the p la y s ,  and would do so In a random o r d e r ,  so t h a t  H would not  be 
ab le  to  p r e d i c t  Ĝ’ s next  cho ice .  S i m i l a r l y ,  a ’ s t r i c t l y  r a t i o n a l ’
H ld e r  would randomize th e  p o s i t io n  a t  which he concealed the bu t ton ,
and. would Independent ly randomize between t e l l i n g  the t r u t h  and l y in g .
0  ~
What may be e a s i e r  to  perform, but  Is t h e o r e t i c a l l y  e q u a l ly
e f f e c t i v e .  I s  e i t h e r  ( 0 , 1 / 2 , 0 , I / 2 )  o r  ( 1 / 2 , 0 , 1 / 2 , 0 ) .  Here H always
g ives 'G  the  same a d v ic e ,  but  randomizes" the°co/iceq,lment o f  the  b u t to n .
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Fol lowing ( 0 , 1 / 2 , 0 , 1 / 2 ) ,  G randomizes between b e l i e f  and doubt in H's 
advice.. Fol lowing ( I / 2 , 0 , 1  / 2 , 0 ) , G d isregards H ’ s advice e n t i r e l y  
and randomizes between unco ndit ional  R and L quesses. In e i t h e r  case 
the end r e s u l t  f o r  G Is e q u i v a l e n t ,  as shown by a comparison o f  M a t r i x  
6 wi th  M a t r i x  7; G nets the  same mean p a yo f f  of  1/2 In e i t h e r  case,  
reaard less  of what H_ does.
M a t r ix  6
G's Payoffs Fo l lowing a U / 2 , 0 , 1 / 2 , 0 )  S t ra te g y  Mix ture
H's S t r a t e g ie s
FR TL TR FL
R
G's S t r a t e g i e s
0 0 1 1
L
0
1 1 0 0
M a t r i x  7
G'-s Payoffs Fol lowing a ( 0 , 1 / 2 , 0 , 1 / 2 ) S t r a te g y  Mi
H's. S t r a t e g i  es
FR TL TR FL
B
^G's S t r a te g ie s
0 I ! 0
D I . 0 0 1
Note t h a t  I f  both players fo 1 low el  t h e r  a (0 J / 2 , 0
( ! / 2 , 0 7 l /2",§)  m ix tu r e ,  then the 4x4 game has been e f f e c t i v e l y  reduced
S. ^
t o  th e  2x2 game. Th is Impl ies  t h a t  the a d d i t io n a l  t w i s t  in the 4x4 
game of  having H a dv is e  G which f i s t  t o  choose, Is t h e o r e t i c a l l y  
I r r e l e v a n t .  But I t  may not be so p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y .
Two ' s t r i c t l y  r a t i o n a l '  p layers  In the 4x4 game, having chosen 
t o  fo l low  e i t h e r  the  ( 0 , 1 / 2 , 0 , 1 / 2 )  o r  ’( I / 2 , 0 ,  1 /2 ,0 )  mix ture  In o r d e r  to
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guarantee themselves a'mean payof f  o f  1 /2 ,  arid t o  minimize energy 
expended on In format ion  g en era t io n ,  are In e f f e c t  p la y in g  2x2 Button-  
Button ( M a t r ix  2 ) .  I f  during the  course of p la y ,  o r  a t  the o u t s e t ,  
a ’ r a t i o n a l '  p la y e r  should s u s p e c t - t h a t  his opponent Is ' I r r a t i o n a l ' ,  
then In o rd e r  to  be ’ s t r i c t l y  r a t i o n a l ’ he must, so t o  speak, suppress 
the  temptat ion  to  e x p l o i t  t h a t  ostens lve  ’ I r r a t i o n a l i t y ’ and poss ib ly  
Increase  h is  mean payoff ..  He would remain ’ s t r i c t l y  r a t i o n a l '  in 
. o r d e r  t o  p r o t e c t  h im s e l f  from c o u n t e r - e x p l o i t a t i o n .  Nepenthe I e ss ; the 
4x4 game, by g iv in g  H_the o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  In f luence .  6,  and G the  
o p p o r t u n i t y  to  I n t e r p r e t  t h a t  I n f lu e n c e ,  n a t u r a l l y  Increasest the 
propensity  of  ljpth to dev ia te  from ' s t r i c t  r a t i o n a l i t y ' .
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R e f l e x iv e  Reasoning and R e f l e c t i v e  Control
A p la y e r  who reasons'as I f  h is  opponent were ab le  to  read his
thoughts,  Is sa id  to  be reasoning " r e f l e x l v e l y " i  A physical  analogy,
developed by le f e b v re  ( 1 9 7 1 ) ,  Is t h a t  of a W e s t e r n - s t y le  duel enacted
between a cjunman and his own m i r r o r  Image. Suppose the gunman reasons
*
t h a t  he had b e t t e r  shoot or  be s h o t .  As his face assumes a th r e a te n in g  
express ion ,  his opponent's does l i k e w i s e .  As he lowers his gun and 
turns away, the o th e r  does the same. As he ra ised  h is  gun q u i c k l y ,  
he sees h is  opponent draw a t  th e  same moment. Each t im e  th e  gunman 
t r i e s  to  fool or  o u t w i t  h is  o p p o s i te ,  he sees h is  every scheme
V
synchronously r e f l e c t e d .  Moreover,  a p la y e r  who assumes t h a t  his  
opponent 's c o g n i t i v e  processes,  competence, and c a p a b i l i t i e s  are  
p r e c ls e ty  the  same as his own, one who reasons before  a m i r r o r ,  f inds  
t h a t  r e f l e x i v e  reasoning cont inues I n d e f i n i t e l y  and gets him nowhere.
U l t i m a t e l y ,  a ' s t r i c t l y  r a t i o n a l '  p la y e r  concludes- t h a t  the  
b e s t  he can do Is to  n e u t r a l i z e  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  his opponent 's  ' a 1 I — 
seeing e y e ' ,  by p lay in g  far such a way t h a t  the opponent can perceive  
n o th in g .  Thus r e f l e x i v e  reasoning i n t u i t i v e l y  leads o n e - d i r e c t t y  to  
the mlnlmax p r i n c i p l e .  As Lefebvre  put  I t ,  " . . . t h e  o p e r a t o r  g iv in g  
r i s e  t o  the maximum p r i n c i p l e  Is a s pec ia l  form o f  s e l f -c o n s c io u s n e s s ."  
One reasons t h a t  one should d is c o n t in u e  reasoning a l t o g e t h e r ,  and 
play In a randomized fash ion which cannot be a n t i c i p a t e d  o r  e x p l o i t e d .
' " In a c h e  govorya,  o p e r a t o r ,  porozhdayushch11 p r l n t s l o  maksmlna, 
y a v ly a y e ts y a  osobol formol samosoznanlya." V.A.  L e fe b v re ,  "Formalny!  
metod Iss le dovan la  re f le k s lv n y k h  pro+sessov,"  Voprosy F l l o s o f l l ,  1971, 
9 ,  p. 108, t r a n s .  by Anatol  Rapoport ,  "A Formal Method o f  I n v e s t ig a t in g  
R e f l e c t i v e  Processes, "  Genera I Systems, 1972, X V I I ,  pp. 181-188.
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Such a s e l f -c o n s c io u s  ’ r a t i o n a l '  s t ra tegy '  mixture is not  u n l ik e  
the  behaviour jof th.e paranoiac ,  in.  the sense t h a t  I t  is a r i g i d ,  s t a t i c  
heurl  s t l  c wh I ch ter^ds t o  r e s i s t  e m p ir ica l  r e f u t a t i o n .  The imputat ion  
o f  ’ r a t i o n a l i t y ’ in to  a n ro je c ted  r e p r e s e n ta t io n  of  one’ s opponent.
In th e  s e r v i c e  o f  s e t f - p r e s e r v a t i o n ,  may o r  may not  be a v a l i d  pro­
cedure.  For i n v u l n e r a b i l i t y  is o f te n  achieved a t  the cos t  o f  d e lu s io n .
The ’ r a t i o n a l ’ p l a y e r  f o l lo w in g  the minimax theorem Is a c t u a l l y  
p la y in g  a g a in s t  h i m s e l f . ’
A c r i t i c i s m  o f ‘game theory  is not  the In t e n t i o n  here .  I t  is 
p r i m a r i l y  th e  concept  o f  ’ r a t i o n a l i t y ’ In o rd in a r y  language t h a t  
f a i l s  one a t  t h i s  p o i n t .  By making success ive samples o f  th e  choice  
behaviour  o f  an opponent,  w it h  a view t o  inducing h is  s t r a t e g y  mix ture  
and thereby co n s t ru c t in g  the  most e f f e c t i v e  c o t m t e r - i t r a t e g y , r a t h e r  
than by a s t a t i c  process of  deduct ion,  one might  succeed In exceeding  
the mlnlmax vatue o f  a game. C u r i o u s l y ,  i f  on e ’ s opponent happens 
t o  be ’ s t r i c t l y  r a t i o n a l ’ no r i s k  Is invo lved  In such a procedure.
But I f  o n e ’ s opponent Is not  ’ s t r i c t l y  r a t i o n a l . ’ , one might  p r o f i t  ^
by a more adventurous ’ i r r a t i o n a l ’ a t t a c k .  The p o in t  Is t h a t  th e  
mlnlmax p r i n c i p l e  Is b l i n d ,  dem ocra t ic ,  and u I t r a - c o n s e r v a t h v e .  In 
a symmetric game I t  cannot be e x p l o i t e d ,  bu t  by the same token i t  
cannot e x p w e a k n e s s  because i t  does not  perce ive  i t ;  I t  s e t t l e s  
f o r  a guaranteed minimal p a y o f f ,  and t r e a t s  a l lop p o n en ts  as equa l .
In the e m p ir ic a l  w o r ld ,  as opposed to  the world o f  the game- 
t h e o r l s t ,  I f  t h e  u t i l i t y  o f  w inn ing  under u n c e r t a in t y  outweighs the  
d i s u t i l i t y  o f  los ing under u n c e r t i f i n t y , o f t e n  s t r a t e g i e s  are adopted 
which a t tempt t o  overcome'the shortcomings o f  ’ s t r i c t  r a t i o n a l i t y '  and 
the mlnlmax p r i n c i p l e .
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The Idea o f  r e f l e c t i v e  cont ro l  I s ,  as Lefebvre put  I t ,  to  
I n s e r t  a f a l s e  r e p r e s e n t a t io n  o f  one’ s own s t r a t e g y  In to  the mind 
of  one's opponent, In o rder  t o  fo rce  him t o  make a c e r t a i n  choice  
v o l u n t a r i l y .  I t  t a c i t l y  r e l i e s  upon the opponent 's  ' I r r a t i o n a l '  
tendency  to  d e v ia te  from a ' s t r i c t l y  ra t io n a l - '  s t r a t e g y  In o r d e r  to  
e x p l o i t  his os ten s lve  weakness. The a d j e c t i v e  " r e f l e c t i v e "  I s  used 
to  Imply the t ransmission o f  an Image o r  r e p re s e n t a t io n  designed to  
compete w i th  the  ' r a t i o n a l '  opponent's p ro je c te d  Image o f  ' r a t i o n a l i t y '  
achieved through r e f l e x i v e  reasoning .
To be sure ,  r e f l e c t i v e  control  is a common enough t a c t i c ,  among 
humans, an im als ,  even p l a n t s .  I t  Is employed In I t s  most complex 
forms In p a r lo u r  game's, f i g h t s ,  wars,  competit ions- ,  as we I I as In the 
marketplace.  We know I t  roughly as the b l u f f ,  t a c t i c a l  s a c r i f i c e ,  
o r  decoy. I t  can be both a defensive  measure, as In 'p la y in g  possum',  
and an o f fe n s iv e  ploy (a prawn to  catch a w h a le ) ,  but  Is not r e s t r i c t e d  
 ̂ t o  pure c o n f l i c t  s i t u a t i o n s .  I t  might be s a id  t h a t  f lowers  r e f l e c t i v e l y
contro l  bees In a co o rd in a t io n  game o f  f e r t i l i z a t i o n  and honey, where 
payo f fs are  In po l len  and n e c t a r .  And In a mixed-motive game such 
as 'P r is o n e r 's  Dilemma, seemingly ' c o o p e r a t i v e '  behaviour may be in  
th e  s e r v ic e  o f  subsequent control  and e x p l o i t a t i o n .  Al l  considered,  
th e  u n i l a t e r a l  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  ' c o o p e ra t io n '  as c o n s t ru c t iv e  would 
seem t o  be n a iv e .  What appears t o  be ' c o o p e r a t io n '  in the a n a lys is  
of  choice p ro to c a ls  may be a c a lc u la t e d  a t te m p t  t o  I n s e r t  a bene­
v o le n t  rep re s e n ta t io n  In t o  the opponen^™ C l e a r l y ,  one need not  feel  
compelled to  I n t e r p r e t  th e  f r e q u e n t l y  observed Increa^a  in  'c o o p e r a t iv e  
responses'  (Rapoport  & Chammah, I 9 6 5 ) / a s  o r i g i n a t i n g  In any pure
I
'c o o p e ra t iv e  m o t iv e ’ working w i t h i n  I n d i v i d u a l s .
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1n *fhe human worfd a vague d i s t i n c t i o n  needs to  be made between
o v e r t  and co v e r t  r e f l e c t i v e  c o n t r o l ,  a l though the two may be adopted 
a t  the same t im e .  In a 2x2 game o f  B u t ton -B u t to n  where no o v e r t  
'communication Is a l lo w ed ,  H lder  may conceal the  button In the r i g h t  
hand f i v e  t imes In a rdW and switch t o  the l e f t  on the s i x t h  play I f  
h e - t h ln k s  t h a t  Guesser w i l l  a n t l c l D a t e  a r i g h t  c o n t in u a t i o n .  Gues^er^ 
may pre tend to  be foo led  b y ' H l d e r ' s  ploy on the s i x t h  p l a y ,  and on 
the seventh begin to  guess l e f t .  V e r b a l ly  such complex t a c t i c s  are  
d i f f i c u l t  to  d escr ib e ,  and are d i f f i c u l t  t o  co n cep tu a l i ze  beyond a 
sha l low depth.  In any case,  I f  a p l a y e r  uses the sequent ia l  s t r u c t u r e  
of  his choices In a 2x2 game o f  B u t to n -B u t to n ,  then t h i s  Is co ver t  
r e f l e c t i v e  c o n t r o l ,  ’ th rough- the-gam e* so to speak.  The most o v e r t  
and a b s t r a c t  form o f  r e f l e c t i v e  contro l  Is accomplished ' t h r o u g h - t h e -  
wor.l-d', by the man ipula t ion  o f  l i n g u i s t i c  symbols. We may I n t e r p r e t  
some pro p o s i t ion s  as t h r e a t s ,  but  the  a d v e r t i s in g  Industry  has shown 
t h a t  t h r e a t s  are not  e s s e n t i a l  to  c o n t r o l . The consumer can be 
convinced benignly t h a t  the q u a l i t y  of  h is  l i f e  wi l l" be enhanced I f  
he spends h is  money In c e r t a i n  ways.
The 4x4 v a r i a n t  o f  B utton-Button  In v e s t i g a t e d  In the present  
study represents an In te rm ed ia te  s i t u a t i o n .  T h e o r e t i c a l l y ,  jd's 
o v e r t  in f lu e n c e  over  G, and both p la y e r s '  c o v e r t  c o u n t e r - In f lu e n c e ,  
have been shown t o  be I r r e l e v a n t  In terms of  th e  payoff  m a t r i x .  The 
' s t r i c t l y  r a t i o n a l '  p l a y e r  refuses  t o  respond t o  e i t h e r  form of
N
r e f l e c t i v e  c o n t r o l .  N e v e r th e le s s ,  th e  hypothesis  Is t h a t  real  p la yers  < 
w i l l  not  be ab le  t o  Ignore  the  I r r e l e v a n t  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  given them.
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Lefebvre provides an a l g e b r a i c  forma 11 z a t  I onh>f r e f l e c t i v e  
systems, t h e i r  s t r u c t u r e ,  and e v o l u t i o n .  But what  Is p s y c h o lo g ic a l ly  
more s i g n i f i c a n t  Is the f a c t  t h a t  I n . c e r t a i n  lab o ra to ry  s i t u a t i o n s ,  
f i x e d  r e f l e c t i v e  contro l  s t r a t e g i e s  have been e m p i r i c a l l y  determined  
to  be more e f f e c t i v e .  In terms o f  t o t a l  p a y o f f s ,  than ’ s t r i c t l y  
r a t i o n a l '  s t r a t e g i e s .  IrK^one exper iment C I96 9 ) ,  Lofebvre's subjects  
encountered a l i g h t  which began a t  the  c e n t r e  and was a b le  t o  move 
from node to  node o f  the maze-1 Ike s t r u c t u r e  shown In Figure 3.  
Subjects were t o l d  t h a t  the movements o f  the l i g h t  were c o n t r o l l e d  
by a th in k in g  machine or /automaton o f  an u n sp ec if ie d  n a t u r e .  The 
automaton's goal was t o  reach one o f  th e  maze's e x i s t s ;  and the  
s u b j e c t ' s  task  was t o  keep the automaton in the maze f o \^ a p )  l e a s t  15 
o f  i t s  moves. Subjects t r i e d  t o  In f lu e n c e  the automaton by adv is in g  
i t  which node t o  move t o  a t  each o f  I t s  choice p o in t s .  The behaviour  
o f  the l i g h t  In the  maze was.ieCtua11y determined by th e  advice given  
I t ,  f o r  the automaton,  c a l l e d  a " d r l b l l n g ' '  by Le febvre ,  was a 
r e f l e c t i v e  contro l  h e u r i s t i c  de f ined  in terms o f  obedience and d i s ­
obedience.  ( corresponding t o  G's B and D s t r a t e g i e s  In 4x4 But ton-  
B u t t o n ) .  By s im u l a t i n g  obedience and disobedience f o r  a few p la y s ,  
t h e  d r l b l l n g  In s e r te d  I n t o  the s u b j e c t ' s  mind a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . I t  
turned o u t  t h a t  such r e p re s e n ta t io n s  had p r e d i c t a b l e  e f f e c t s  on the
(
s u b j e c t ' s  behav iour,  and th e  d r l b l l n g  thus r e f l e c t i v e l y  c o n t r o l l e d
the s u b j e c t ' s  ad v ic e .  For example, I f  the d r l b l l n g  does as I t  Is
>
t o l d  f o r  5 p lays ,  the  s u b j e c t  n a t u r a l l y  begins to  t e l l  I t  to  move 
towards the cen t re  o f  the maze. But  a t  t h a t  p o i n t ,  the d r l b l l n g  
disobeys I t s  In s t r u c t i o n s  and t h e r e f o r e  progresses towards an e x i t .
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Figure 3. Labyrinth Structure Employed by Lefebvre (1 9 6 9 ) . ’
\
I Taken from V, A. Lefebvre, "Ustrolstva optimlzlruyushch\e. svoyu 
rabotu v rezu l ta t le  protlvodelstvtya cheloveka," (Devices that  optimize 
as a result  of opposing Interference' by- man), Froblemy Evrlst lk l  
(Problems of Heur ist ics ) ,  1969, pp. 243-254.
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When the s u b je c t  catches on, t h a t  Is ,  when he has formed a 
re p re s e n ta t io n  o f  disobedience,  he begins t o  be t r u t h f u l  a g a in .  But  
a t  t h i s  p o in t  the d r l b l l n g  switches back t o  obedience.
The currmu 1 a t l  ve e f f e c t  of  th e  d r ib  l i n g ' s  r e f l e c t i v e  contro l  
h e u r i s t i c  Is t h a t  the  11.ght In the maze succeeds In reaching an e x i t  
when a human s u b je c t  Is t r y i n g  t o  prevent  I t  from doing so In s i g ­
n i f i c a n t l y  fewer moves than I f  I t  takes  a random w a lk .  Lefebvre  
concluded t h a t  s ince  s t r u c t u r a l l y  s i m i l a r  d r t b l l n g s  were successful  
w ith  human In t e r f e r e n c e  In a-number o f  contexts (Lepsky, 1969;
Le febvre ,  1967, 1969; Baranov & Tru do l!ubov ,  1969a, 1969b) ,  t h a t  
human players  d e v ia t e  from ’ s t r i c t l y  r a t i o n a l ’ s t r a t e g y  mix tures  in  
c e r t a i n  system atic fash ions .
Generat ing  and Processing S t a t i s t i c a l  and Semantic Inform at ion
%
In I n f o r m a t i o n - t h e o r e t i c  terms,  a ' s t r i c t l y  r a t i o n a l ’ p laye r  of
4x4 B ut ton-But to n*generates  the maximum amount o f  s t a t i s t i c a l
in form at io n  the message s e t  a l low s .  Conversely,  by doing so he
* \
generates a minimal amount o f  s t a t i s t i c a l  redundancy, f o r  redundancy 
means p r e d i c t a b i l i t y . '  In o th er  words, he t e l l s  h is  opponent as l i t t l e  
as pos s ib le  about h is  own s t r a t e g y ;  hence, the semantic component o f  
his  t ransmission  Is sa id  to  be minimal .
An ’ I r r a t i o n a l ’ d r l b l l n g ,  on the o t h e r  hand, in an a t tem p t  to  
gain more than th e  mlnlmax value o f  th e  game, does not  o u tp u t  the  
l e a s t  semantic In form at io n  and the most s t a t i s t i c a l  In fo r m a t io n ,  but  
generates some excees redundancy, c a l c u l a t e d  to t r a n s m i t  an Image 
or rep re sen ta t io n  o f  I t s e l f .
*
#■
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THere e x is t s  a pood deal o f  eyl dence t h a t  a ' a r ^ I q t l y  r a t i o n a l ' ,  
sei  f -conscfous p la y e r  w i l l  have his d i f f i c u l t i e s  genera t in g  s t a t i s t i ­
cal in format ion to  randomize as the mlnlmax p r i n c i p l e  d i c t a t e s .  People 
produce pat terned  redundancies when d e l i b e r a t e l y  In s t r u c te d  to  
randomize; they generate too many s h o r t  a l t e r n a t i o n s ,  not  enough long 
runs,  avoid repeated p a i r s  and t r i p l e t s ,  and re p e a t  sequences o f  s i x ,  
'Seven, and e i g h t  a t  long I n t e r v a l s .  (Bakan, I960;  Wagenaar, 1970; 
Chapanls,  1953; Goodfel low,  19*41; L inco ln  5, A lexander ,  1955) .  Moreover,  
whether as a r e s u l t  of pre-eSs^erlmentaI learned b i a s ,  as po s tu la ted  by 
Estes ( 1 9 6 4 ) ,  or as an " i n t e l l e c t u a l  response",  (Edwards, 1961) , In 
probab 1 I I t y - ! e a r n l  na s i t u a t i o n s ,  sub jec ts  have manifested both p o s i t i v e  
and negat ive  recency e f f e c t s . '  ( J a r v l k ,  1951; Edwards, 1961; Edwards &
Llndman, 1961; Feldman, 1959; Derks, 1962; Anderson & Whalen, I960;
*
W i t t e ,  1964) .  %
Othej^wlse known as th e  "gambler 's  f a l l a c y " ,  negat ive recency 
seems t o  be a r a t h e r  evanescent  phenomenon; but  might  be exoected t o  
a r i s e  In a gaming s i t u a t i o n .  A p la y e r  might  no t  expect  h is  opponent 
to  produce long s t r i n g s  of the same move, and would generate too" j
many a l t e r n a t i o n s  and s h o r t  runs I f  he were t r y i n g  t o  avoid an t i  c l p a -  
t l  on.
As e a r l y  as 1938, Goodfel low noted In connect ion with p r o b a b i l i t y -  
l ea rn in g  s tud ie s  t h a t  th e re  were d e f i n i t e  s eq u en t ia l  dependencies In 
a s e r i e s  o f  guesses. There was a tendency t o  avoid symmetrical  
arrangements In fa vo u r  o f  asymmetr ical  ones.  There are a lso  preferences  
In guesses o f  ou'tcomes In a ser ies  o f  coin tosses (Goodfel low,  1940) ,  
and systematic  p a t te r n s  o f  choices In s i n g l e  p lays  o f  two-person games 
(Guyer & Rapoport ,  1972) .
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Now cons.ider the task  of  the ' n o t - s t r l c t l y - r a t l o n a t ' but  
' s c i e n t i f i c 1 p l a y e r  who attempts to  observe his opponent 's  react io ns  
t o  s t i m u l i ,  In o rd er  to dev ise  the opt imal  c o u n t e r - s t r a t e g y ,  This  
s o r t  o f  e n t e r p r i s e  Involves  seq u en t ia l  samp 11nq end h y oothes ls -  
t e s t l n q  c y c l e s .
Tversky & Kahneman ( 1 9 7 1 ) ,  with a se r ie s  of quest ions about the
*  ■-
re I a t l  ve-* I I ke 11 hood o f  c e r t a i n  random samples taken from qlven popu­
la t i o n s ,  I s o la t e d  sys tem at ic  misconcept ions and e r ro r s  which c o l l e c ­
t i v e l y  comortse b e l i e f  In the "law o f  small numbers". Subjects saw
e r r o rs  as c a n c e l l in g  r a t h e r  than d i l u t i n g ,  showed exaggerated
• 1
confidence In the  v a l i d i t y  o f  conclusions d er iv ed  from small samples,
In the s t a b i l i t y  of observed p a t t e r n s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  In e a r l y  t r i a l s ,  
and a p re d is p o s i t io n  to  f in d  causal exp lan a t ion s  fo r  d iscrepancies In 
' l i e u  of a sampling var ia nce  e x p la n a t io n .  Using a s i m i l a r  procedure,
Kahneman & Tversky (1972)  noted t h a t  the pr imary fea tures of the
s u b je c t i v e  concept  o f  randomness seem to  be I r r e g u l a r i t y ,  local
r e p rese n ta t iv en ess ,  and absence of sy s tem a t ic  p a t t e r n s .  People a lso  
seem t o  b e l ie v e  t h a t  samples always r e f l e c t  in d e t a i l  the  fe a tu res  
o f  the  popula t ions th ey  represent  (Tversky & Kahneman, 1972) .
F i n a l l y ,  th e re  seems to  be a fundamental law o f  co g n i t io n  t h a t  
once a hypothesis has been developed about an e x i s t e n t i a l  cont ingency,  
^^S o n f  1 rmlnq instances are sought a f t e r  and d lsconf  1 rnunq Instances
^Ignored. T h is  a t t i t u d e ,  one employing p o s i t i v e  feedback known as
.  J  .
the " s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g  prophecy"*, Is fo rm a l ly  in d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  from
the mechanisms o f  c l i n i c a l  parano ia ,  and leads to ex tremely  baroque
delusions In the s im p le s t  experimental  paradigms w i th  'n orm al '  s u b jec ts .
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This s o r t  of  r i p i d i + y  Is not  e a s M y  dtssoived by Increases In 
I n c e n t iv e s ,  nor do In s t r u c t io n s  e f f e c t i v e l y ,  moderatef I t  (Hake &
. /  ,
Hyman, 19.53; Feldman, 1963; Dulany,  1961; Y e l l o t t ,  1969; M i l l e r , /  1967;
’  '  ' /  ■'
*Wason, 1960, I968> 1969; Goodnow & Postman, 1955; Via son & Johnson-  
L a l r d ,  1972; Go'odw'fn- & Wapon, 1972) .  * ,
c» .
.* V
AM In a,I I , from a p u r e ly  formal p o in t  of v iew,  I t  seems "that
/  •
•
ordinary'human beings are.  11 l -equ i  pped f o r  I t e r a t e d  plays o f  even' .the
- . : ■ 
s lm n les t  zero-sum game w i th o u t  a s a d d le p o ln t .  However, I n t e r p r e t i n g
th e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  d e v ia t io n s  from ' r a t i o n a l i t y '  Is not' such a
/
»■* * • 
s t r a  I ght forward m at te r .  ^
• The-'I n te rp re ta t lo 'n  of Choice Behaviour
O • .
. A b s t r a c t  mathematical  t h e o r ie s  are  o f te n  In sp ired  by some
m a te r ia l  prob lem .of appl.i c a t i o n . Just  as the theory of p r o b a b i l i t y /
•H * . ' ■ • .  ‘ , /  ;
•developed o u t  o f  the  co n tex t  o f  gambling and b e t t i n g ,  so. game theory  j.
I  /
has i t s  o r i g i n s  In' the study o f  .the io a tca l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  ' r a t i o n a l '  }
' / . t
cogf 1 i c t .  w j
‘ /
When a purely deduct ive  t h e o r y - i s  . ' t e s t e d '  by soc ia l  s c i e n t i s t s  /
.a s  I f  I t  were a model o f  human Derformance,  the tendency Is to  examine
' *  ' L
only  the 'goodness o f  f i t ’ betwe6n the model's p r e d i c t io n s  and ' . th e '
t  • ,  ■
data,  t r e a t i n g  such 'goodness' I f  I t  be found, as conf irm atory  
evidence In favour o f  the  th e o r y .  Often what Is  neg lected  Is a ' ^
co n s id e ra t io n  o f  the number and the s i m p l i c i t y  o f  necessary axioms
/
' a model Is based upon, By I t s e l f ,  a 'good f i t '  >is no demonstrat ion
* *  ' !■
/ ’ • •
o f  th e  psychological  r e a l i t y  o f  a model, espec ia l . ly  when t h i s  f i t
r e l i e s  upon the a d ju s tm e n t 'o f  severa l  u n i n t e r p r e t a b l e  parameters.  The
I:
real  usefu lness  o f  a mathematical  model Is I t s  h e u r i s t i c  v a lu e ,  measured
i;/
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by the  number and meanlnafulness o f  th e  quest ions I t - g e n e r a t e s . 
■Conf-lrmaTl on belongs In th e  background,  not  the  foreground of  
I n v e s t i g a t i o n .  ' '
For example,  th e re  Is an ex te n s iv e  l i t e r a t u r e  devoted t o  the
J*-
quest ion o f  how naive subjects re v is e  t h e i r  p r o b a b i l i s t i c  est imates  
In a sImp Ie Bayes 1 an paradlgm Cpu11 Ing co loured b a l l s  out  o f  an urn) .  
Most experiments have repor ted s i m i l a r  r e s u l t s ,  t h a t  re v is io n s  are  
In the d i r e c t i o n  p rescr ib ed  by the Bayesian model,  but  are sluggish  
(Pe te rso n ,  e t  a I , ,  1965, 1967; P h i l i p s  & Edwards, 1966; Wendt, 1969) .  
Bayes!ans consider these f ind ings  as evidence  of  conservat ism. But .  
as Tversky & Kahneman (1971)  p o in t  o u t ,  re v is io n s  seem to  be based ^ - 
'upon d i f f e r e n c e s  between f r e q u e n c ie s . encountered In a sample, and not
a t  a l l  upon the proport ions of  those f re q u en c ies .  Bayesian theory
x  -\
Is based .upon ssmple proport ions and not  sample d i f f e r e n c e .  T h ere fo re ,  
in the don t e x t  o f  th e  Bayesian model, even t'hough the gross r e s u l ts  
conf irm t h a t  s u b je c ts  were fundamental ly  Bayesian,  founding r e v is io n s  
upon sam pl§^d lf fe rence  cannot be-cons Idered  c o n s e rv a t iv e .  The p o in t  
Is t h a t  the 's lu gg ish  Bayesian'  Is more probably a l t o g e t h e r  non-  
"• Bayesian,  and the c o g n i t i v e  processes governing the r e v is io n  o f  
•es t im ates  under the  weight  o f  sequent ia l  sampling may w e l l  be based 
upon h e u r i s t i c s  q u a l i t a t i v e l y  d i f f e r e n t  from those governing Ba'^esjflan 
s t a t l  s t l  cs . ^
I n v e s t ig a t io n s  I n t o j f h e  psycho I ogl ca(l r e a l i t y  o f  the  concept  
o f  c o r r e l a t i o n  between v a r ia b le s  lead to  s i m i l a r  conc lusions .  Irf 
g e n e ra l ,  the I n t u i t i v e  not io n  o f  c o r r e l a t i o n  Is not  e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t  
from the mathematical f o r m u la t io n ;  b u t  In d e t a i l ,  the I n t u i t i v e
V
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percept ion  o f  c o r *« ^ a t io n  has been found to  depend on mostly p o s i t i v e  
Instances of p a i rs  o f  Events,  and not  negat ive  ones, where n e i t h e r  
event  occurs (Jenkins & Ward, 1965; Smedslund, 1963) , I t  has 
a lso  been' demonstrated t h a t  p r e - e x i s t i n g  verbal  assoc ia t io ns  and 
h ab itua l  biases st rong ly "Inf 1 uence the percept ion  o f  corre  I a t l  ons (by 
making. pfSnfl rmlng Instances of f a m i l i a r  c o r r e l a t i o n s  appear more 
promlnent  "than Instances of  unexpected c o r r e l a t i o n s  (Chapman, 1967) .  
What Is o f  psychologica l  . I n t e r e s t  a re  the poss ible determinants  
' o f  the f in e  s t r u c t u r e  of  d e v ia t io n s  away from a model's p r e d i c t i o n s .  
When behaviour Is t r e a t e d  u n i l a t e r a l l y  as performance measured .agalnst  
a s in g l e  c r i t e r i o n  o f  o p t Im a 1 1 t y , - the  r e s u l t s  are r a r e l y  ,e n I Ig h te n ln a .  
U n f o r t u n a t e ly ,  t h i s  Is somewhat ' the case w i th  previous s tu d ie s  o f  
cho'lce behaviour-  In two-person donstant-sum games. ■
I n ' a ^ x 2 ,  and In 3x3 zero-sum games with unique S a d d le p o ln ts , 
Lleberman ( I 9 6 0 ) , ,  and Scodel (1961) found t h a t  sub-Jects tended t o  y
choose s t r a t e g i e s  co n ta in in g  those s a d d l e p o ln t s . P lay lnq  a g a in s t  a
j
programmed ' r a t i o n a I ' ^ s t r a t e g y  In a 3x3 game, sub jects  learned to
choose t h e i r  mlnlmax s t r a t e g y  c o n s is t e n t l y  a f t e r  150 p lays ,  (Brayer ,
1964) .  However, a study-.by Morin ( I 9 6 0 )  showed t h a t ,  In e 2x2 game,
* •
subjects responded to ^ fve  mean p a y o f f  assoc ia ted  w ith  each s t r a t e g y ,  
and were o b l iv io u s  t o  the mlnlmax p r i n c i p l e .
The r e s u l t s  of  s tu d ie s  o f  zero-sum games w i th o u t  saddtepolnts  
a re  a ls o  mixed. P lay in g  100 t r i a l s  o f  a 2x2 game ag a in s t  a ' r a t i o n a l '  
mlnlmax programme, sub jects  did not  respond .with  t h e i r  mlnlmax 
s t r a t e g y  m ix ture  (Lleberman, 1962) .  In 200 plays of  the  same game 
between bona t \ d e  s u b je c t s ,  o n ly  10 o f  18 had approximated the  mlnlmax
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m ixture  In t h e j a s t  100 plays (Malcolm & Ll.berman, 1965) , S i m i l a r -  
r e s u l t s  were obtained  f o r  p layers  In a 3x3 game aga in s t  a programmed 
opponent (Messlck,  1967) .  In a 2x2 game, Kaufman & Becker (1961) had 
sub jects  spec i fy  o v e r a l l  proport ions  of choices f o r  100 plays a t  a 
t ime.  T h e i r  opponent, the exper imenter  In t h i s  case,  subsequently  
chose his s t r a t e g y  m ix tu re  In o rder  to  take  maximum advantage of  the 
s u b j e c t ' s  d e v ia t io n  from ’ r a t i o n a l i t y ' .  Across games of  50 plays  
each,  the propor t io n  o f  subjects using opt imal  mixtures  Increased  
from 10^ to  65?°. . In t h i s  format ,  the tendency towards the mimlmax 
p r e s c r ip t io n  might be I n t e r p r e t e d  as a r e l a t i v e l y  simple learn in g  
e f f e c t .  The f a c t  t h a t ,  In the s tud ies  reported  by Lleberman ( 1 962 ) ,  
Malcolm & Llberman (1 9 6 5 ) ,  and Messlck ( 1 9 6 7 ) ,  sub jects  did not  respond,- 
to  a mlnlmax programme w it h  t h e i r  own mlnlmax s t r a t e g y  m ix t u r e ,  Is 
also not s u r p r i z in g  from a lea rn in g  p ers p e c t iv e  since these Su b je c ts '  
payoffs were,  In e f f e c t ,  u n re la ted  to  t h e i r  own choices .  For i f  one  ̂
p la y e r  Is ' r a t i o n a l ' ,  he n e u t r a l i z e s  the p la y  o f  .the o t h e r -
,,
However, In a more recent  ser ies  of  experiments by Fox ( 19 72 ) ,
Fox & Guyer (1 9 7 3 ) ,  and Kahan & Goehrlng ( 1 9 7 3 ) ,  subjects  p la y in g  a 
2x2 game a g a in s t  a programme did approach t h e i r  own mlnlmax s t ra t e g y  
m ix tu re .  Furthermore,  they learned to  e x p l o i t  an ' i r r a t i o n a l '  opponent,  
programmed t o  depart  from the mini max p r e s c r i p t i o n .
No ob^ecvable p a t t e r n  emerges in the r e s u i t s  of the c i t e d  z e r o -
\  t h a t  ch<
gaming ex j e r lm e n t s ,  taken as a whole.  Roughly, they In d i c a t e  
hoice behaviour in zero-sum games, as we might  expect .  Is 
n e i t h e r  e n t i r e l y  o u t  of  l in e  w i t h ,  nor does I t  fo l lo w  with  any 
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t h a t  p layers In b o t h  Lieberman's CI962) and  M a l g o l m  & L i e b e r m a n ' s  
(19.65) e x p e r l - m e n t ,  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e y  w e re  t r y i n g  t o  i s o l a t e  p a t t e r n s  
In t h e i r  O D p on en ts ’ p l a y ,  and r e s p o n d  t o  t h o s e  p a t t e r n s  o p t i m a l l y .
They v?ere behaving as I f  the  game were a t e s t  o f  p a t te rn - re c o g n I  t l o n ,  
p rob lem -so lv in g ,  o r  a b a t t l e  o f  w i t s .  In one o f  Messlcks'  condi t ions  
( 1 9 6 7 ) ,  when the .programme's choices were determined by the su b je c ts '  
choices on the previous p l a y ,  most subjec ts  recognI z e d / t h e  I n t e r ­
dependence and responded w i th  the opt imal  coun te r -s t j / 'a te g y , thereby  
Increas ing  t h e i r  payoffs above the mlnlmax va lue  o f  th e  game.
What makes f u r t h e r  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  d i f f i c u l t  is th e  f a c t  t h a t  
methodologies In these'gamlng s tud ies  d l f f e / e d  In severa l  respects:  
p ayof f  s t r u c t u r e s ,  game m a t r i c e s ,  form ats,  I n s t r u c t i o n s ,  a n d , feedback.  
The problem l ^ t h a t  previous r e s e a r c h e r s . t a c i  t l y  assumed . that  the  
most d e t e r m i n i s t i c  fea tu res  o f  games are embedded in the game p a ra ­
meters themselves.  A hypothesis to  the e f f e c t  t h a t  choices In pure 
c o n f l i c t  s i t u a t i o n s  can bes t  be understood by re fe rence  t o  the- .wider  
and deeper, game environment,  what Lefebvre (19 ? I)  c a l l s  the "arena
»
of  I n t e r a c t i o n " ,  in c lu d in g  the  p l a y e r s ’ dynamic rep resen ta t io n s  of-  
each o t h e r ,  has not  y e t  been t e s t e d  e m p i r i c a l l y  In the context  o f
%
simple constant-sum games. The reason f o r  t h i s ,  s ta te d  a t  the
beginning  o f  t h i s  s e c t i o n ,  Is t h a t  researchers have been preoccupied
wit h  t e s t i n g  zero-sum game theory  as i f  I t  were on ly  a model f o r
p r e d i c t i n g  ’ r a t i o n a l ’ choice bbhav Iour .
*
And presumably because th e r e  is some S t r u c t u r a l  s i m i l a r i t y  between 
the  two paradigms, at tem pts have been made to'sa n a lyze  game s i t u a t io n s
v \
in terms o f  s t a t i s t i c a l  lea rn in g  th eo ry .  Game theory  addresses I t s e l f
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s p e c i f i c a l l y  to  in te rp erso n a l  c o n f l i c t ,  and even though th e  r e s u l t s  
of  p r o b a b i l i t y  learning  s tu d ies  dc^bear upon issues in the  psychology 
of  games, when the c o n f l i c t  aspect  o f  i n t e r a c t i o n  begins to  fade in t o  
something more akin to an i n d iv id u a l  pro b lem-solv ing  t a s k ,  then there  
is less and less basis f o r  an argument in favour  o f  s t a t i s t i c a l  
l ea rn in g  theory over game t h e o ry ^  o r  v ic e  versa f o r  t h a t  m a t te r ,
Estes '  e a r l y  observat ion  t h a t  " . . . i n  a s imple dec is io n  process 
th e  human su b je c t  tends t o  behave In accordance wi th  the  p r i n c i p l e s  
o f  a s s o c i a t i v e  learn ing  and not,- In g en era l ,  in the most r a t i o n a l  
manner as ' r a t i o n a l '  is c o n v e n t i o n a l l y  d e f i n e d " , '  must not  be con­
s t rued  as a c r i t i c i s m  o f  the gam e- th eo re t ica l  concept o f  ' r a t i o n a l i t y ' ,  
s ince  the outcomes assoc ia ted  with  the  "simple dec is io n  process" he 
spoke o f ,  were not  r e la t e d  to  an unambiguous u t i l i t y  scale o f  payof fs .
S i m i l a r l y ,  in 1958, Atkinson & Suppes presented an " a n a ly s is  
of two-person game s i t u a t i o n s  in terms of  s t a t i s t i c a l ,  l ea rn in g  th eo ry" ,  
and one o f  t h e i r  major conclusions was t h a t  p l a y e r s '  choices were more
V
In accordance wi th  a stochast . lc  learn ing  model than a game model.  
However, in the game s i t u a t i o n  Atkinson & Suppes i n v e s t i g a t e d ,  2x2 
payof fs  were def ined  in terms of  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  of  being ' c o r r e c t ' ,  the  
game m a t r i x  was not  d is p la y e d ,  and In d iv id u a l  s u b j e c t s ,  a l though they ■ 
were present  in p a i r s ,  were t o l d  t h a t  t h e i r  tasks were two e n t i r e l y  in ­
dependent p r e d i c t i o n  problems. This is ha rd ly  a game s i t u a t i o n  from 
t h e  s u b j e c t ' s  p o in t  of v iew.  Since p layers  In more t r a d i t i o n a l  gaming
*W11 I Iam K. Es tes ,  " i n d i v i d u a l  behaviour in u n cer ta in  s i t u a t i o n s :  an
I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  In terms of  s t a t i s t i c a l  asso c ia t io n  t h e o r y , "  In R. M. 
T h r a l l ,  C. H. Coombs, and R. L. Dav is ,  ( E d s . ) ,  Decis ion  Processes, New' 
York:  W I le y ,  1954, p.  136.
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experiments a ls o  adopt probJem-s.o I vl ng o r i e n t a t i o n s ,  f t  must be 
admitted t h a t  t h e r e  seem to  be no c l e a r  c r i t e r i a  f o r  d is t i n g u i s h in g  
between game and non-game s i t u a t i o n s ,  a p r i o r i  at  le a s t .  Moreover  
we seem to  be a long way .from understanding the  determinants o f  
s u b je c t iv e  percept ions  o f  exper imenta l  paradigms, such t h a t  dec isions  
as t o  the v a l i d i t y  o f  models o f  choice behaviour would seem t o  be a t  
. t h i s  p o i n t  premature and f r u i t l e s s .
On the o t h e r  hand, th ere  have been some observa t ions concerning
non-cont ingent  p r o b a b i l i t y  le arn in g  t h a t  po ss ib ly  I l l u m i n a t e  t h e  key
s  / ■*
fa c t o r s  a c t in g  w i t h in  the  wider game arena .  Recal l  t h a t  In the z e r o -  
sum gaming s tu d ies  mentioned, In s t r u c t i o n a l  se ts  were never Independently
i -
m anipulated .
I f  a s u b j e c t  confronts two mutual ly  e x c lu s iv e  events ,  one o f  
which occurs over a long s e r ies  of  t r i a l s  more f r e q u e n t ly  than the  
o t h e r ,  and Is asked t o  p r e d i c t  the outcome o f  each t r i a l ,  we say 
t h a t  he probabI 11ty-matches I f  he p r e d ic t s  the occurrence o f  each 
event  w i th  the same o v e r a l l  frequency as I t  a c t u a l l y  occurs;  and we 
say t h a t  he probabI 11ty-maxlmlzes i f  he learns to  always p r e d i c t  thee  
monds' f r e q u e n t  e v e n t . Probab! I ! ty-maxlml z a t lo n  is  usu a l ly  deemed more 
’ r a t i o n a l ’ than matching,  I f  th ere  are payof fs  f o r  c o r r e c t  p r e d i c t i o n s ,  
since I t  leads t o  g r e a t e r  t o t a l  payoffs. -
Flood (1954a)  and Goodnow (1955)  hypothesized  t h a t ’s lnce  s u b jec ts  
t y p i c a l l y  t ak e  a p ro b lem-so lv ing  approach t o  the  p r e d ic t i o n  o f  a 
random b in ary  event ,  i h a t  a gambling approach t o  the same ta s k  would 
be more o p t im a l ,  t h a t  I s ,  evoke probab111ty-max Imlzat lon r a t h e r  than 
matching I f  one eve n t  Is  observed to  occur more f r e q u e n t ly  than the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission
31 '
o t h e r ,  I t  was hypothesized t h a t  sub jects e n t e r  In t o  a losing b a t t l e  
of  w i t s ,  whenever they- pe rce ive  anott \er  mind a t  work a g a in s t  them, and 
are more a p t  t o  maximize t h e i r  payof fs Itv a game a g a in s t  Na ture ,  a one-  
person game as I t  were. In F lood 's  te rmino lo gy  (1954b) ,  choice  
behaviour I s ^ i x e d  or  pure according as su b jec ts  are o r  are not
convinced o f  n o n - s t a t lo n a r l  t y  In a s i t u a t i o n  t h a t  Is  a c t u a l l y  s t a -
0
t l o n a r y .  The Im p l i c a t i o n  f o r  the 2x2 zero-sum game Is t h a t  p layers  
w i l l  play ' r a t i o n a l l y '  I f  they perce ive  t h e l r  opponent 's I n d i f f e r e n c e ,  
and ' I r r a t i o n a l l y '  I f  they sense n o n - s t a t l o n a r l t y  or  sequent ia l  
dependencies in t h e i r  opponent 's  p la y .  Since the  recog n i t io n  of ' 
environmental  s t a t i o n a r l t y  o r  n o n - s t a t l o n a r l t y  Involves sampling and 
s u b je c t iv e  Induct ion ,  and Is not an e i t h e r - o r  dec is io n ,  I t  was hypothe­
s iz e d  t h a t  In s t r u c t i o n a l  s e t s ,  by a f f e c t i n g  a s u b j e c t ' s  I n i t i a l  re p re ­
s e n ta t io n  o f  the game arena ,  would determine the subsequent s t r u c t u r e  
o f  choice behav iour,
Goodnow (1955)  did Indeed d iscover  t h a t  sub je c ts  o r i e n t e d  by 
I n s t r u c t l o n s ' t o  view a p r e d i c t i o n  t a s k  as one o f  p a t t e r n - r e c o g n l t l o n  
and pro b lem -so lv in g ,  tended to  p r o b a b l I I t y - m a t c h ,  w h i le  sub jects  given  
t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  they were In an exper iment about gambling, a lthough  
yoked to  the same sequence o f  outcomes, tended t o  probabl I  I t y -m ax lm lze .
McCraken e t  a l .  ( 1 9 6 2 ) ,  however, found no d i f f e r e n c e  between 
s u b j e c t s '  performance under tw o 's e ts  o f  I n s t r u c t i o n s  s i m i l a r  t o .  
Goodnow's. Both produced p r o b a b i l i t y - m a t c h i n g .  In a more extreme  
condit ion ' ,  sub je c ts  t o l d  d i r e c t l y  t h a t  th e re  was no p a t te r n  or  r u le  
t o  be d iscerned ,  tended to  pro ba b l11 ty -m ax fm ize . When they were t o l d  
t h a t  the p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  the  most f re q ue n t  outcome was s t a t i o n a r y ,  as
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I t  a c t u a l l y  is in a l l  such non-cont ingent  s i t u a t i o n s ,  th ey  responded
*  ' ■ t
more o p t i m a l t y  s t i l l , . b u t  not  p e r f e c t l y .
A number o f  s i m i l a r  experiments f a i l e d  t o ^ f ln d  th e  hypothesized  
e f f e c t  o f  in s t r u c t io n s  (Anderson & Grant ,  1957; Lee & Janke, 1965; 
Edwards, 1962).  Van der Meer ( I 9 6 0 )  a c t u a l l y  hypothesI zed the opposite  
e f f e c t ,  bu t  found no d i f f e r e n c e s  between I n s t r u c t i o n  c d n d i t lo n s .
No doubt ext raneous s i t u a t i o n a l  v a r i a b l e s  a f f e c t  a s u b j e c t ’ s 
degree o f  b e l i e f  In the  In s t r u c t i o n s  given t o  him. I t  may be g e n e ra l ly  
t h a t  when subjects  have some reason to  b e l ie v e  t h a t  the sequence o f  
events  they are to  p r e d i c t  has been pre -determ lned according to  some 
o r d e r l y  p r i n c i p l e  o r  p l a n ,  they t r y  t o  d iscover  what  t h a t  p r i n c i p l e  
i s .  Th is approach t y p i c a l l y  leads to  non-6ptlmal chol ci^jbehavl our.  
Studies reported by Rubinstein (1 9 5 9 ) ,  Morse, & Runquist  (1 9 6 0 ) ,  Nies 
( 1 9 6 2 ) ,  and Peterson & U ie h la  ( 1 9 6 5 ) ,  have d em o n st ra ted - th a t  when 
subjects  were able to  v i s u a l l y  observe outcomes be in g -g en era ted  by
Xj*
an i n d i f f e r e n t  dev ice  o r  process,  they behaved more o p t i m a l l y  than 
when they vere merely t o l d  a s e r i e s  o f  outcomes had been generated  
beforehand by such d e v ice s ,  i t  must be, t h e r e f o r e ,  th-et choice-  
behaviour is determined not  by I n s t r u c t i o n s  a lone ,  and c e r t a i n l y  not  
by th e  ’o b j e c t i v e '  beh av io u r  o f  the env ironment,  whether I t  be 
co n t in ge n t  o r  non-co n t in g en t ,  but  by the G e s t a l t  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  o f  
those v a r ia b l e s  which induce a general  r e p re s e n ta t io n  of  the game 
arena and the In t e n t i o n s  o f  th e  opponent,  whether he be mindless or  
n o t .
One might  expect  t h a t  in no case do human beings conform 
p e r f e c t l y  t o  any formal  not ion  o f  ’ r a t i o n a l i t y '  o r  o p t i m a l i t y ,  To
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r^'peated-ly conf i rm t h i s  exp ecta t io n  has not  been d i f f i c u l t .  The 
quest ion I s t H-)ow sha l l  ’ I r r a t i o n a l i t y 1 be p sy ch o lo g ic a l ly  In te rp re ted ?
In L e fe b v re ’ s (1971)  d iscuss ion  o f  r e f l e c t i v e  processes he 
assumes t h a t  rea l  players  c o n s t r u c t  r ep re sen ta t io n s  of  game arenas 
and opponents,  In o rder  to  learn as much as they can f o r  the  purpose 
of p r ed ic t ing  o r  second-gugsslng those opponents,  whoever they may be. 
In o th e r  words, Lefebvre be l ieve s  t h a t  p layers  a u t o m a t ic a l ly  e n te r  
In to  a dynamic b a t t l e  o f  w i t s ,  and he I n t e r p r e t s  the em p i r ic a l  Inves­
t i g a t i o n s  o f  r e f l e c t i v e  processes as I n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  th e re  are  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  pa t te rns  In the formation and r e v i s io n  o f  Inner  cog­
n i t i v e  r e p r e s e n ta t io n s .  The f a c t  t h a t  a lg o r i t h m ic  dev ices have been 
constructed  which c o n s i s t e n t l y  d e f e a t  naive p layers  (Lepsky, 1969);  
Lefebvre,  1967, 1 96 9 ; ;Baranov & Tru do l lubov ,  1969a, 1969b) , points  
to the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a sys tem atic  d e s c r i p t i v e  theory o f  game behaviour  
a theory o f  P la y .  Moreover,  normative game theory  might  be cont ras ted  
' w i t h  d e s c r ip t i v e  P lay -T h eo ry .  * «,
Thbfccharacter o f  P la y fu ln ess  in human i n t e r a c t i o n  has never been 
considered q u i t e  w i t h i n  the range o f  hard empirica.I  s c ien c e ,  perhaps 
s ince  the nature  .of P la y  has always been regarded as something In e f f a b  I 
u l t i m a t e l y  r e s i s t a n t  to  a n a l y s i s .  Never th e le ss ,  the present  th e s is  
turns I t s  a t t e n t i o n  to  t h e - s t r u c t u r e  o f  Play  in so fa r  as i t  can be 
examined, because as Huiz inga  I n s i s t s ,  "you can deny, I f  you l i k e ,  
near ly  a l l  a b s t r a c t io n s :  j u s t i c e ,  beauty ,  t r u t h ,  goodness, mind, God;
you can deny se r io usness ,  but  no t  play . ' I *
/
1 Johan H u iz in g a ,  Homo Ludens, Boston: Beacon Press,  1955, P. 3.
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Summary of Hypotheses and Exp ectat ions
The n u l l  h y p o t h e s l s - p e r t a l n 1nq -ho a l l  t rea tm ents  Is t h a t
subjects  w i l l  behave ' r a t i o n a l l y ' .  In the g am e- th e o re t lc  sense,  
f
e f f e c t i v e l y  Ignoring  each o t h e r .  In view o f  past 'per formance  In 
both gaming and p r o b a b i l i t y  learn in g  s i t u a t i o n s ,  and the l i t e r a t u r e  
on b inary g e n e r a t io n ,  t h i s  hypothesis Is not  expected t o  o b t a in .
There Is some basis f o r  expect ing  t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  In s t r u c t i o n s  
w i l l  produce d i f f e r e n t  choice behav iour  In the same game. But s ince  
In s t ru c t io n s  may vary In severa l  dimensions s im u lt an eo u s ly ,  a 
d e t a l l e d  hypothesis cannot be formed as t o  the e f f e c t  of  a p a r t i c u l a r  
s e t .  In the  s tu d ies  on r e f l e c t i v e  c o n t r o l ,  su b jec ts  deemed t o  under­
es t im ate  the  I n t e l l i g e n c e  o f  an automaton. Yet  the p r o b a b i l i t y
learn ing s tu d ie s  In d ic a t e  t h a t  sub je c ts  convinced of  the  I n d i f f e r e n c e  
and s t a t l o n a r l t y  of  t h e i r  'opponents behave rro're ' r a t i o n a l l y ' .  Thus 
th e re  are  a t  le a s t  two poss ib le  hypotheses regard ing  the  e f f e c t  of  
t e I  11ng a p ia y e r  he 1s opposIng a t h 1nkIng machIne: t h a t  he w1 I 11
respond w i th  a ' . r a t i o n a l '  s t r a t e g y  m ix tu r e ,  o r  t h a t  he w i l l  e n t e r  In to
a b a t t l e  of  w i ts  w i th  t h a t  automaton, as he represents  I t .
I t  Is expected,  however, t h a t  the  e f f e c t  of  In s t r u c t i o n a l  se ts  • 
complexly I n t e r a c t s  w i th  the behaviour o f  an opponent across p lays ,  
and t h a t  a game between two bona f i d e  p layers  reaches a steady  
s t a t e  a f t e r  a large  number o f  p la y s ,  regard less  o f  I n s t r u c t i o n s .
I t  Is hypothesized t h a t  r e f l e c t i v e  con t ro l  s t r a t e g i e s  used by 
L e fe b v r e ’s d r l b l l n g s  ( Gdl and Gd2 In the  p res en t  study) a re  e q ua l ly  
e f f e c t i v e  In a 4x4 game of But to n -B u t to n .  I t  Is expected however, t h a t  
d r ib  l ings  a re  more successful  I f  human opponents represent  them as 
non-human.
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A l l  p layers are expected t o  t r y  and a n t i c i p a t e  t h e i r  opponent 's  
p la y ,  and t o  form some s o r t  o f  Image of  t h a t  opponent 's  s t r a te g y  and 
m o t iv a t io n .
There Is no reason to expect  t h a t  p la yers  would be ab le  to de tec t  
t h a t  t h e i r  opponents were making t r u l y  random cho ices .  That  I s ,  
subjects  are not  expected t o  be able to  d l f f e r e n t l a t e  a real  opponent  
from a random stooge,  and are  not  expected t o  d iscont inue p r e d i c t i v e  
a' ttempts. On th e  o t h e r  hand, I f  a p la y e r  Is led to  b e l i e v e  t h a t  his  
opponent Is a non-human automaton, such a rep re sen ta t io n  Is expected  
t o  decay,  and n r o a r e s s lv e ly  be transformed In to  a r e p re s e n ta t io n  o f  
a human mind.
In g e n e ra l ,  I t  is f u r t h e r  hypothesized t h a t  naive  p l a y e r s '  
notions of  ' r a t i o n a l i t y '  bear  l i t t l e  r e l a t i o n  t o  the  formal concept  
of ' r a t i o n a l i t y '  in  game t h e o r y .
More d e t a i l e d  hypotheses are d i f f i c u l t  to  form, most ly because 
choN^e behaviour  In games as simple as But ton-Button has never been 
examined d i r e c t l y ,  and constant-sum games In general  have never been
a
stud ie d  w i th  a view towards understanding the ev o lu t io n  o f  c o g n i t i v e  
Images, as determined by the I n t e r a c t i o n  o f  I n s t r u c t i o n a l  se ts and 
th e  choice behavlogr o f  a'n opponent.
I
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CHAPTER I 1 
-METHOD
Subjects
Although several  publ ished s tu d ies  have f a i l e d  t o  uncover such
an e f f e c t ,  -for example Lutzker  ( 1 9 6 1 ) ,  t h e r e  Is some evidence t h a t
sex is a determin ing f a c t o r  a f f e c t i n g  game behav iour .  When subjects
played P r is o n e r 's  Dilemma a g a in s t  predetermined programs, B lx en s t in e
e t  a l .  (1964)  found t h a t  males were m o r e - ' c o o p e r a t i v e ' ,  but  Komorita
(1965)  found t h a t  males were less ' c o o p e r a t i v e ' .  When n a l rs  o f  bona
f i d e  subjec ts  p lay  P r is o n e r 's  Dilemma, male p a i r s  tend to be more
' l
' c o o p e ra t iv e '  than" female n a l r s ,  and mixed nal rs achieve a leve l  of
'co o p era t io n '  h igher  than fema.le p a i rs  and lower than male p a i rs
(Rapoport  & Chammah, 1965; Oskamp & Perlman,  1965; Evans & Crumbaugh,
1966) . Conrath (1972)  found a s i m i l a r  e f f e c t  In a game o f  Chicken.
In a three-person game, Vlnacke ( 1 9 5 9 ) - observed t h a t  female groups
f a i l e d  t o  form c o a l i t i o n s ,  and formed t r i p l e  a l l i a n c e s  more f r e q u e n t l y
than males. He concluded t h a t  males were more concerned w i th  "w inning" ,
and t h a t  females were p r i m a r i l y  concerned wi th  c o l l e c t i v e  s a t ls W act io n .
To be sure ,  one must r e f r a i n  from g e n e r a l i z i n g  from In c o n s is te n t  r e s u l t s
such as th e s e .  But when sex d i f f e r e n c e s  do a r i s e ,  how are they t o
be In te rp re te d ?  The sexual f a c t o r ,  once recognized ,  cannot be e x -  
*r
p la in ed  w it h  r e fe ren c e  t o  any sound t h e o r e t i c a l  conception and remains,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  an i n t e r e s t i n g  c u r i o s i t y .  Note a lso  t h a t  experimental  
games have been used r e c e n t ly  as pragmat ic  Ind ices  o f  such things as 
drug e f f e c t s  (H u rs t ,  e t  a l . ,  1969) ,  and n a t io n a l  p e r s o n a l i t y  t r a i t s  
CRapoport, e t  a i .  1971) among o t h e r s ,  but  i t  remains to be demonstrated
' 36
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t h a t  these ■ measures->a re meaningful ,  o r  even u s e f u l ,
Moreover,  1here Is l l t t - l e  reason to  b e l i e v e  t h a t  sex Is a 
f a c t o r  In constant-sum games l i k e  B u t to n -B u t to n , The subjects in 
the present  study are 100 undergraduate females,  f o r  I t  Is assumed 
t h a t  sex Is  not  a f a c t o r ,  and an empir ica l  r e f u t a t i o n  of t h is  assump­
t i o n  would be o f  l i t t l e  t h e o r e t i c a l  moment.
Design o f  Independent V a r ia b le s
In 200 I t e r a t e d  plays o f  4x4 Bu+ton-Button ( M a t r i x  3 ) ,  80 of  the  
IQO sub jects  played the r o le  o f  H Ide r ,  and the remaining 20 acted  
as Guessers^ Thus, a l though 80 separate games were played,  only 20 
Invo lved  two bona f i d e  p la y e r s .  The o t h e r  60 games werg played be­
tween bona f lde 'R ^ders  and pre-programmed Guessers. ^
f ‘
Thte'.HIders were randomly assigned t o  one o f  two groups,  HP 
( ’ PT f o r  person) o r  HD ( ’ D' f o r  d r l b l l n q ) .  The 40 Hlders In the HP_ 
group were t o l d  they were p lay in g  a g a in s t  Guessers who were bona , 
f i d e  subjects  l i k e  themselves.  In the HD_condit ion,  Hlders were t o ld  
they were p la y in g  a g a in s t  an automaton.  (See Appendix A f o r  the  
e xa c t  I n s t r u c t i o n s  given to  each group) .
Of the 20 bona f i d e  Guessers,  10 played a g a in s t  Hlders In the HP 
c o n d i t io n ,  and 10 a g a i n s t  Hlders In the HD c o n d i t i o n .  Al l"  20 were 
given the  same In s t r u c t i o n s ;  In o th e r  words,  a l l  sub jects  who acted
as bona f id e  Guess re assigned to the same group, GP. The th ree
pre-programmed Guessers were GR ( ’ R* f o r  random), GDI ( d r ib  11n g - I ) ,  
and GD2 ( d r i b  11n g -2 ) .
\
Thus, as I l l u s t r a t e d  In Table  1, t h e  two H Id e r  cond it io ns  and 
the fo u r  kinds o f  Guessers g ive  r i s e  t o  8 d i f f e r e n t  game condi t ions
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In a 2x4 design,  wi th  10 games In each c e l l ,
TABLE I
/ ' '
Design of  8Q1- Games
t
GP !• GR GDI GD2
HP
10 HP's 
v s .  10 GP’ s
- io  HP's 
y v s .  GR
10 HP's  
v s .  GDI_
10 HP's 




10 HD's 10 HD's 10 HD's
v s .  10 GP's v s . GR v s .  GDI_ v s . GD2
GR represents the ' r a t i o n a l  ' Guesser p rescr ibed  by Game Theory,  
and t h e r e f o r e  a random s er le p ,  Independently pre -determ ined f o r  each 
game. GR Is s t a t i s t i c a l l y  ..' I ndeoendent o f  H_'s choice behav iour.
For the  second and fourth  blocks o f  SO p lays ,  GDI and GD2 are  
a ls o  random. B*u+ f o r  the f i r s t  and t h i r d  b lo c k s ,  they are c o nd it io na l  
s t r a t e g i e s  def ined In terms o f  'obedience '  (B) and 'd isobedience '
(D) in response to H_'s..advl c e . GDI and GD2 are In f a c t  I d e n t i c a l  to
the r e f l e c t i v e  contro l  s t r a t e g i e s  used by Lefe bvre 's  d r i b l l n g s  (1969 ) .
GDI can be s ta ted  as:
(b lo c k  I ) :  +5, - 6 ,  +2,  - 4 ,  +4,  - I ,  +1,  - 2 ,  +4, -3', +2,  - I ,
+1,  - 3 ,  +4 ,  - 3 ,  +4.
(block 2 ) :  5 0 . random
( b lo c k  3 ) :  r e p e t i t i o n  o f  block  I .
(b lo ck  4 ) :  50 random.
The +5 designates t h a t  GDI begins wi th  5 ’ o b e d ie n t '  responses,  an 
the <-6 means t h a t  t h i s  Is fo l lowed by 6 ' d is o b e d ie n t '  responses, I . e . ,  
BBBBBDDDDDD, e t c .  GD2 Is s t r u c t u r a l l y  id e n t i c a l  t o  GDI but  begins wi th
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• . 3<5 ■
D and switches to B:
' ( b l o c k  I ) :  +6,  r-2, +4,  ^4,  +1,  - ' I ,  +2, - 4 ,  +3, - 2 ,
+ 1, - 1, +3,  r~A, +3,  - 4 .
( b l o c k ' 2 ) :  50 random.
( b lo c k  3 ) :  r e p e t i t i o n  of  block I .
(b lock  4 ) :  50 random.
Procedu.re and Apparatus . • '
I f ,  In the HP-6P and HD-GP c o n d i t i o n s ,  th e re  were two bona f i d e  
p la y e r s ,  they  were not  j&Iow&d see each o ther  before  the game, 
and during theucourse o f  t h e ' p l a y ,  each was pos i t ioned In a separate  
room. A f t e r  I n s t r u c t i n g  the p la y ers  (see Appendix A) ,  th e  exper im enter  
r e t r e a t e d  t o  a t h i r d  room where he monitored,  manual ly recorded the
outcome of each D la y ,  and acted as Guesser In the GR, GDI , and GD2
c o n d i t io n s .
A l l  I n t e r a c t i o n  took place by means o f  the game t e r m in a ls  shown 
in Figure 4 .  The sequence o f  o p era t io ns  c o n s t i t u t i n g  one play  was 
as fo I  Iows:
1. The exper im enter  s i g n a l l e d  the p la yers  t o  prepare f o r  the .
»* * 
next  play by means o f  the  l i g h t  located a t  the top o f  the t e r m in a l s .
I t s  onset  t o j d  them to switch o f f  the l i g h t s  they c o n t r o l l e d ;  and.
I t s  o f f s e t  cued the H Ider  to  b e g in .
2 .  H_ turned  on one l i g h t  in the bottom row 6 f  her  t e r m in a l ,
sy m b o l ic a l ly  h id in g  a button In her  r i g h t  o r  l e f t  f i s t .
3 .  H turned on one l i g h t  In the middle row o f  her  t e r m i n a l ,
and t h i s  a c t i v a t e d  the corresponding l i g h t  In the botton row o f  (B’ s
t e r m i n a l .  S y m b o l ic a l ly ,  H advised G as t o  the lo c a t io n  o f  th e  b u t to n .





On = C lear  
Off  = S t a r t
The Guess 
- -  Send a Message 
—  Hi de the Button
— On = C lea r  
' O f f  = S t a r t
Where The Button Was
—  Guess
— . H I d e r ' s  Message
re 4. Apparatus:  Game Terminals  f o r  H Id e r  and Guesser
Cl2" x 18"; with 3-way to g g le  sw i tc h e s ) .
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4 ,  G turned on one l i g h t  In the middle row of  her  t e r m i n a l ,
i
s y m b o l ica l ly  guessing where had In f a c t  hidden the b ut ton ,  CB's-*’ 
guess was then displayed In the top row o f  H_'s g e r m i n a l ,  and H_'s 
i n i t i a l  choice In ( 2 )  was displayed In the  top row o f  G's t e r m i n a l .  
S y m b o l ic a l ly ,  H_ revealed  In which hand the button was a c t u a l l y  hidden.
5, H_ and G deduced .which one o f  them had won th e  play according  
to th e  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  o f  l i g h t s .  ( I f  (5 guessed c o r r e c t l y ,  G won and
H_ lo s t ;  I f  G was I n co r rec t , .  H_ won and G_ l o s t . )  I f  a p la y e r  won she 
took a whi te  poker chip from a box l a b e l l e d  "1 won" and dropped I t  ••• 
in tjre s l o t - o f  a 'box la b e l le d  "who worr?"; I f  a p la y e r  lo s t  she took 
a coloured poker ch ip ’ from a box ia b e l le d  "1 lo s t "  and dropped i t  in 
the "Who won?" box.
6 ,  A f t e r  the exper im enter  had recorded the/outcome,o f  t h a t  
p l a y ,  he sIgna I  Ied^the p layers  to  c l e a r  the I r - t e r m i  na1s and begin the  
ne^<t p I ay , ■
Two-hundred plays of the game' were broken In to  blocks o f  50 ,  
separated  by 2 minute t lm e -d u t  p e r io d s .  }
At the end o f  th e  complete game, t y p i c a l l y  las t in g  40 minutes.
the Hlders completed thre 13 - i tem q u e s t io n n a i re  given in  Appendix B.
;'T
F i n a l l y ,  each pj ayer  was awarded from I t o  6 l o t t e r y  t i c k e t s  acccSr-
a
ding t o  the  paydff  scheme exp la ined  during the  i n s t r u c t io n s , .  I t i c k e t  
plus 1 e x t r a  f o r  every w h i te  chip drawn a t  random from the "Who won?"
o *• >
box.  (See Appendix A ) .  __
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Cod1ng of Dependent V ar iab le s
In terms o f  H Id e r  and Guesser 's choices ,  th e re  are 8 noss lb le  
outcomes of  each o l a y . ^ H  makes 2 binary  choices :  C p ^ , where to  
" h i d e  the button;  and Cm|) ,  what message t o  send to  G. G makes a 
- s i n g l e  guess, ( a j ) .  On each p l a y ,  v a r i a b l e s ,  p j ,  m | , and g| are 
given the value I f o r  a l e f t  choice and 0 f o r  a r i g h t  cho ice.  I f  
Pi- = q| tlien G w 1 ns and w| Is gl ven the  vaIue I ; otherwI  se w | = 0. 
'With no loss of In fo rm a t io n ,  each outcome was coded as a s in g le  d i g i t  
0 through 7.
I f  we consider  a reduced 2x2 model o f  4x4 Button-Button where 
no d i s t i n c t i o n  Is ^nade between r i g h t  and l e f t  choices ,  th ere  are
* t
only »4 poss ib le  outcomes o f  each play in terms of s t r a t e g i e s  a v a i l a b l e
t o - t h e  p la y e r s .  'Although In the GP co n d i t io n s ,  th e re  was no way of
determin ing whether o r  not  G's s t r a t e g y  was c o n d i t io n a l  upon Ĥ 's
message, the model assumes t h a t  I t  was always so, f o r  the sake o f
«
s i m p l i c i t y .  The 4 outcomes shown in M a t r i x  8 can be considered  
" s t a t e s " ' o f  the game-system, and a Markov chain .analysis al lows the  
t e s t i n g  f o r  sequent ia l  dependencies In the choice o f  s t r a t e g y .
M a t r i x  8





Truth F a l s i t y
• BT' . 'BF1
*DT* 'DF'
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Table 2 gives a complete l i s t i n g  o f  th e  dependent v a r ia b le s  
fo r  each p lay ,  In terms o f  both choices and s t r a t e g i e s  In the 2x2 
game mode I .
S t a t i s t i c a l  Analyses.
To determine whether p la ye rs  were ’ s t r i c t l y  r a t i o n a l ' ,  I . e . . ,  
random, the fol l 'owlng analyses were performed on each of the 80 
games .
The sums o f  the v a r ia b le s  pj and q j , over  each block o f  50 as 
well  as over the e n t i r e  200 p la y s ,  were compared wi th  the s t a t i s t i c s
r
expected from a random B ern o u l l i  process.  ( I f  n=200,  t h e i r  expected
v
value is 100, and t h e o r e t i c a l  var iance  50; I f  n=50, t h e i r  expected  
va lu e  Is 25,  and t h e o r e t i c a l  var iance  1 2 . 5 ) .  Furthermore,  the I n t e r ­
nal run s t ru c tu r e s  o f  pi and qj were tes ted  t o  see T f  they contained  
an I n o r d in a t e  number of a l t e r n a t i o n s .  (Over n plays the number of  
runs Is a s y m p to t ic a l ly  normal w i t h  an expected va lue o f  ( n + l ) / 2 ,  and 
var ian ce  ( n - 1 ) / 4 ;  the number o f  runs o f  length e x a c t l y  k is a ls o  
a s y m p to t ic a l ly  normal wi th  an expected v a l u e o f  n /2 ^+^ ) J
The only p r i n c i p l e  the v a r i a b l e  m; need conform t o j s  t h a t  
I t  remain s t a t i s t i c a l l y  Independent o f  p j .  A ch i -s q u a r e  s t a t i s t i c  
was computed t o  t e s t  t h i s  hypothesis over 200 p la y s ,  and by blocks o f
I
50.  S i m i l a r l y ,  ch i -square  t e s t s  were performed t o  determine whether  
Wj and q j .w e r e  Independent.
'These expressions are der ived  from the theory of  runs "'presented by 
Marek F I s z ,  P r o b a b i l i t y  Theory and Mathematical S t a t i s t i c s , T h i rd  
E d i t i o n ,  New Y o r k ;  W i le y ,  1963, pp. 415 -42 4 .
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TABLE 2
Dependent-VarfabI©s f o r  Each Play
Co<j«’d
Outcome
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* ! S ta te
0 .. 0 0 T 0 B 1
v-CO
l
1 0 0 T 1 D, ' 0 ’ DT*
2 0 ' 1 F 0 D 1 'D F !
3 0 I ” F 1 B 0 ’ BF1' .
4 1 0 F 0 B 0 'BF'
5 1 0 F 1 D f T D FT
6 1 1 T 0 D 0 ’ DT'
7 1 I T I B 1 'BT'
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The sequ en t ia l  dependencies between th e  H i d e r ’ s play and the
Guesser's play are examined In some d e t a i l  by regressing  p| and
m| upon a l i n e a r  combinat ion o f  q j - l ,  q p 2 ,  q p 3 ,  q p 4  and q j - 5 ,  and
regress ing qj upon a l i n e a r  combinat ion o f  mj, m p l  , m j-2 ,  m j - 3 , ' m j - 4
m p 5 ,  p p f , ' p p 2 ,  p p 3 ,  P |^ 4 ,  and p p 5 .  In o th e r  words, I t  was
^•determined, In r e t r o s p e c t ,  how a p l a y e r ’ s choices were dependent
upon the choices o f  h is  opponent.  Whether o r  not  a p l a y e r ' s  choices
were Indeed p r e d ic t a b le  given a knowledge o f  the previous f i v e  plays
2
Is r e f l e c t e d  In the c o e f f i c i e n t  o f  m u l t i p l e  d e te rm in a t io n ,  R ; and . 
the regress ion be ta -w e lgh ts  themselves provide in form at ion  about  
recency e f f e c t s  In choice behav iour .
W i th in  the Markov Model, ch i -square  t e s t s  were used to determine  
the depth of  t h e  dependency between s t r a t e g y  and the previous f i v e  
s t a te s  of the game,. For each p la y e r  e i g h t  s t a t e - c o n d i t i o n a l  propens I 
t i e s  were computed over 200 p lays .  These p ro p e n s i t i e s  are l i s t e d  In 
Table 3.  They each have an expected va lue o f  1 /2 and XG, f o r  
example, can be read as G’ s pro pens i ty  to fo l lo w  a p lay  In which she 
obeyed H_'s message and H_ was t r u t h f u l  ( the  s t a t e  B T | ) ,  with obedience  
(B| + j ) .  XG Is es t imated  by the c o n d i t io n a l  f requency (qj + j = m] + | 1 
P jnmI =q I ) •
Appendix C o u t l i n e s  how the  c o n d i t io n a l  p ro p e n s i t ies  can be 
combined as products t o  form a t r a n s i t i o n  m a t r i x ,  and how t h i s  
4 - s t a t e  Markov model was solved f o r  each game. The r e s u l t a n t  
s t e a d y - s t a t e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  were compared f o r  g o o d n e s s - o f - f I t  w ith  the  
observed f requencies o f  th e  4 outcomes o f  each p l a y .
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TABLE 3
Condit ional  P ro p en s i t ie s  o f  H Id er  and Guesser
Guesser HI der
YH = (Ti +
-YH = ( F I +
”XPH = ( T , +
XPH = (F .+
XH = ( T , +*~YPG = (B| + | , D T , )
, DT:)-XH = ( F j +YPG = C D , . I , DT;)
, DF.)I -YPHi “ ( T i +-XPG = (B I + | ;  D F j )
YFrl = (FXPG = (D l = | , D F . )



















Indices  o f  S t r a t e g i c  Dependencies
S t r a t e g i c  Recency
S t r a t e g i c  Flux
S t r a t e g i c  Response 
to  Success
S t r a t e g i c  Response 
t o  F a l lu r e
Guesser  
(XG t  XPG -  YG- -  YPG)/2  
(XG t  XPG + YG + YPG)/2
XG + XPG -  I
YG + YPG - I
H Ider
(XH + XPH -  YH -  YPH)/2  
(XH + XPH + YH + YPH)/2 - I ,
XH + XPH -  I




Cer ta  nr 'eorfTTt jw^t lons of  the c o n d i t io n a l  p ro p e n s i t ies  which 
can be I n te r p re te d  p s ych o log ica l ly  were computed fo r  each game.
These Indices are presented In Table 4 .  Each has an expected value
In d lca tes  r e v e r s a l .
In o rd e r  to t e s t  fo r  any e f f e c t  due to  th e  in s t ru c t io n s  given 
t o  the H Id e r ,  and any e f f e c t  due to  the play of  Guesser, analyses of  
variance  were performed on each of  the dependent v a r ia b le s  Introduced  
above, as wel l  as the q u es t io n n a i re  Items,  and the c o n d i t io na l  
p ro p en s i t ie s  were employed as va r ia b le s  In d is c r im in a n t  fu nc t ion  
analyses,
The q u e s t io n n a i re  was f a c t o r  analyzed ( p r i n c i p a l  components),  
and the Items themselves used as Independent cI ass I f 1 c a t i o n ' v a r i a b l e s  
In analyses of  var iance  as above to  t e s t  the hypothesis t h a t ,  regard­
less of  I n s t r u c t i o n s ,  H ld e r 's  r ep res en ta t io n  o f  her  opponent had an 
< e f f e c t  on her  p la y .
The number of plays won by Guesser ( th e  sum o f  W | )  was used as 
a dependent v a r i a b l e  to t e s t  f o r  th e  e f f e c t  of , the four, blocks of 50 
plays ;  and f o r  the  same purpose,  the numbers o f  rups In p j , m j , and 
qj per block were f a c t o r  analyzed fo r  p r i n c i p a l  components.
The co n d i t io na l  p ro p en s i t ie s  were also  f a c t o r  analyzed and used' 
as the basis fo r  a Q ^facto r  ana lys is  o f  th e  80 Hlders In an e f f o r t  
to c l u s t e r  them in t o  t y p p s ^ / ^ T y p e ’ was then, used as a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  
v a r i a b l e  In o rd e r  t o  t e s t  f o r  I t s  e f f e c t  and thus exp 11 cate I t s  
c h a ra c t e r .
o f  0; a p o s i t i v e  value in d ic a tes  p ers is tence  and a negat iv e  value
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RESULTS
The breakdown of  bias in the v a r i a b l e s  p, m, and g is given in
ft
Table  5. At the leve l  of  choice ^ h a v i o u r ,  i t  can be said  t h a t  39? 
of the Hiders dev ia ted  .from ' r a t i o n a l i t y ’ in h id in g  the but to n ,  
over 200 p la ys .  Although game theory  does not r e s t r i c t  the prop­
o r t i o n  o f  r i g h t  to  l e f t  messages, only 15? of  the Hiders showed a 
s i g n i f i c a n t  bias in the  v a r i a b l e  m, and none o f  the  Hiders fol lowed  
e i t h e r  o f  the  'prominent '  s o l u t i o n s ,  ( 1 / 2 , 0 , 1 / 2 , 0 )  and ( 0 , 1 / 2 , 0 , 1 / 2 ) .  
Of the  20 bona f i d e  Guessers, 30? showed an in o rd in a te  tendency in 
t h e i r  guessing. ' Note t h a t  in a l l  th re e  v a r i a b le s  the modal f requen­
cies  of  bias occurred in th e  t h i r d  block of the game. ^
Table 6 shows the r e s u l t s ' o f  runs t e s t s  on p,  m, and g.  The 
mean number o f  runs in p over 200 plays does not  d i f f e r  from the  
number expected o f  a B e rn o u l l i  s e r i e s .  However, t h e r e  were too few 
runs in the t h i r d  block o f  p la y s .  O v e r a l l ,  t h e r e  were too few 
runs in m, and e s p e c i a l l y  in the  second and t h i r d  blocks.  Al though,  
consider ing a l l  80 games, th e r e  were a lso  too few runs in the t h i r d  
block ,  the 20 bona f i d e  Guessers generated too few runs only in t h e '  
four th  b lock .  Note th e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  va r ian ce  of the number o f  runs
i
' ' 49
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TABLE 5
Frequencies of S i g n i f i c a n t  Bias in the  Var ia b le s  
n , m, and q .














D 2nd 50 13 16.25
P 3rd 50 24 30.00 •












m 2nd 50 12 15.00
m 3rd 50 14 17.50












q 2nd 50 7 8.75
q 3rd 50 9 1 1 .25
q 4th 50 5 6 .25
Bona FI de 
Guessers in 
the GP 






200 p 1 ays 











q 4th 50 4 20.00
S in ce ,  t h e o r e t l c a i ! y , the sums of  these v a r i a b l e s ,  X » , are d i s t r i b u t e d  
b l n o m ia l l y ,  bias was def ined  whenever ttie abso lu te  value of X | - n / 2  was> 
n 1 /2 ,  n being the number o f  p lays .




Runs Tests on the Var iab le s  n, m, and q
Vari ab 1 e Range k
I
F s i g . F
_ 2






200 plays  
b 1ock 1 
b 1 ock 2 
b 1ock 3 
b 1ock 4
98 .575
25 .675  
25.700












- 0 . 2 7 3





2 .068  









200 n 1 ays 
b 1ock 1 
b 1ock 2 
b 1ock 3 
block 4
95 .363
24 .538  
2 4 .288  
23 .688
24 .538










- 0 . 7 2 8
-0 .2 7 5
- 0 . 3 4 T
- 0 . 5 1 8
- 0 .2 7 5
2.201 
1 .437 
1 .333  










'200 p1 ays 
block 1 















- 0 .3 0 7
-0.1-21'
0.071
- 0 .3 3 9
- 0 . 2 3 6
1 .629 
1 . 193 ■ 
1 .103  
1 .293  
1 . 154
.05






200 p 1 ays 
b 1ock 1 
b 1ock 2 







6 .275  
2 .4 43  
2.715 • 






- 4 . 0 7 8  
- 0 . 5 5 7  
- 0 . 4 0 0  
- 0 . 5 1 4  
- 0 . 7 0 0
2.524  




'Here F -  va r  (k)  /  l / 4 ( n - l ) ,  where n Is the number of p lays .  This column 
in d ica tes  a t  what level o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  v a r ( k )  can be sa id  to  be ' in o rd in a te ly  
large .
2 z = (zk -  n -  I ) /  ( n - I ) 1^2 . •*
"^Thls column in d ica tes  a t  what  level  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  z can be sa id  to  
di f f e r  from zero .
*v




was c o n s i s t e n t l y  i n f l a t e d ,  and t h i s  impl ies t h a t ,  even though
the  mean t r e n d ,  i f  any, was towards too few runs and not too many
as hypothesized,  there  were very la rge  in d iv id u a I  _d i f f e r e n c e s
i n run s t r u c t u r e s ,
*
The in te rn a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  runs in p, of  -length up to  15 
and over 200 p la y s ,  is l i s t e d  in Table 7 and p l o t t e d  l o g a r i t h -
t
m ic a l l y  a g a in s t  the t h e o r e t i c a l ,  curve in F igure  5.  A g a in ^ t te  
observed var iances were unusual ly  la rg e .  Over i t s  complete 
domain, the em p ir ica l  curve was a good f i t  w ith  the t h e o r e t i c a l  
curve.. The d i s t r i b u t i o n s  o f  runs up to 5 in length cannot’^ e ^  
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d .  However, a KoImogorov-Smirnov goodness o f  f i t  
t e s t  f o r  j  g r e a t e r  than 8 demanded the r e j e c t i o n  o f  the nu l l  
hypothes is ,  ( 0 = 0 .2 2 ,  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  . 0 1 ) .  The e m p ir ica l  curve  
f o r  j  g r e a t e r  than 8 can in f a c t  be sa id  to be s h i f t e d  to'"the  
r i g h t , "  ( 4 (D+)^mn/(m+n)=8.06=chi-square  wi th  2 d . f . ,  s i g n i f i c a n t  
a t  . 0 2 5 ) .  Thus, t h e r e  were too  many long runs in p, even though 
the mean number of  t o t a l  runs was not i n o r d i n a t e .  This circum­
stance must be a t t r i b u t e d  t o  th e  larg^? betweeffep.1 ayer  v a r ian ce .
The number o f  runs in p, m, and g were analysed f o r  p r i n c i p a l  
components, and the  m a t r i x  of  loadings is^^presented in Tab le  8.
- In  p and m, the  runs in th e  f i r s t  two b lo cks \^e re  -c o r r e I a t e d ,  and 
t h i s  group can be roughly d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  from the  group o f  runs 
in the la s t  two b locks .  In g,  the  group o f  runs in the second 
and t h i r d  blocks can be c o n t ras ted  wi th  the  f i r s t  and f o u r t h ,
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TABLE 7
Observed and Exoected Values o f  k j ,  the Number 
of Runs of  L e f t  Choices in the Var ia b le  








Devi a t ion
r
I
25 .377 2.51 8 25. 125 11.837
2 12.944 1 .550 1 2 .588 5 .226
3 6 .439 1 .101 5 .4 6 3 ' 2 .912
4 3.187 .74 1 2 .6 5 1 .849
5 1 .569 .467 1 -3 1 .354
6 .768 .237 .825 ■ .99 i
7 .374 .145 .475 1 .019
8 . 181 .083 ' .150 .393
9 .087 .046 .175 .382
10 .042 .024 . .063 ■ .244
1 1 .020 .014 .063 .244
12 .009 .007 .05 .219
13 .004 .003 . .038 , .191
14 .002 .002 0 ■o
15 .001 ■ .001 .038 . 191
Computed from equat ions provided by Marek F ls z ,  loc.  c i t .  When a r i g h t  
and l e f t  choice are equ lp ro b ab le ,  and n Is the number of  choices,
E ( k j )  = ( n / 2  + l ) C2)( n / 2 ) CJ5 /  n (j’+ l ) ,
v a r ( k j )  = [ ( n / 2 + l ) (2)  %( n / 2 ) ( J \  /  n ( j + l ) ] 2
-  ( n / 2 ) (2 )  ( n / 2 + | ) (2 )  ( n / 2 )  C2J} /  n(-2J+2) , 
where a^m  ̂ is def ined as a ( a - l )  . . .  ( a-hH-l ) .





LOGARITHMIC PLOT OBSERVED4 FIGURE
AND THEORETICAL' DISTRIBUTIONS OF
VARIABLE P, OVE
j





-•Rotated Factor  S o lu t io n  o f  the
Run S t ru c tu re  o f  V a r iab les
1 • ^p ,  m, and q S'
X ______________________________________________  >_
fa c to rsVari  ab I'e
.058- . 8 7 9
- . 8 3 2
KPI
- . 0 0 6.051.023KP2
.00KP3 ' .726
.817
- . 4 4 3
.026P. 293.007
.508.579- . 3 3 4
- . 0 5 5
.032
.032.797.009





• .706- . 0 0 8KG4
.006I .524 I. .4473 .3 23  -el gen values .699
r e l a t i v e  % 
var  I ance 16.6826.56 17.62
cumulat ive % 
variance 74.99  .62.4948 .9 319.92
r
i
'This  was a p r in c ip a l  components a n a lys is  employing a r i g i d  r o t a t i o n .
^KPl equals,  the number o f  rtfns In th e  v a r i a b l e  p over  the f i r s t  50 p la ys ,  
and the o t h e r  v a r i a b l e s  are 'analogous I y d e f in e d .
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taken as a group. Except t o r  the apparent  responsiveness between 
the runs in m and g during the f i r s t  50 p la y s ,  the number of runs 
g e n e r a te d , by H ider  and Guesser remain r e l a t i v e l y  independent.
Y
Now from the p o in t  of view of  s t r a t e g i e s  and not moves,
Table 9 shows the f requencies  o f  bias in the r e l a t i o n s h i p  between 
H i d e r ' s  p and m, between h id in g  the button and i n s t r u c t i n g  the 
Guesser.  Over 200 p la y s ,  51$ of  the Hiders dev ia ted  from ' r a t i o n ­
a l i t y ' .  In the f i r s t  50 plays th e re  was a s i g n i f i c a n t  t rend  
towards being t r u t h f u l ,  but  in the l a s t  th ree  blocks the s p l i t  
between the  ' T ’ and 'F '  s t r a t e g i e s  was not  s i g n i f i c a n t .  Note* 
once again t h a t  the t h i r d  block was the modal' s i g h t  of  ' i r r a t i o n ­
a l i t y ' .
Mor eover,  H id e r 's  bias in terms eft choosing moves proved to  
be unre la ted  to  her s t r a t e g i c  b ia s ,  ( t o t a l  c h i -s q u a re  with I d . f .  
= 0 . 1 6 6 ) .  Combining the  r e s u l t s  on both moves and s t r a t e g i e s ,  
over  200 p la ys ,  19$ of  the Hiders  proved to  be. ' i r r a t i o n a l '  on 
both counts,  and 29$ appeared to  be fo l lo w in g  one of the fa m i ly ,  
of  ' r a t i o n a l '  minimax s o lu t io n s .
The corresponding r e s u l t s  on Guessers are given in Table 10.
The t h i r d  block once more e l i c i t e d  the  g r e a t e s t  s t r a t e g i c  b ia s .
W it h in  the group o f  bona f i d e  Guessers,  the tendency in the f i r s t  
and t h i r d  blocks was towards obedience.  Here s t r a t e g i c  ' r a t i o n a l i t y '  
proved to  be p o s i t i v e l y  r e l a t e d  to  ' r a t i o n a l i t y '  in terms of  moves, 
( t o t a l  ch i - sq uare  with  I d . f .  = 5 . 0 9 ,  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  0 . 0 2 5 ) .
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TABLE 9
Frequencies o f  Bias in H id er 's
Use of  S t r a t e a i e s
Ran ge f C . F ' - b i a s ) f ( ' T ' - b i  as) f C T / F ’ - b i a s ) 2 51g-Chi 
square
200 p 1 ays >20 21 41 (51.2558)
1s t  block 6 16 22 (27 .5? ) .05
2nd block ■ 12 9 21 (26 .25?)
3rd block 15 13 28 (35 .0? )
4th block 1.5 10 25 (31 .25?)
N o t e : N=’80
This t a b l e  does not  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  between r i g h t  and l e f t  cho ices ,  but  
only  between H id e r 's  tendency to  use the  'T '  s t r a t e g y  ( i . e . ,  send t r u t h f u l  
messages) and t h e  ' F* s t r a t e g y  ( i . e . ,  send t r u t h f u l  messages). Whether  
o r  not  t h e re  Ex is ted  a bias was determined by whether o r  not  pj and m; 
were shown t o  be s t a t i s t i c a l l y  dependent by a ch i-square  s t a t i s t i c  a t  th e .  
.05 leve l  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  ’ ’ *
O
This column gives the t o t a l  o f  the T -  and F-columns, and in d ic a te s  the . 
number o f  Hlders showing a bias in e i t h e r  d i r e c t i o n .
^This column gives  the  level  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  a t  whIch i t  can be said t h a t  
the frequenc ies  o f  the two t r i a l s  d i f f e r .
V
ft
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TABLE 10
Frequencies o f  Bias in Guesser 's










200 p 1 ays 
1s t  block  
2nd block  












I I  ( 1 5 .1 5 % )  
5 (6.25%)  
9 ( 1 1 .25%)  
9 ( 1 1 .25%)  
4 (5%)
.05
r p 200 p 1 ays .1 8 9 (45%) - .05
1s t  block 0 5 5 (25?) .05Condi t io n 2nd b lock 1 6 7 (35?)N-ZU 3rd block 1 7 8 (40?) .05
4th block 0 1 I (5?)
'This t a b l e  does not  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  between r i g h t  and l e f t  choices ,  but  
only  between Guesser's  \tendency t o  use the 'B '  s t r a t e g y  ( I . e . ,  obey I t 's  
message) and t h e  'D '  s t r a t e g y  ( I . e . ,  disobey I t 's message). Whether o r  not  
th e re  e x i s t e d  a bias  was determined by whether o r  no t  m| and qj were shown
t o  be s t a t i s t i c a l l y  dependent by a ch i -sq u are  s t a t i s t i c  a t  the .05  level
o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e .
^Thls column g iv es  the t o t a l  o f  th e  B- and D-columns, and In d ic a te s  th e  • 
number o f  Guessers showing a b ias  In e i t h e r  d l r e c t i o f t .
^Thls column gives  the  level  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  a t  wh'Ich I t  can be  s a id  t h a t
the f requencies  o f  th e  two biases d i f f e r .
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Of the  20, 5 proved to  be both ways ' i r r a t i o n a l ' ,  and 10 seemed 
to  be ' r a t  iona I ' -. ' •
. The i n t e r e s t i n g  f e a t u r e s  of  the m a t r ix  o f  c o r r e l a t i o n s
between p l a y e r s '  s t r a t e g i c  b iases ,  given  in Table  I I ,  is the
1
f a c t  t h a t  H id e r ' s  o v e r a l l  b ia s ,  beginning in the  second block,
r '
is n e g a t iv e ly  c o r r e l a t e d  w ith  Guesser 's  bias in th e  f i r s t  block .  
Since ' T ' and 'B' were coded as +1 and ' F ' and TD ' w.ere coded as. 
- I . ,  t h i s  in d ic a te s  t h a t  Guesser 's  s t r a t e g y  in the f i r s t  50 plays  
determined the na ture  o f  H i d e r ' s  r e a c t io n  f o r  the remainder of  
the game.
Table 12 shows the number o f  plays  won by Guesser across  
a l l  c o n d i t io n s .  Although Guesser tended to  win more plays than  
H id e r  in the f i r s t  b lock ,  over  200 plays the  mean.number o f  wins 
was not unusual.  H iders  s u f f e r e d  e a r l y ' l o s s e s  then recovered.  
Note ,  however, that '  t h e  va r ia n c e  in the  number o f  plays  won was 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  l a r g e r  than  could be expected from a random process,  
and t h a t  the major c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h i s  va r ia p ce  came from the  
t h i r d  block.
Table [5 g ives  the  mean b eta -weig hts  In the regress ion  
equat ions which descr fbe the  l i n e a r  dependence of  a p l a y e r 's  
choices (moves) on her  opponent 's  chcflces in the past  f i v e  p lays .  
For H ld ers ,  on ly  the  l j . r s t  two mean c o e f f i c i e n t s  turned out  to  
be s i g n i f i c a n t ;  and in terms o f  the  simple p r e d i c t i o n  of  b in ary
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TABLE I I
S i g n i f i c a n t  C o r r e l a t io n s  Between H id er  




. i- in ® >T3
I . P -  J














































H i de r ' s 200 p 1 ays 1 + .41 + .62 +.  72 + .73 - . 3 9
'T '  vs. 1st b lock + .41 1 + .50 + .22
’ F' bias  
N=80 2nd b lock + .62 + .50
<
1 + .33 + .34 - . 2 6 - . 2 8
3rd b lock t - 72 + .33 1 + .68 - .3 1
4th b lock + .73 + .34 + .68 1 - . 2 3 - . 4 0
200 p 1 ays - . 2 3 1 + .35 + .59
1
+ .49 + .31
1 s t b lock - . 3 9 - . 2 6 - .31 - . 4 0 + .35 1 + .39 +.25
2nd b lock - . 2 8 + .59 + .39 1 +.31
3rd b lock + .49 +.25 + .31 1
•
4th b lock + .22 + .31 I
-
^hown are those c o r r e l a t i o n s  which d i f f e r  from zero a t  a t  le as t  the  
.05 level  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e .
V
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TABLE 12
Mean and Variance o f  th e  Number-'Of Piays  
Won by Guesser Across Al l  Condi tlotvs
Prob (=n /2 ) Variance ■MeanRange
.0582.3701 .800200 pI ays
26 .175s+ 50
3.042nd 50 24 .975
25 .1383rd 50
25 .2634th 50
^A t - t e s t  determined a t  what  s i g n i f i c a n c e  level  the mean number o f  wins 
could be said t o  d i f f e r  from the expected va lu e ,  n /2 .  \
^The observed var iance  was d iv id ed  by the t h e o r e t i c a l  varl fanci  ( n / 4 ) ,  to  
form an F s t a t i s t i c  a t  79 and 79 degrees o f  freedom. This column g ives  
the s i g n i f i c a n c e  leve l  a t  which the hypothesis  t h a t  the two var iances  
were Id e n t i c a l  was r e j e c t e d .




Meansi o f  Standard P a r t  1 a I Regression C o e f f i c i e n t s
in the  P r e d ic t io n  o f  a P l a y e r ’ s Choices Given 
the Opponent’ s Choices In the Previous Five Plays.
p rob (=0)STD-Beta standard
-e r ro r
dependent  
v a r l a b l e
indepen dent  
uar i  able
0.0176 .001
- 0 . 0 2 1 3 0 .0 0 8 8 .05
0 .0 0 6 0.0070- 3HI de r 1 
Choi ce 0 .0 06 30 .0 024- 4
0029N=80
0.00760.0102m-
0.0037- 0 . 0 0 1 8-2
0.0065- 0 . 0 0 3 6- 3
0 .00 18 0.0032- 4





0 .0 04 8  ’
0 .0 057  






0 .0024 0 .0054Guesser’ 
Cho i ce
N=80 - 0 . 0 0 2 8 0.0i
-0 .0 0 5 7
o.odos
- 0 . 0 0 8 7
.0050
0.0074- 3
' .050 .0 042- 4
0.0021 0.0020
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TABLE 13 cont inued
r
t . 'i  “ '
p rob (=0)standard






-0 .0 0 0 9
0 .0016- 0 . 0 1 6 81-2
0 .0070
0 .0 079  • 0 .0 0 7 81-4
Condi 11 on 
N=20
- 0 . 0 0 8 3
- 0 . 0 3 1 0
0.0190- 0 .0 1 3 8
- 0 .0 1 7 3
A standard p a r t i a l  regression c o e f f i c i e n t  (STD-beta)  Is the o r i g i n a l  
b e ta -w e lg h t  m u l t i p l i e d  by the  r^atlo o f  the  standard  d e v ia t io n  o f  the  
Independent v a r i a b l e  and the  standard  d e v ia t io n  o f  the dependent v a r i a b l e .
^Thls column represents  the s i g n i f i c a n c e  leve l  of a t - t e s t  on t he
/  hypothesis t h a t  the  STD-beta va lue  Is equal t o  zero .  ^ n_| = STD-beta /  
*  standard e r r o r ) .
\
^  "  ir *■ ■ ■ «» 'r ~ r e • -r1- - - r■ . : « «
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events ,  as in p r o b a b i l i t y - l e a r n i n g ,  t h e i r  signs imply the so-  
c a l l e d  p o s i t i v e  recency e f f e c t .  The f i r s t  c o e f f i c i e n t  in the  
p r e d i c t i o n  o f  g r e f l e c t s  Guesser 's  bias towards obedience;  o t h e r ­
wise,  Guessers did not  d isp lay  any recency e f f e c t .
I f  the regression  F - s t a t i s t i c s  associated 'with the l in e a r  
p r e d ic t io n s  were s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  the 0 .0 5  l e v e l ,  t h i s  co n d i t io n  
def ined  " p r e d i c t a b i l i t y " .  I t  happened t h a t  the numbers o f  cases 
in which p, m, and g were p r e d ic t a b l e  were p ro por t io na l  to  the  
f requencies  of  t h e i r  b ia s ,  4 ! ? ,  \J>%, and \A% r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  with  
in the GP c o n d i t io n .
As shown in Tab le 14, the frequency of  any dependency between 
s t r a te g y  on piay j and s t a t e  on pI ay j was s u b s tan t ia !  f o r  k = I , 
and dropped o f f  as k increased.  Although across a l l  c o n d i t io n s ,  
the dependency curves f o r  H ider  and Guesser proved to be s i g n i f ­
i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t ,  ( KoImogorov-Smirnov D=0.29,  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  
0 . 0 1 ) ,  w i t h i n  the GP_ c o n d i t io n  the hypothesis o f  i d e n t ic a l  d i s t ­
r i b u t i o n  fu nc t ions  could not be r e j e c t e d  ( D = 0 . l l ) .  In Table  
15, the p r i n c i p a l  component loadings demonstrate roughly the  
r e l a t i v e  independence of  the depth of  the p la y e r s '  s t a t e - c o n d i t io n e d  
dependencies across a l l  80 games.
The mean values of  the  s t a t e . c o n d i t i o n a l  p ro p e n s i t ie s  
are given in Tab le  16. Note t h a t  most means d i f f e r  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
from 1 /2 ,  implying t h a t  net  dependencies obta ined  over 200 p lays .




Frequencies o f  the Depth of  S ta te -C o n d i t io n e d  
S t r a t e g i c  Dependencies
Depth * Hiders  (N=80) Guessers
n
SI g -ch l- sq  uare
1 54 23 . <  .005 r,
2 29 5- <  .005
3 15 ' 14
4 12 * 22
5 • 11 7 ■
bona f i d e  Hiders and Guessers In the GP Condi t ion
N=20
1 I f  a p l a y e r ' s  s t r a t e g y  on p la y  i was shown to be dependent (by a ch i-square  
s t a t i s t i c  a t  the .05 l e v e l )  upon the s t a t e  o f  p la y  I - k ,  ther) t h a t  p lay er  
Is  s a id  to  d isp lay a s t a t e - c o n d i t i o n e d  dependency o f  depth k.
^TMssco l  umn gives the s i g n i f i c a n c e  (eve! o f  a ch i -square  . t e s t  on the  
hypothesis t h a t  the f requenc ie s  o f  Hiders  and Guessers are e q u a l .
‘  ■
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TABLE 15
Rotated Factor  S o lu t i o n  o f  the  Depth o f  S t a te -Cond i t i oned  
S t r a t e g i c  Dependencies'
State
Factors
1 , 1 1 11 !
. 1









- .1 42  
.297 





- ; 5 2 l
-.,580
.014
1 .392 - .322 -.021
H i d e r ' s  _ ? .594 - .048 - .366
Dependency
.312 .755 .037
4 .770 .108 - .140
5 .670 . 125 .121
e igenva lue 2.097 1 .578 1.372
re 1 a t  1 ve %
va r iance 37.38 • 31.87 30.75
cumu1 a t ! v e  %
var iance/ 18.87 34.87 50.48
'T h is  w a s -a " p r i n c i p a l  components a n a ly s i s  employing  a r i g i d  r o t a t i o n .
- 1 ■ '
I f  a c h i - squa re  s t a t i s t i c  In d i c a te d  a dependency a t  the  .05 level  between
s t r a t e g y  on p lay  I and th e  outcome o f  p lay  I - k ,  then the  " s t a t e - K  dependency"
was ooded as I ;  i f  n o t ,  I t  was coded as 0.
1
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TABLE 16
Mean Values o f  Cond it io na l  p roDensi+ies
Propensity Mean Standard Dev ia t ion Drob ( = . 5 ) 1
HI de rs V ,
a VH 0.441 0 .1 65 .01
N=80 XPH 0 .503 0 .  197
i XH 0 .550 0 .1 87 .05
YPH 0 .4 10 0 .  154 < .001
Guessers: .
N=80 XG 0 .5 70 0 .0 9 6 < .001
YG 0.554 0 .0 76 < .001
■ YPG 0 .5 2 8 0 .  101 .05
XPG 0 .5 17 0 ,1 1 3
Bona Fide 
Guessers I XGn 0..562 0.281
th e  GP YG 0 .585 0.109 .01
Con d 111 on : YPG 0 .4 26 0 .1 1 3 .01
N=20 XPG
*
0 .416 0.141 .01
'Th is  column gives the s i g n t f I c a n c e  level  o f  a t - t e s t  on the hypothesis  
t h a t  the p ro pens ity  Is equal to  1 /2 .
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Bona f i d e  G u es s e rs ^  p r o p e n s i t i e s  s l g n i f y  an a l m o s t  u n i f o r m  b i a s '
$ *
t o w a r d s  o b e d i e n c e .  H i d e r s '  p r o p e n s i t i e s  seem d e f i n i t e l y  s t a t e -
c o n d i t i o n e d .  A p r i n c i p a l  compon en ts  s o l u t i o n  i n  T a b l e  1 7 , shows 
1 '  
how H i d e r s '  p r o p e n s i t i e s  c l u s t e r  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  l o w e r - l e v e l  -
. s t r a t e g i c  b iases .  Three of  Guesser ’ s p r o p e n s i t i e s  load o n , th e
' ' /  , ' 
t h i r d  f a c t o r , ,  and t h e  f a c t  t h a t ' X G  . loads on t h e  f i r s t  f a c t o r  w i t h
XPH aj^d YPH, i l l u s t r a t e s  t h a t  Guesser 's  p ro p en s i ty  t o  p e r s i s t
* ■ -a *
w i t h  o b e d i e n c e  f o l l o w i n g  s u c c e s s  i s  c o r r e l a t e d  w i t h  B i d e r ’ s t e n d -
v ,
i ■ * ’ .
ency to  p e r s i s t  w i th  f a l s e  in s t r u c t i o n s  regard le ss  of. the previous
t  , ‘
o u tc o m e .  1 '
* r 9 " * . • I
More .me^ningfu I than the c o n d i t io n a l  p r o p e n s i t i e s  themselves ,  ■'
v  • r  - ,
v  are t h e i r  I i neaV combi nat ions;  In the form o,f the s t r a t e g i c  depen-
' ' * •? \
dencies presented in T a b l e - 1-8.^ H iders had a s i g n i f i c a n t  tendency 
towards p o s i t i v e  s t r a t e g i c  recency,  t h a t  i s ,  a tendency t o  a n t i c i p a t e
an Immediate* r e p e t i t i o n  of  Guesser'-s s t r a t e g y . .  Note t h a t " t h i s
* ' ' * * 1
Index c o - e x i s t s ' w i t h  [ )p s i t i v e  recency a t \ t h e  level  o f  moves, and'
. . . .  i 9b ’ ' . *
the j o i n t  e f f e c t  is c y c l i c . .  Hiders ^ Iso  tended t o  a l t e r n a t e  th e i r *  
s t r a t e g  i e s ' f o l  lowi ng a pf^ay they had j u s t  l o s t .
'The 20 bona f i d e  Guessers apparent  I y>had no s i g n i f i c a n t  In ­
d ices  o f  s t r a t e g i c  dependency. HpweveV, a 1.1 the*Guessers taken r~-




as a group d i s p l a y e d ' p o s i t i v e  s t r a t e g i c  f  lux,  a tendency t o  repeat
*  ' <* ■
. ( f  s t r a t e g i e s  regard le ss  o f  the  most recen t  outcome. 'T h u s ' th e '  ;
recency e f f e c t  H iders  d isp la y  is reasonab le ,  i f  no t ' - ’ r a t i o n a l  ’ .
. ;  • 4  -• . - V  . *
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TABLE 17
Rotated Fac to r  So lu t Io n  o f  Condit iona l  P ro p e n s i t ies
Factors
Propens I ties'' 1 1 1 1 1 1
‘YH ' .267 .835 - .  109




- .1 4 9
- .8 6 9
.895  
- .  128
.040
.077
XG - . 3 9 7 .327 - . 0 2 6
r  YG Guesser - . 2 5 5
.117 .557
YPG .003 .005 - .8 3 1
XPG - . 0 3 7 ' .200 ' - . 8 1 2
El gen value,. 2 .176 1 .676 1 .406
r e l a t i v e  % .variance 35.84 31 .85 32 ,-29
cumulat ive  % v a r ia n c e - 23.55 44 .50 65 .7 2
*ThIs was a prl  nc I pah'components ana lys is  employing a r i g i d  r o t a t i o n ,  
<•* *  .
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TABLE 18
Mean Values o f  Ind ices of  S t r a t e g i c  Dependency
1 ndex Mean Standard D e v ia t io n prob (= 0)*
h ^de r s : N= 80
*
s t r a t e g i c  recency 0 .  104 0 .1 2 3 ■ < . 0 0 1
s t r a t e g i c  f l u x • - 0 . 0 4 4 0 .2 20
response to success 0 .0 5 2 0 .2 9 3
response to  f a i l u r e - 0 . 1 4 5 0 .2 0 4 < . 0 0 1
Guessers: N=80
s t r a t e g i c  recency O.OOZ 0.0 80
s t r a t e g i c  f l u x 0 .0 8 6 0 .  108 < . 0 0 1
. response to success 0 .090 0 .1 55 < . 0 0 1
response to f a i l u r e - 0 .0 7 2 0 .1 1 7 < . 0 0 1
Bona FI de
Guessers In the GP 
Condi t io n :  N=20 '
- •
s t r a t e g i c  recency . - 0 . 0 1 7 ' 0 .0 9 4
s t r a t e g l c  f 1 ux -C .005 0 .07 2
'response to success - 0 .0 2 3 0 .1 3 2
response t o  f a i l u r e - ^ . 0 1 2 0 .102  .
Th is  column gives th£ s i g n i f i c a n c e  level  o f  a t f - t e s t  on the  hypothesis  
t h a t  the  Index Is equal t o  0 .  '  \
r
*  ,>
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C o r r e la t i o n s  between the ind ices  o f  s t r a t e g i c  dependency*are g iven  
in Tab le  \9 »  The lack of r e l a t i o n  between p l a y e r s ’ In d i o i e s  b e s p e a k ^ ^ y / ^  
a - c e r t a i n  lack of responsiveness a t  t h i s  le ve l  o v e r a l l .
When the s t e a d y - s t a t e  s o lu t io n s  of the Markov model (see Appendix 
C,5 were compared with  the observed s t a t e  f requencies over 200 p la ys ,  
the  model provided a good f i t  in a l l  but  4 out  of  80 games. Since «
the model 's  parameters were not independently e s t im a ted ,  but stemmed 
d i r e c t l y  out  o f  the p la y e r s '  c o n d i t io n a l  p r o p e n s i t i e s ,  i t s  success 
should not  be s u r p r i s in g .  The f a i l u r e  o f  the Markov model In 4 cases 
^  is- s u r p r i s i n g .  What is s i g n i f i c a n t  is the f a c t  t h a t  the f a i l u r e s
a l l  occurred in games between two b o n a ' f i d e  p la y e r s ,  and when Hider  
.bel ievpd she was p lay in g  a^bona f i d e  Guesser.  I f  the fo u r  f a i l u r e s  
were a c t u a l l y  randomly d i s t r i b u t e d  .among the G c o n d i t i o n s ,  then the  
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a l l  tu rn ing  up in the  G P 'co n d i t io n  would be less than
0 .0 0 4 .  The Im p l ic a t io n  is t h a t  in th e  bona f i d e  games the depend-
f
encies  which were rooted f u r t h e r  back than the previous  play  were
such t h a t  asymptot ic  s t e a d y - s t a t e s  were n e v e r ^ s t a b l  1 shed in 200 p lay s .
> In o t h e r  words, th e r e  was more genuine Play  in a c t i o n .
The e f f e c t s  due t o  th e  Independent v a r i a b le s  on those measures
discussed so f a r  are summarized in Tab le  20.. One would expect  t o  ^
f in d  Guesser 's  play t o  show a 'Guesser e f f e c t ' ,  and t h e r e f o r e  such v- 
*
re la t ion sh ip 's  s h a l l  not  be mentioned In the o u t l i n e  which f o l lo w s .  *
0
Hiders t o l d  th ey  were p la y in g  a g a in s t  an automaton* (HD_'s) showed
• ■ y




S i g n i f i c a n t  C o r r e la t io n s  Between Indices o f  S t r a t e g i c  Dependency
in tn ©L. inin ©u
5- ©V Z> u 8 z>C V r— c O —© X ZJ © 0) X 3 rao n (A s- u ZJ in s-4) — © —i_ *4— O-4- O ' 4— 04- O4-O o o- o•— «— © ® -d •— © ©ov O) w in 05 O) (A in© © c c € © • C c4- +- o o 4- 4- o o<0 ro ci- O- © © CL ci-i- L- in CA W in-Hin . 4-V) £ £ -4- •in 4-tn © £
in lA in U7 in cn in lA
r ̂ 54 xl <S> I o| bi o|
H's s t r a t e g i c  recency 1 + .46 + .7 7
H 's s t r a t e g i c  f l u x + .46 1 + .91 + .83
H ’ s response t o - success + .77 + .91 1 + .58
H 's response to  f a l l u r e + .83 + .58 I
Gjs' s t r a t e g i c  recency 1 + .36 + .76 - . 2 4
Gjs s t r a t e g i c  f l u x + .36 1 + .87 + .66
£ s response to success + .76 + .87 1 + .32
Gjs PSsponse to  f a l l u r e - . 2 4 + .66^ + .32 1
n
Shown are those c o r r e l a t i o n s  which d i f f e r  from zero a t  a t  l e a s t  the .05  
level  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  N=*80.


















Summary o f  Analyses o f  Var iance Due to  In s t r u c t io n s  Given to  H id er
*
(TNb ' H l d e r  E f f e c t ' O a n d  Four Guessers (The 'Guesser E f f e c t ' )
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Bias In p o v e r  200 plays .23 1 .35 1 .35 1 .49 1 .41 12
Bias In 1st  50 . 14 0 * 24 - .21 .21 2 *
Bias ln^2nd 50 .1 3 .85 1 . 86 1 .36 1 .'50 13 *
Bias I n ’ 3rd 50 .21 .24 1 .42 1 .03 1 .08 10
Bias In 3th 50 .17 0 1 .06 1 .94 1 .29 1 1
Bias In m over  200 plays .13 1 .60 a80 1 .87 1 .37 12
.Bias In 1st  5Q . 14 ,37 .49 .37 .42 4
Bias In 2nd 50 . 12 .41 3. 27 .05 .41 1 .63 14 + .005
Bias In 3rd 50 .14 1 .38 1 . 04 1.15 1.14 10 A c
Bias In 4tn 50 .17 .68 1 .89 ■ .88 1.29 1 1 + . 0 ;
Bias In g o v e r  200 plays .09 .13 3.71 .05 .85 1 .98 .16 + -QR5
Bias In 1st 50 .06 ,22. 3. 15 .05 .22 1 .47 13 + :005
Bias In 2nd 50 .08 .15 , 15 1 .78 .85 8
Bias In 3rd 50 . 10 .13 3. 61 .05 . 13 1 .62 .14 •f* .005
Bias  In 4th 50 .05 2 .0 8 3 . 31 .05 .85 2 .0 8 17 + .005
Standard ized  runs- In p
o v e r  200 plays 7.80 .08 3. 48 .05 . 12 1 .55 13 .005
" In 1st  5 0 *  ' 4,41 .27 1. 17 .28 .66 6
” In 2nd 50 2,75 .59 3. 78 .05 ,64 1 .98 16 + .05 — .005
" Ip 3rd 50 3,26 0 3 .7 3 .05 .30 1 .72 14 - .005
















CD - --O '
3Q.C
§. , TABLE 20 ( C o n t 'd )
• ® \













H ld er  
s E f f e c t
Guesser
E f f e c t
H*G In­
t e r a c t i o n









































Standard ized  runs, In A
'S -
m over  200 p 1 ays 4 .2 6 .92 5'.39 . W .26 2 .5 5 .03 20 - .01 - .001
" In 1st 50 4.01 .40 4 . 1 3 .o\l .34 1 .97 16 - .05 — .005
" In 2nd 50 1.77 .10 2 .10 .22 I .01 9
" I n & r d  50 2 . 9 2 1 .86 2r63 .  • ■! .47 1 .59 13 - .05 - .05
" 1 n-iyth 50 3 .0 6 1 .24 3 .0 7 .05 .05 1 .51 13 - .05 — .05
StandardIzed^f f ins In
q o v e r  200 plays 2 . 4 3 .75 2 .69 (» 7 1.83 2 .0 4 17 — .05 [
" !In 1st  50 1 .34 .69 3.29 .05 ' ' .s i 1 .72 -14 — ( .  10)
» In 2nd 50 1 .21 .01 2 .1 3 .36 1 .07 9 - .05
" In 3 r d ^ 0 1 .52 3.38 .21 3.60 .05 2.11 17
" In 4 th  50 1 .19 .01 2 . 8 3 .05 2.58 2 . 3 2 .05 18 .05 — .05
Bias In H 's  s t r a t e g y
over  200 plays .48 .03 3 .1 4 .05 1 .20 1.86 — .005
" In 1s t  50 .26 1 .76 1 .89 .59 1 .31 t » 1 1
" In 2nd 50 .25 .05 2 .46 1 .53 1 .72 14 - .01
" In 3rd 50 .34 .45 2 .9 6 .05 .24 1 .40 12 - .01
" In 4th 50 .30 .37 *2.67 .48 1 .42 12 — .01
Bias  tn G's  s t r a t e g y
over 200 plays .12 .  1 1 6 .7 6 .001 .  1 1 2 . 9 6 .01 22 ■ +4 .0001
” In 1st  50 ' .06 0 5 .7 4 .005 .52 2 . 6 8 .05 21 ’ + .0005 + .05
" tn 2nd 50 .10 .08 3 .3 2 .05 C \ 2 1 .63 14 V + .005
" In 3rd 50 .10 .17 5 .3 5 .005 .4 8 2 .6 6 .05 21 > + .0005






















Dependent V a r i a b l e
PI ays won by £  over  
200 plays  
" In 1st 50 
" In 2nd 50 
" In 3rd 50 
11 In 4th 50
P r e d l c t a b l 1 1 t y  o f  2
P| u  
P r e d l c t a b l I I t y  o f  3 
m,
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• • .64 2 . 4 8j r 1 .35 12 [
14.23 .43 .13 ' l 8 .19 2
l
12.97 .02 '■'.23 2 .2 4 1 .06 9
2 2 .40 I .03 .03 .73 .47 4
15.73 .13 ! .67 1 .30 1 .29 1 1
.24 1.32 1 .74 1 .04 1 .38 12
-■ .05
.11 0 1 .35 .90 .96 9 '
.0 8 1 .42 14.89 .0001 .58 6 . 8 3 .0001 40 + .0001
.02 4.83 .05 1 .37 1 .50 1 .92 16 + .05
.01 1 .32 .19 • .71 .57 5
.004 5.38 .74 I .70 1 .53 13
.003 .03 1 .48 1 .32 1 .20 10
.002 1.49 .63 .24 .59 5
.005 .01 .25 .89 .49 5 ' -
.001 .46 .38 .31 .36 3
.003 .07 .93 2 .3 3 1 .41 12 X
.001 .31 1 .23 1 .23 1 . 10 10
.002 3.88 .05 2 . 7 9 .09 2 .5 9 .05 1 .99 16 - .05 + .05
.009 .03 7 . 0 8 .0005 .03 3.05 .01 23
+ .  000
.002 .28 1.18 2 .4 6 1 .60 13
.002 .17 1 .21 .23 .64 . 6 noR
.003 .06 3. 18 .05 . 5 L 1 .59 13
.00 2.00 1 .33 .,67 1.14 10













TABLE 20 ( C o n t ' d )
Dependent V a r i a b l e
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to CO 1 to S I to
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+ .01 + .05
.05 + .01
.0001 • - .005
.0001 .05
0001 - .0005 - .0001
0001 - .05 “ + .001
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A ’ c o n t r a s t - c o d e d ’ dummy v a r i a b l e  scheme was generated t o  account f o r  the indenendent v a r i a b l e s . .  These ' J
columns give  the  r e s u l t s  o f  t - t e s t s  on those dummy v a r i a b l e s '  be ta  we ights In a . l i n e a r  regress ion  e q u a t io n .
The sign o f  th e  simple main e f f e c t  I n d ic a t e s  which mean Is  g r e a t e r ;  f o r  example,  I f  th e  'HP-HO* e f f e c t  were 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  p o s i t i v e ,  t h i s  would I n d i c a t e  t h a t  the  mean o f  the dependent v a r i a b l e  f o r  the  HP̂  group was 
l a r g e r .
2 3 4
' ' P r e d i c t a b i l i t y '  here r e l a t e s  to  the F s t a t i s t i c  due t o  regress io n  when a p l a y e r ' s  choices were regressed  
upon h is  cppdnent's choices In th e  prev ious f i v e  n l a y s .  I f  th e  F was s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  the .05 l e v e l ,  ' p r e d i c t a b i l i t y '  
was coded as I ;  o th erw ise  as 0,
^ m o fy e  of  a p o s i t i v e  recency e f f e c t ,  in terms o f  moves, than Hiders  
t o l d  they were p lay in g  another  su b je c t  (H P jS ) .  S i m i l a r l y ,  HD's 
tended t o  respond t o  success with s t r a t e g i c  p e r s is t e n c e ,  w h i le  
HP_’ ŝ  actua 1 1 y had a s l i g h t  tendency t o  reverse s t r a t e g i e s  f o l lo w in g  
success.
There was no main ' H id e r  e f f e c t ’ on the  number of p lays won in
the game, a l though t h e r e  was a simple e f f e c t  a g a in s t  the GDI dr i b I i  ng.'
HD’ s won more plays than HP’ s,  ( 1 0 1 .2  to* 95 r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  s i g n i f y
1
cant  a t  0 . 0 5 ) ,  and t h i s ,  i f  an y th in g ,  serves t o  c o n t r a d i c t  the a -
p r i o r i  hypotheses concerning wins.  S .
Hiders produced more runs in p in response t o  GD2 than to  G D I ,
e s p e c i a l l y  in the  second and t h i r d  blocks;-  and in the second block
produced fewer runs in response to  the  d r i b l i n g s  than the o th er  G_'s.
With regards t o  th e  var . iab le  m, GO I produced more bias .in the
second block than GD2. In the f i r s t ,  t h i r d ,  and fo u r th  b locks ,  as
wel l  as over a l l  200 p la y s ,  Hiders generated too few runs when
play in g  bona' f i d e  Guessers,  and ' fewer in response t o  GDI than t o  GD2.
E s p e c ia l l y  in th e  t h i r d  b lock ,  and over  the  e n t i r e  game, Hiders
tended to  l i e  more o f t e n  than be t r u t h f u l  when p lay ing  the bona f i d e
Guessers as opposed t o  the driblings..*"' ' ' -
\
Note t h a t  the  number o f  p lays  won by Guesser remained e n t i r e l y  
u n a f fe c ted  by which Guesser H ld er  faced .  Both d r i b l i n g s  were e q u a l l y  
i n e f f e c t i v e .  Fur thermore ,  a  se p ara te  a n a l y s is  f a i l e d  to  uncover any
*
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i n t e r a c t i o n s  between .H iders ,  Guessers,  and b lo ck ,  w it h  regard to
th e  number o f  wins.
H id ers *  c o n d i t io n a l  p ro p e n s i t i e s  and i.ndices of  s t r a t e g i c
dependency were,  however, a f f e c t e d  by Guesser,  regard less  of  the
i n s t r u c t io n s  Hiders were g iv e n .  For the d r ibF in gs  as a group, YH
was la rger , '  and GDI e l i c i t e d  the  la rg e s t  pro pens ity  t o  f o l lo w  a
•1
*BT’ outcom e  w i t h  th e  *Tt s t r a t e g y .  The d r i b l i n g s  produced a
g r e a t e r  tendency in Hiders t o  fo l lo w  a !BF* outcome wi th  ’ T* .
&
And H i d e r ' s  propens ity  to  fo l lo w  *DT’ w ith  *T 1 was g r e a t e r  in 
response t o  GDI than t o  GD2. :
t ' .
Hiders*  s t r a t e g i c  f l u x  was more in the d i r e c t i o n  of a l t e r n a t i o n  
when fac ing  GR, ( - 0 . 1 2 9 ) ,  than GP Guessers, ( - 0 . 0 4 6 ) .  More s i g n i f ­
ic an t  in t h i s  respect  was the d i f f e r e n c e  between th e  t w o - d r i b l i n g s .  
H iders a l t e r n a t e d  s t r a t e g i e s  in response to  GD2, and p e rs is te d  in 
response to  GD I .
Hiders*  s t r a t e g i c  response t o  success was to  p e r s i s t  aga ins t  
G P 's ,  ( 0 . 0 7 3 ) ,  and a l t e r n a t e  a g a in s t  GR's,  ( - 0 . 0 7 0 ) ;  and al though
r
they  p e rs is te d  in response t o  success a g a in s t  both d r i b l i n g s ,  GDI 
p'roduded s i g n i f i c a n t l y  more p ers is te n c e  than GD2, ( 0 . 1 8 6  t o  0 .014  
r e s p e c t i v e l y ) .
in response t o  f a i l u r e ,  H iders  reversed s t r a t e g i e s  ag a in s t  
both d r i b l i n g s ,  but  d id  so more a g a in s t  GD2 than G D I,  ( - 0 . 1 9 4  to  
- 0 . 0 3 2  r e s p e c t i v e l y ) .
■' • A
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As t o  the post-game q u e s t io n n a i r e ,  Table 21' shows the 
d is p e r s io n  of endorsement. Answers to  the  free - response  item,
m u l t i p l e - c h o i c e  items.  - Frequent comments'-we r e ,  "Since I was
pla y in g  a t  random, t h e r e  wasn.’ t  any game s t r a t e g y " ,  and "Di 'dn' t
use much s t r a t e g y 1' ,  as i f  s t r a t e g y  were i n t u i t i v e l y  more of  a 
V'Nq u a n t i t a t i v e  than a' q u a l i t a t i v e  concept .  In g e n e r a l ,  the f re e
Guesser. Most Hiders reported  t h a t  they b e l ieve d  from the s t a r t
t h e i r  opponent was a c t u a l l y  the ex per im en ter ,  and t h i s  b e l i e f  
was not a l t e r e d  during the course o f  p la y .  The o th er  th re e  i n ­
i t i a l  rep re s e n ta t io n s  underwent m o d i f i c a t i o n s ,  and most suspicions  
arose in the  f i r s t  100 p la y s .  In summary, i t  can be sa id t h a t  
r e p r e s e n ta t io n s  changed, but  did not  change a t  random.
Tab le  23 gives the  m a t r ix  o f  loadings r e s u l t i n g  from a
* \
p r i n c i p a l  components ana I ys i s o f  tITe post-game q u e s t io n n a i re .  
Factor  I is the format ’ r a t i o n a l i t y ’ f a c t o r ,  s ince  i t  impl ies  
a re fu sa l  t o  a n t i c i p a t e  th e  opponent. Factor  V concerns the  
i n t u i t i v e  not ion o f  ’’ r a t i o n a l i t y " .  Items #1 and #2 were,  however,  
p o s i t i v e l y  c o r r e l a t e d  w i t h - #3 and #4;  so t h a t ,  i n t u i t i v e l y , the  
concept  o f  " r a t i o n a l i t y "  seems t o  include a commitment to  sequent-- 
t i a l  reasoning ,  wlnere f o r m a l , g a m e- th eo re t ica l  ’ r a t i o n a l  i t y ’" 
ends up by abandoning reasoning a l t o g e t h e r .  Factor  I I I  involves
#13,  were t y p i c a l l y  redundant with  res-pect to  the  twe lve
‘ comments were vague,  and when s p e c i f i c ,  o f t e n  in c o n s is t e n t .  ^
‘v  . ' i j J
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TABLE 21
Response Frequencies on Post-Game Quest ionnai re  Across
A11 Condi t io n s
Skew'
t
1. Would you say t h a t  you played r a t i o n a l l y ?
51 -  "Yes."  y ‘
19 -  "Cannot s a y . "
10 -  "No." * .' '
.005
V
2.  Would you say t h a t  your opponent played r a t i o n a l l y ?
44 -  "Yes ."  • t 
■31 -  "Cannot say ."
5 - ' ' Y "  . v
.005
3.  Were you’ t r y i n g  to a n t i c i p a t e  a n W o r  o u t w i t  your opponent?
39 "Yes,  c o n s t a n t l y . "  V .y— ’ "S
40 -  "Some o f  t h e ’time";.
1 -  " D e f i n i t e l y  n p t . "  ' 6
v.005
4.  Do you t h t n k  your opponent was t r y i n g  t o  a n t i p t p a t e  an d /or  
o u t w i t  you? \  y Y
43 -  "Yes, c o n s t a n t l y . "  .— r—~—  ’ __ .
33 -  "Some o f  the t im e ."
4 -  " D e f i n i t e l y  n o t . "  ' • /* t /
_J)0'5
5. Were you making your choices a t  random, o r  were you f o l lo w in g  
some s t r a t e g i c  plan? - .
14 -  " I  was t r y f n g  t o  choose a t  random." /
62 -  "1 was fo l lo w in g  a loose s o r t  o f  plarrr"
4 ^ik&l was fo l lo w in g  a s t r i c t  p l a n . "
.05
6 .  Do you t h i n k  your  opponent was making choices a t  random, or  
foi lowing some s o r t - o f  plan?
13 -  "Choosing a t  random." ■
53 -  '"Fol lowing a loose s o r t  of p l a n . "
14 -  "F o l lc w ln a  a s t r i c t  p la n .?
■ " /
n . s .
7 .  When you won, t o  what  did you a t t r i b u t e  your success in  
general?
24 -  "To good lu c k . "
53 -  "To somet imes- luck,  o t h e r  t imes s k i l l . "  '
6 -  "To your  s k i l l  a t  p r o b le m -s o lv in g ."
-------------------- - --------------------------------------------- :---------------- «------------------------------------------------------
.005
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TABLE 21 . ( C o n + ' d )
Skew
8. -Whenlyou lo s t ,  to  what did you a t t r i b u t e  your f a i l u r e  in
,__j pane ra I?
I 4 -  "To bad Iu c k ."
42 -  *”76—sqmeti mes luck,  o t h e r ' t im e s  s k i l l . "
24 -  "To your opponent's s k i l - K a t  prob lem-so lv ing
9 .  ' At t h e  very beglnhlnp of the game, 
b e l i e v e  you w ere .p la y in g  against?
Jt^onyRd r e a l l y
21 -  "A naive su b je c t  l i k e  y o 'u rs e l f . "
6 -  "The e x p e r l r e n t e r ' s  c o n f e d e r a t e . "  /
37 -  "The experimenter  h i m s e l f . "  ' '
16 -  "A t h i n k i n g ,  non-hufnan machine o r  automaton of ,  
some s o r t . "
,-n . s .
1 0 . ' Did you acqu ire  any suspicions or  doubts about the real  
i d e n t i t y  of  your opponent? : ’
8 -  "I became extremely  s u s p ic io u s ."
16 -  "1 became somewhat su s p ic io n s ."
26 -  " I  became only s l i g h t l y  s u sp ic io u s ."
30 -  "I never had any 'cioubts.”
I f  you did  becom^jsuspicious about your opponent, when did  
' these doubts f i r s t 1 ar ise?
« /
24 -  "During the f i r s t  50 p l a y s . "  
22 -  "D ur in g -the  second 50 p l a y s . "  
4 - -  "During the t h i r d  40 p l a y s . "
2 -  "During the fo ur th  50 p l a y s . "  
17 -  "Only ju s t  now."
12. Now t h a t  y6u have been gleen an o p p o r tu n i ty  to  s e r i o u s l y  
consider  the q u e s t io n ,  whom do you not* t h i n k  ydu were 
p la y in g  against?
12 -  "A naive s u b je c t  l i k e  y o u r s e l f . "
5 -  "The exp er lm e nte r 's  c o n f e d e r a t e . ' r 
47 -  "The exper im enter  h im s e l f .
16 -  "A t h i n k i n g ,  non-human machine or  automaton o f  
some s o r t . "
*Thls column, f o r  items I through 8, gives t h e . l e v e l  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  
a c h i -s q u a re  s t a t i s t i c  (Ta^-b) /a+b)  on the hypothesis t h a t  the d is pers io n  
about the c e n t r a l  response is symmetr ic . .
5





Changes^ in H id e r 's  Representat ion o f  Guesser
N
I n i t i a l  Representat ion
A Bona Fide Subject
The Experimenter 's  Confederate
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Changes in Representa t ion ' .005
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.‘ This row ts t h e - l e v e l  of  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  a c h i -s q u a re  s t a t i s t i c ,  I . e . ,  the 
p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  a p a r t i c u l a r  I n i t i a l  r e p re s e n t a t io n  remained unchanged.
t
2. This Is the p r o b a b i l i t y  i t i a t ,  in g e n e r a l ,  i n i t i a l  and f i n a l  representat ions'  were 
I d e n t i c a l .  The c h i -s q u a re  s t a t i s t i c  was computed by squaring the d i f f e r e n c e  
between the sums o f  on-  and o f f - d i a g o n a l  elements and d i v i d in g  by 80.
► O
^This ts the level o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  the  ch i -s q u a re  s t a t i s t i c  f o r  the compfete  
3x3 cont ingency fa b le ,  and Im pl ies  t h a t  i n i t i a l  and f i n a l  r ep rese n ta t io n s  were  
s t a t i s t i c a l l y  dependent.  ' ■













Rotated Factor  So lu t io n  o f  Post-Game Oues f ionna ire  *
I tem Number . • Factors -------
1 1 1 I 11 IV V
1 .138 .019 - . 0 6 6 - .  190 .848
2 .075 .052 - . 0 6 8 .169 .781
3 .605 - . 0 8 5 .056 .0-18 .299
'4 .688 . 140 . .134 .064 • .363
5 - . 1 4 8 - . 0 7 0  L .740 • .027 - .  179
6 .007 .021 .797 - . 0 4 6 .050 :
7 -•.682 - . 0 6 6 .503 .010 - . 0 0 7
8 - . 7 8 3 - . 1 0 9 .272 .014 .212
9 .059 .014 ' - . 0 4 3 .813 .072
- 10 - . 0 1 2  - .912 ‘ L .070 .030 - . 0 1 3
1 1 .132 .864 137 *  .006 .087
12 - . 0 2 4 .008 .024 .837 - . 0 6 6
Ei gt^nval ue 2 . 7 3 ! .53 I .51 I .42 I .07
% re  1 a t  I v e ■varlance 2 4 .0 3 19.72 18.95 17.37 19.93
% cumulat i ve
var lance 16.54 30 .11 . 43 .2 6 55.22 68 .94





^Thls was a p r i n c i p a l  components a n a lys is  with' a r i g i d  r o t a t i o n .
2 •
Fac to r  r e l i a b i l i t y  was est imated  by c o e f f I c l e n t - a l p h a ,  being k r ,  j / U t f c k
. j )  where k Is the number o f  I tems,  and J >  I . -
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the s t r a t e g  i c. o rder  I i ness of p la y .  Since item § \  was n e g a t ive ly  
c o r r e I a t e d . with H5, t h i s  would corrobora te  the not ion  t h a t ,  i ntu i t -  
i v e l y , play ing " r a t i o n a l l y "  means p lay ing  according to  some o r d e r ly  
scheme.
» **
Moreover,  what was a - s i n g l e ,  u n i f i e d ,  formal concept became
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y ,  in to  a t  l e a s t  t h r e e  separate  
components. At the same t im e ,  note t h a t  a r e f l e x i v e  p r i n c i p l e  
was in o p era t io n .  That  i s ,  p layers in general  b e l ie v e d  t h a t  t h e i r  
opponents were mimicking t h e i r  own s t y l e  of p l a y ,  s ince the f i r s t  
e i g h t  items were c lu s t e re d  as p a i r s .
■ The independent v a r i a b l e s  had l i t t l e  e f f e c t  on response to
the post-game q u e s t io n n a i re . .  I n i t i a l l y ,  H iders t o t d  they were 
•p lay ing  aga inst  another s u b jec t  -(HF^'s) tended t o  b e l i e v e  they  
were p lay ing  the ex p e r im e n te r 's  confederate,cjw h i Ie  Hiders t o l d  
they were p lac ing  an automaton (HD's)  thought they were p lay ing  
the experimenter  h im s e l f .  A f t e r  the game, the  HD's op in ion had 
not changed, and the  HP_'s were more evenly s p l i t  between v is io n s  of  
the opponent as the experimente r  and h is  co n fe d e ra te . .
There was a s i g n i f i c a n t  i n t e r a c t i o n  e f f e c t ,  a l though no main 
^  e f f e c t s ,  upon item HA ("Do you th^nk your opponent was t r y i n g  to  
- a n t i c i p a t e  and/or  o u t w i t  y ou?") .  The HP's f e l t  th e  d r i b l i n g s  
were constant  I y- t r y  i n g - to  o u t w i t  them,> but  the H ID 's  thought t h a t  
the  d r i b l i n g s  were doing so on ly  sometimes, and t h a t  bona f id e  
Guessers were doing so c o n s t a n t l y .
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?
1 A summary of these an'alyses is given in Table 24. More 
i n t e r e s t i n g  r e s u l t s  were obta.i ned when the q u es t io n n a i r e  responses 
were t r e a t e d  as le ve ls  o f  independent c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  v a r i a b l e s ,  
and the measures descr ib in g  the play were regressed upon them.
The s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t s  due to  items # 2 , #5 ,  #9,  and #12 are sum­
marized in Table 25, and the means and simple main e f f e c t s  are
r~
g i ven i n Tab Ie 26.
The more obedience Guessers d isp layed  in the t h i r d  b lo ck , '
the less l i k e l y  were Hiders to  say t h a t  Guessers played " r a t i o n a l l y " .
On the other , .hand, a t t r i b u t i n g  " r a t i o n a I i t y "  t o  Guesser was d i r -1 4
e c t l y  r e l a t e d  t o  how many p lays Guesser won out  of  the  f i r s t  50.
To the e x t e n t  t h a t  Hiders  sa id  they were randomizing,  the
&
g r e a t e r  was t h e i r  tendency t a  a l t e r n a t e  s t r a t e g i e s ,  both in response 
Jfo success and t o  f a i l u r e .  A p p a re n t ly ,  when H iders were w i l f u l l y  
at tem pt ing  to  randomize they generated too many a l t e r n a t i o n s  of  
s t r a t e g y ,  but otherw ise  not .  Thus is i l l u s t r a t e d  the importance 
of a s c e r t a i n in g  th e  s u b j e c t ' s  own motives be fo re  i n t e r p r e t i n g  
choice p r o to c a ls .
The f a c t  t h a t  the  degree o f  bias in p over 200 plays i^ l a r g e r  
f o r  those Hiders who be l ie ved  i n i t i a l l y  they were p lay in g  the  
experim enter  or'aiT^automaton,  as opposed t o  another bona f i d e  
sub je c t  o r  the  e xp er im en te r 's  c o n fe d e r a te ,  would seem t o  expose 
an ' e x p e r i m a n t a I ' o r . p a t t e r n - r e c o g n i t i o n  s t y l e  on the  p a r t  of  the  
former group,  and a more ' r a t i o n a l '  ( s t r i c t l y  with respect  to



















Sunmary o f  Analyses o f  V a r i a n c e  in Post-Game Q u est io n n a ire  Due to  In s t r u c t io n s  
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Summary o f  Analyses o f  Var iance  Due t o  Post-Game O u es t io n n a i re  Responses v
' S
Independent V a r i a b l e Dependent V a r i a b l e No. o f  Le v e ls ,  
k
E r r o r
Mean
Square
Fk - I , 4 9 ‘ Sig-F^
p2 4K , fi
2
Item 2
G's s t r a t e g i c  b ia s  in 3rd  
• b 1ock













l t « n  
Item 5
FMs s t r a t e g i c  f lyx  
H's response t o  .success 








5 .54  
3.69  







1 tern 9 Bias In p over 200 p lays  
/-*
- 4 , . .211 3.30 .05 45
1 tern 12 _____—
1


















Means and Simple Main E f f e c t s  In V a r ia b le s  R e la ted  to  Post-Game Q ues t io n n a i re
t K
Dependent Yar labJe 1 tem Leve 1 Means/Level
S i mp 1 e 14a ltn ,E f l e t t s /  
■ S i g - t  ■
G's s t r a t e g i c  bias In 3rd 
b lock






(a) ■ (b) (c) ( d0 ‘ f  
'1 . '
, ( ^  vs.  (c )  c o n t r a s t / .005  
(a )  vs. (c )  c o n t r a s t / . 05
0 . 0 *  ' 
26 .52
0 .1 29  
26 .2 6
0 .2 0 0  
*  ■
22 .60
H's s t r a t e g i c  f l u x  
, H's response to  success'  








- . 1 3 9 5
- . 3 0 8 5
- . 0 0 8 6  
* - .  0869 
-  . 1 1 55
.0372  
. 1853 
- . 0 2 0 8
-----  .
(a )  vs.  .(g) c o n t r a s t / . 005 
(a )  vs.  (c)  c o n s t a n t / .05. 
(a)  vs. ( c ) . c o n t r a s t / .005
Bias In p over  2Off  plays
s
§9 4 .2381 ".3333 • .2973 .8125 ( a ) , ( b )  vs. ( c ) ( d )  c o n t r a s t /  
.05 ..
* O
j?lays won by G In 1st 
/  b 1 ock #12 4 26 .08 26 .2 25 .87 27 .  13 
1




' outcomes1 approach on the p ar t  of the L a t te r  group.
F i n a l l y ,  those Hiders who b e l ie v e d  they had played aga ins t  
an automaton tended to  win fewer plays in' the f i r s t  block than 
those who be I ie ved ' th ey  had^pIayed1aga in s t  the exper imenter .
Considering the 10 p la yers  who actua . l ly  faced d r i b l i n g s  and
b e l ieved  they were p l a y in g 'a n  automaton, the mean number of  pi,ays '
won,by the d r i b l i n g s  was 27.1 in the f i r s t  b lo c k ,  and 24 .9  in
the t h i r d .  N e i th e r  d r i b l i n g  can be sa id to  have been, o v e r a l l ,
e i t h e r  successful  or  unsuccessfu l .  Fur therm ore , an a n a lys is  of
v.
var iance  on the number of plays won revealed  no ^e f fec t  due to 
the d i f f e r e n c e  between the two d r i b l i n a s ,  no e f f e c t  between the  
f i r s t  and t h i r d  blocks,  and no i n t e r a c t i o n  e f f e c t ,  ( e r r o r  mean
A
V
square^15 . IS,  F ’ s with  I and 16 d . f . = 2 . 2 3 ,  1 .5 9 ,  and0.2l ,  r e s p e c t i v e ly  
•The r e s u l t s  of .a Q - f a c t o r  a n a ly s is  on both p l a y e r s 1 c o n d i t io n a l  
p ro p e n s i t ie s  is shown in Table 27. The f a c t o r s  here' represent  ^ 
h ypo th e t ica l  b i p o l a r  types of  p lay in g  st-yles,  and f a c t o r  loadings 
are  simply each'game's c o r r e l a t i o n s  wi th  those types .  A game was 
•considered a mixed type i f  the d i f f e r e n c e  between i t s  loadings was 
less than 0 . 3 0 ;  19 games were e l i m in a t e d  oft t h i s  account.  Also,  
^̂ gafjies loading on the minor poles of the  Types were e l i m in a t e d ;  th e re  
were 'in f a c t ,  4 negat iv e  t y p e - 1 ' s ,  and on ly I negat ive type-1 I.!.
A ttep  dropping a t o t a l  of  24 games, we are l e f t  w i th  24 neg at ive  
t y p e - 1 ' s  (henceforth  c a l l e d  t y p e - 1 ' s i ,  21 t y p e - H ' s ,  and 11 type-1 I ' s  
F i r s t _ o f  a l l ,  l e t  i t  be noted t h a t  the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  games.
• ' . A
J '  ^  ■ 
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• '  TABLE 27
'"'-Factor Solut ion of  Eighty Games Based on H id e r  and a*
Guesser's C ond i t io na l  P ro p e n s i t ies *
Game
Types Game
r---  i -4 -
Types'
1 1 1 ‘ I I I 1 1 1 ■ 1 1 1 
: J
1 ■ - . 4 9 9 .76! - . 2 8 7 21 .183.. .698
----- -  » ^
- . 0 5 2
T1* .0 1 8 ' .601 .403 22 - . 2 7 8 - . 1 4 0 .477
3 ..027 .224 ,788 23 - .021 *.668 .894
4 .324 .72? .561 24 - . 6 3 3 .715 - . 1 6 2  .
-5 .141 .172 .952 ' 25 . - . 8 6 4 .016 .089
6 ■ . 154 .629 - .606 26 - . 7 7 4 . .490 ^ 2 9 4
> B
- .  1 18 - . 8 8 5 .41 1 27 - . 1 8 6 ' - . 4 7 5 - .  766
192 .083 .Q05 28 • - . 4 7 2 ' .778 - . 0 0 9
9 .051 .41 1 .666 ‘ 29 - . 7 2 4 , - . 5 9 5 ' .234
10 - .  726 - . 2 9 0 - . 4 1 2 30 - . 5 3 0 : .7 i  i - . 0 2 6
1 1 - .541 - . 3 5 9 .712 31 .466 .814 .226'
1 2 - . 8 1 9  ’ - . 5 0 2 - . 1 2 8 32 . - . 9 3 9  ■ - .061 - .254 .
13 - . 3 6 4 .321 , - .331 33 A  1.82 .901 - . 2 0 7
14 - . 8 6 4 ' J  99, .-332 34 - .361 .353 .61 1
-• 15 - . 7 9 3 .22° .394 35 1 .387 .698 .555
16 .31 1 .593 .467 36 .269 .798 • - . 2 3 3
1 7 - . 2 9 7 - . 1 7 8 .612 ' 37 • - .  806 - . 1 6 0  . .358
1 B . 188 - . 0 9 8 .879 38 - .2 6 4 . .347 - . 8 5 4
19 .144 .888 .213 39 - . 8 6 5 - . 3 9 0 ' - . 0 8 0
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TA^LE 27 ( C on t . 'd ) c
Game
41 1 - .6Q2
42 - . 8 1 5
'43- - . 8 6 5
•44 - . 5 6 6
'45. - . 0 4 6
46 .074
47" .250
48 - . 5 7 7




53 - . 1 9 7
54 •' ‘ - . 3 5 0
55 * '.139
56 .512
'57 . . - . 8 3 1
J5B ' . / - ?  468
59. , . - .971







- .f39 r 
.713  
■. 778 








- .044  












































- .89 1  
- . 9 3 9  
- .866  




- . 6 1 4  
- . 4 8 0  
- . 4 8 6  
- . 3 4 4  
-  .584 
- . 5 9 4  
- .841  
- . 5 6 8  
- . 0 7 9  
.340 
. 139 
- . 8 2 7  
- . 7 3 4
. 117
- .061  




- .  575*" 
' .274 
. - .486








’ . 873 
.059 
.113.






- . 5 7 4  
.378 
- . 5 5 4  
.443  
- . 0 6 0  
. I 33 
.099 
.503 
- .  333 
’- . 2 5 9  
- . 0 3 9  
.434 
.360 





^This. was a p r i n c i p a l  components a n a lys is  which achieved the c l u s t e r i n g  of  
80 games ( p a i r s  of- p la yers )  on 8 , v a r t a b l e s  (4  condi>roo^l  p ro p en s i t ies  fo r
each p l a y e r ) . '  O r i g i n a l l y  the method of  p r ln c ip a T  axes iŜ s 
Since the e igenvalues o f  the l a s t  4 o f  these were re I a t ] v  
procedure was forced to" condense to  on ly  3 . . factors,  and th' 
o r t h o g o n a l l y . • •
ued 7 fa c t o r s ,  
ly sma l i /  the  
se were—ro t a t e d
%
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i n t o  t y p e s  p r o v e d  t o  bead no s t a t i s t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w h a t e v e r
i '
to '  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b I e s , c o n s i d e r e d  i n  t h i s  s t u d y .  The r e s u l t s
* "  *
* K  '
o f  t h r e e  d i s c r i m i n a n t  f u n c t i o n  a n a l y s e s  based on t h e  g e n e r a l i s e d
d i s t a n c e  b e tw e e n  type.s i n  t e r m s ^ f  c o n d i t i o n a l  p r o p e n s i t i e s  and
i n d i c e s  .of s t r a t e g i c  depen de ncy  a r e  o f f e r e d  i n  T a b l e s  2 8 ,  29 ,  and 
■ ■ ■ • . • <\-
30 ,  as e v i d e n c e  o f  c o n v e r g e n t  v a l i d i t y  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  Q - f a c t o r  
/ *  ’ ' •  
a n a l y s i s .  M o r e o v e r ,  t h e  p o i n t  b e i n g  made i s  t h a t ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e
s u b j e c t s  may n o t  have c l t J e t e r e d  c l e a r l y  a ro u n d  t h e  - in d e p e n d e n t
» *  ♦
ma n i p u I  a t i o n s , t h e y  i d 1c I u s t e r  a c c o r d i n g  t o  some p r e s u m a b l y ' p r e ­
d e te rm  i n e d  ' c o g n i t i v e - s t y l e ' o r  p e r h a p s  p e r s o n a  I i t y  v a r i a b l e s .  .
F i g u r e  6 shows t h e  mean p r o f i l e s  o f  t h e  t h r e e  maj .o r  t y p e s  i n
te rm s  o f  t h e i r  c o n d i t i o n a l  p r o p e n s i t i e s .  N o t i c e  t h a t ,  as e x p e c t e d ,
• t h e  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  i s 'm u c h  c l e a r e r  th ’ r ough  H i d e r ' s  p ro p e n s  i t-i  es
t h a n  t h r o u g h  G u e s s e r " s ;  w h i c h  i s  t o  say  t h a t  wd a r e  d e a l i n g  p r i  —
i  ' r
m a r i l y  w i t h  t l j r r e e ^ t y p e s  o f  Hi d e r s f- i  n - a c t i o n ,  so t o  sp e a k .
In' hopes o f  d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  t y p e s  f u r t h e r  t h a n  i n * t e r m s  o f  
t h e i r  c o n d i t i o n a l  p r o p e n s i t y  p r o f i . l e s ,  t y p e  was used as an i n d e p ­
e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  i n  a s e r i e s  o f  a n ^ l ^ s e s  o f  v a r i a n c e .  I n c l u d e d  in  
T a b l e  31 a r e  t h e  s u c c e s s f u I  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e s e  a n a l y s e s ;  and t h e  means 
o f  t h e  d e p e n d e n t  m e a s u r e s ,  as w e l l  as t h e  c o n d i t i o n a j  p r o p e n s i t i e s  
p l o t t e d  i n  F i g u r e  6 ,  a r e  g i v e n  f o r  each t y p e  i n - T a b l e  32.
T h e r e  was somewhat o f  a t e n d e n c y  f o r  t y p e - I ' s  and t y p e - l l ' s ,
I '
as opposed  t o  t y p e - I l l ' s ,  t o  r e p o r t  t h a t  t h e y  had p l a y e d  " r a t i o n a l l y "
^  * %
T y p e - l l ’ s showed 1$e l e a s t  b i a s  i n  t h e  v a r i a b l e  p i n  t h e  second





Summary o f  TvD'al CI ass I f i c a + l o n  Per formance  of  D i s c r i m i  n ant  »
/
*  F un ct i on  A n a l y s i s  w i th'  Guesser *s C o n d i t i o n a I ,  P r o n e n s i t i e s  
and In d ice s  o f ' S t r a t e g i c  Dependency as V a r i a b l e s  ' '
K
Number o f  Games C f a l s i f i e d :
“  . " I n t o  TYPE
From TYPE
• 1 1 1 * •' I I I
I 14 _  9 1
11 ‘ / 0* 18 3




Notej ,  A c h i - s q u a r e  with- 4 d . f .  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  .001







Summary of Typa l .  C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  P e r f o r m a n c e  o f  D i s c r i m i n a n t  
F u n c t i o n  A n a l y s i s  w i t h  H i d e r ' s  C o n d i t i o n a l  P r o p e n s i t i e s  
and I n d i c e s  o f  S t r a t e g i c  Dependency as V a r i a b l e s -
Number o f  Carnes C l a s s i f i e d :
I n t o  TYp E
95
From TYPE 1 ■ 1 i ■ \ r i
1 22 2 0




N o t e :  A c h i - s q u a r e  w i t h  4 d . f .  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  < . 0 0 1
'V -
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TARLE 30
\ % ■
Summary of Tvpal C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  performance of  D iscr im in an t  
Funct ion Analysis with  H ld er  and Guesser's Condit ional  
* P ropens it ie s  as Var iab les
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FIGURE 6 . M EA N  C O N D IT IO N A L  PROPENSITY  
PROFILES FOR THREE. MAJOR  
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TABLE 3 I ■
Mean P r o f i l e s  of  Three Major  Types of
IP layers on Related Variabl.es
9 8





1 1 1 11 i
Guesser’ s XG .561 .603 .599
Condi t i o n a 1 YG .543 .578 .585
Pro pens it ies YPG .564 .554 .483
XPG ••545 .519 .486
Hi d e r 's YH • ■” .439 . .303 .546
Condit ional XPH .327 .595 .650
Propens I t i  es XH' .529 .407 .783
.
YPH .274 .488 .466
Post-Game Q uest ionna ire  Item 1 ■1 .417 1 .476 2.091
Post-Game Quest ionna ire  I t e m '3 1.500 , 1 .381 1 .818
Bias in p in 2nd b 1 ock .208 0 .455
Bias' in m oyer 200 p lays . 125 .048 .364
Bias -i n rtf in. 4th b 1 ock .167 .095 .455
H ’s s t r a t e g l  c. bi as over 200 plays' .500 - . 6 1 9 .364"''
H's s t r a t e g i c  bias -in 1st block .250 - . 1 4 3 .455
IH's s t r a t e g i c  bias in 2nd block .208 - .381 .091
H ’ s s t r a t e g i c  b ias  in 3rd block .250 - .4 2 9 .091
H's s t r a t e g i c  bias in 4th block • .125 - .4 7 6 .273
H’s s t r a t e g i c  recency .071. .107 .210 ,
H ’ s s t r a t e g i c  f l u x - . 2 1 6 - . 1 0 3 .223
H ’s resportae t o  success - . 1 4 9 .002 .432 •
I t 's response t o  f a i l u r e - .  284 . - . 2 0 9 .004
n | =24 n i r 21 n l 1 r 11 N=56
The v a r ia b le s  determin in g  the c l u s t e r i n g  of. p layers  were both H id er  and 
Guesser 's ' c o n d i t io n a I  p ro p e n s i t i e s  as def ined  in ’the 4 - s t a t e  Markov 
\ Mode 1. (See Chapter  2 , and AppendIx.C) .  t '

















^  TABLE .32
Summary o f  Analyses o f  Var ia nce  Due to  Type o f  P layer  as a C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  V a r i a b l e
































































Post-Game Q u e s t io n n a i re  Item 1 .528 3.54 .05 V i. .05Post-Game Q u es t io n n a i re  I tem 3 .238 2 .9 3 .05 .05 - .05
B!as In p In 2nd b 1ock . 126 6 .0 6 .005 - .005 - .01
Bias In m o v er  200 plays . 1 16 3. 18 .05 - .05 - .05
Bias In m o ver  4th b jock .148 . ■ 3 .26 .05 - .05
H's s t r a t e g i c  b ias  over 200 plays .255 30.  12 .0001 + .0001 - .05
H's s t r a t e g i c  b ias  In 1st b lock . 185 8 . 2 7 .005 - .0005 .01
H's s t r a t e g i c  b ias  In 2nd block .223 * 9 . 2 ! .001 + .0005
H's s t r a t e g i c  bias in>3rd block .237 1 1 .35 .00§>5 + .0005
H's s t r a t e g i c  bias In 4th block . 190 14.96 .0001 - .0001 - .005
H's s t r a t e g i c  recency .008 8 .8 6 .005 - .0001 - .005
H'.s s t r a t e g i c  f l u x .024 2 9 .8 3 .0001 - .000 1 -  . .0001
H's response to  success .044 15.81 .0001 - .0001 - .0001
H's response i p  f a i l u r e .031 3 .9  1 .05 .0001
"
.‘005
See foo tnote  t o  Table 20.
i
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blo ck ,  and t y p e - 1 l l ' s  showed more than t y p e - I * s .  The same r e l a t i o n -
• sh ip  held f o r  the v a r ia b le  m in the fo u r th  b lock ,  and over 200 p lays .
Thus t h e r e  was some correspondence between i n t u i t i v e  not ions of
. " r a t i o n a l i t y "  and b'ias a t  the level  o f  choices .-  
■ \The t h r e e  types can 've  d is c r im in a t e d  more c l e a r l y  a t  the  
leve l  o f  s t r a t e g i c  b ias .  Type l l ’ s g e n e r a l l y  l i e d  about where the  
but ton  had been hidden,  and more of them did so as the game pro­
gressed ,  w h i le  t y p e - l ’ s and t y p e - 1 l l ' s  were biased in the  d i r e c t i o n
J
• r *
of  t r u t h f u l n e s s .
F igure  7 shows the  mean p r o f i  les of the th re e  types in terms of
t h e i r  indices of  s t r a t e g i c  dependency. T y p e - 1 l l ' s  d isp layed  the
/
l a rg e s t  p o s i t i v e  s t r a t e g i c  recency e f f e c t ,  - ju s t  as they generated  
th e  most bias in t h e i r  choices.  T y p e - I ' s  and type-1 I ' s  a lso  displayed  
p<Jsitive recency,  but t o  a lesser  degree.  • T y p e - 1*1 I ' s  showed a pos­
i t i v e  s t r a t e g i c  f l u x ,  w h i le  the o th ers  tended t o  a l t e r n a t e  s t r a t e g i e s ,  
t y p e - 1 ' s  doing so more than type-1 I ' s .  In t h e i r  response t o  success,  
t y p e - ) l l ' s  showed a strong tendency to  p e r s i s t ,  and t y p e - 1 ' s  a ten d -  . 
ency t o  a l t e r n a t e .  Fo l lowing f a i l u r e ,  t y p e - 1 ' s  showed an even la rger  
tendency to  a l t e r n a t e ,  w h i le  type-1 I ' s  had a s l i g h t l y  la rg e r  but  s t i l l
t
n eg a t iv e  response index,  and t y p e - 1 l l ' s  a near zero index.
A l l  i n’ a I I , i t  might  be sa!d  t h a t  t y p e - 1 ' s  are t r u t h f u I , s t r a t ­
e g ic  a l t e r n a t o r s ;  t y p e - 1 I ’ s t e l l  l i e s  and switch s t r a t e g i e s  when they  
lose;  and ty p e —I l l ’ s a re  t r u t h f u l  and p e r s i s t e n t .
\
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H'S RECENCY - 
H'S FLUX . 
H'S R-SUCCESS J 
H'S R-FAILURE
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FIGURE 7. MEAN PROFILES OF THREE MAJOR TYPES 
OF PLAYERS IN INDICES OF STRATEGIC DEPENDENCY





In r e t r o s p e c t ,  the present  study may have s u f f e re d  from c e r t a i n  
methodological  o v e r s ig h t s .  '
Although several  subiects  confessed to  experienc ing  cons iderab le  
anx ie ty  and f r u s t r a t i o n ,  both a t  the o u t s e t  and through the comple­
t i o n  of  p l a y ,  no doubt due t o  the ambiauity of  the game arena. This 
u n ce r ta in ty  was p.robably the maior  source o f ,  r a t h e r  than a hindrance  
t o , ^ t h e  unexpected and t h e r e f o r e  i n t e r e s t i n g  re l a t io n s h i p s  described
above. . .
*
H e r e t o f o r e ,  em p ir ic a l  research on decision-making has been 
g u i l t y  o f  ta k in g  too narrow an a - n r i o r i  view of  which va r ia b le s  were 
l i k e l y  t o  converge on r e l a t i v e l y  s im p le ,  ' c o n t e n t - f r e e '  choice behaviour  
Consequently,  and as t h i s / s t u d y  c l e a r l y  demonstrates,. too many e x p e r i ­
mental e f f o r t s  to  d a i e - ' f i a v e  e i t h e r  ig n o red jo r  discarded'  a I t o g e th e r  
the most meaningful aspects of choice var iance  under t h e . t i t l e  "e r ro r " . .  
To be sure,  haphazard approaches t o  design and an a lys is  produce,  
more o f t e n  than not ,  i r r e p l i c a b i e  r e s u l t s .  But a t  the same t ime,  
b u i l t - i n  a r t h r i t i c  c o n s t ra in t s  on th e  s o r t  o f  data deemed "hard" ,
r
an in o rd in a te  respect  fo r  convention in s t a t i s t i c a l  a n a l y s i s ,  in a 
word, paro ch ia l ism ,  is  not  a p r e f e r a b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e .
Moreover,  w ith  regards to  the present  s tudy ,  the  o b je c t io n  t h a t  
many of  the e f f e c t s  revealed  would prove to  lack r e l i a b i l i t y ,  must 
be s e r io u s ly  considered.  Since we were a c t u a l l y  dea l ing  with 80 games
102
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I
each c o n s is t in g  o f  200 p la y s , .a n d  each o f  these invo lv ing  3 b in ary  
choices,  re s u l ts  Obtained on the choice n r o t o c a ls ,  and e s p e c ia l l y  
those va r ia b Ie s fsuch  as the in d ices of  s t r a t e g i c  dependency and the  
s t a t e - c o n d i t i o n a l  p ro p en s i t ie s  which w e r e ' d i s t i l i e d  and abstracted  
from the e n t i r e  range of  the da ta ,  would presumably be of  r e l a t i v e l y  
s t a b le  c h a r a c te r .
y
■ Th'e most ser ious  shortcomings of t h i s  study in vo lve the post-game ' 
q u e s t io n n a i r e .  M&ny j u s t - s h o r t - o f - s I a n i f i c a n c e ,  and m a r g in a l ly ^  
s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t s  between the q u e s t io n n a i r e  and the game wcjuld have 
been resolved had the q u e s t io n n a i r e 's  sca les been snrea.d-out  and 
granted more f i d e l i t y .  From what we were able to  r e c o n s t r u c t ,  ■ 
the  i n t u i t i v e  not ion of  " r a t i o n a l i t y "  was n e i t h e r  e n t i r e l y  out  of l i n e
♦f
with the formal ooncept o f  ' r a t i o n a l i t y ' ,  nor were the two col l i n e a r .
The I n t u i t i v e  not ion  seemed more y ' m a t t e r  of  ex post  fac to  in duct io n  
than a x io m at ic  deduct ion as i t  stands in game theory .  At  any r a t e ,  
a b e t t e r  q u e s t io n n a i re  might  have c l a r i f i - e d  these r e l a t i o n s h i p s .
Als^i, s ince  t h e - 0 - f a c t o r  ana lys is  worked so w e l l ,  an examinat ion  
o f  the  e f f e c t s  o f  some p e r s o n a l i t y  v a r ia b le s  is in d ica ted  f o r  f u tu re  
research .  An improved q u e s t io n n a i re  would draw out  a f f e c t i v e  as wel I 
as c o g n i t iv e  s t y le s  and t r a i t s .
Another shortcoming may have been r e l a t e d  t o  response t im e s .  A few 
subjects suspected t h a t  response t ime was th e  key v a r ia b le  in the study.  
Had response times been recorded,  they mlght  very wel l  have proved 
Im por tant .  An unusual ly  Ia rg e^ ee p ^ n se  latency might  make I t  seem t h a t  
the decision-maker is going through s g a f  t ime-dependent  reasoning
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process ,  and thus o n e1? re p re s e n ta t io n  of  an opponent might depend in 
some wav on perceived response t im es .  ■
F i n a l l y ,  the r e s u l t s  of t h i s  studv a e n e r a l l y  p r e s c r ib e  t h a t . f u t u r e  
research .con cern- i tse I  f more w i th  the s o r t  of measures generated by 
th e  Martoiv, mode I , t h a t  i s ,  c o n d i t io n a l  a~s oonosed t o * u n c o n d i t io n a 1 measures 
such as the f l a t  f requenc ies  of choices made, or  s imple c h o ic e - le v e l  
recency.  The i n t e r n a l ,  dynamic, and f i n e - s t r u c t u r a l  r e l a t i o n s  emerging 
in i t e r a t e d  plays o f  But ton-B ut ton  proved to  be p syc h o lo g ic a l ly  f a r  
more i n t e r e s t i n g ,  and o f  vast l .y o r e a t e r  h e u r i s t i c  value than u n i l a t e r a l  
measures of  the e i t h e r - o r - k i n d  o f  ' r a t i o n a l i t y '  w i t h i n  the ranqe of a








General In s t r u c t io n s  Given t o  All  P l ayers >•
’’You are going to be p lay in g  a simple game y o u ' r e  ,orobab I y faml I I
wi th c a l le d  B u t to n -B u t to n . I t ' s  d I ayed between a H ld e r  and a Guesser.
The H ld e r  hides a button In one of  h is  f i s t s  and the  Guesser t r i e s  to
V
guess which f i s t  the button Is In.  I f  the Guesser picks the c o r r e c t
f i s t  he wins and the H ld er  loses;  I f  the Guesser is wrong,, he loses 
* s
and the  Hlder  wins.  To make i t  more I n t e r e s t i n g  however, when you 
play  t h I s  var I  ant  o f  B u t to n -B u t to n , a f t e r  the.  HI der  h 1 des the but to n ,  
and b e f o r e - t h e  Guesser makes h is  guess, the H lder  sends a message to  
the Guesser t e l l i n g  him where the button I s ,  but  he i s n ' t  compelled 
to  be t r u t h f u l .  The Guesser receives t h i s  message and can decide i f .  
th e  HI der Is ly 1 ng, o r  t h a t  h e ' s t e I I  I no the  t r u t h , o r  to  d! s regard  
th e  message a l t o g e t h e r .  .Then a f t e r  the Guesser guesses he not only  
f inds o u t  where the button was hidden,  but  a lso  whether the H lder  was 
being  t r u t h f u l  or  n o t . "
A d d i t io n a l  In s t ru c t io n s  t o  H iders In the HP Condit ion
"You are going to  be the H ld er  and another  s u b j e c t  In the next  
- • \  , 
room w l I  I be the Guesser. As H ld e r ,  the f i r s t  th in g  you do is hide
the but ton  by t u r n in g  on e i t h e r  t h i s  r i g h t  o r  l e f t  l i g h t ;  the switch
goes both ways. You leave I t  on, and a t  t h i s  p o in t  the Guesser doesn
know where/ 'me button I s ,  The nex t  th ing  you do Is  send the Guesser
a message, t e l l i n g  her  where t h e  button Is ,  To do t h a t  you turn on
one o f f  the l ig h ts  In t h i s  middle row--remember t h a t  you don’ t  have to
1
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be t r u t h f u l , but  .you can I f  you l i k e ;  I t ’ s completely ud to  you how 
you n la^ ,  Now a f t e r  the Guesser gets your message (a l i g h t  comes on-
V
I n - h e r  box) ,  she has the opt ion  o f  fo l lo w in g  your a d v ic e ,  doing the  
o p p o s i t e ,  o r  d isregard in g  your message. in any case, th e  Guesser 
wl I I then, guess where the button i s ,  and one. o f  these two too l ig h ts  
w i l l  gome on.  -Then .the Guesser f inds  out  where the  button  r e a l l y  
"was, and you both fl 'gure out  whethd^ you won o r  lo s t * t h e  p la y .  I f  you 
won- you put  one o f  these white  chins In t h i s  box;* I f  y o u . l o s t  you 
p u t - I n  one o f  these coloured  ch ips .  By t h a t  t ime t h is  l i g h t  w i l l
v  C .  " *  -  ^
come on and t h a t ’ s a s ig na l  from me t o  turn,  o f f  the l i g h t s  and get
t
ready ' fo r  the next  p la y .  When t h i s  s lan a l  l i g h t  goes o f f  you. can
■sea r
^  s t a r t  again .  Y o u ’ re going to  p lay  200 times a j t o g e t h e r  but  y o u -g e t i
to  take a break a f t e r  50, 100, and 150. You^nee^n't  count  y o u r s e l f ; '
when the signal  l i g h t  comes on a f t e r  50,  100, and 150, and a t . t h e  very
end, I t  w i l l  stay on f o r  a couple of.  minutes.  You can r e s t ,  and when 
«
. i t  goes o f f  s t a r t  up agalsi. At the very end you’ I I have 200 chips In
t h i s  box, and I ' l l  get  you t o  reach in and p ick  o u t  5 w i th o u t  looking.
•»
For each white  one you draw, you win an e x t r a  l o t t e r y  t i c k e t .  Three
sub je c ts  out  o f  100 win $25 each in the  l o t t e r y .  So you ge t  one t i c k e t
f o r  sure ,  and can win up to  f i v e  more. So the more p lays  you win ,
the more white  chips y o u ' l l  have In the b o ^ ^ t h e  more t i c k e t s  y o u ' re
l i k e l y  "b win,  and the g r e a t e r  your  chances of winning $25 In the  
l o t t e r y . "
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‘
In s t r u c t io n s  to  fjjkders In the HD Condit ion
These Hiders are given the same in s t r u c t i o n s  as above, except  *
*
as concerning the 1 dentt-ty- o f  the Guesser ,—
"You are going to  be the H ld er  an.d the Guesser I s n ' t  another
persOT but  Is an automaton, t h a t  I s ,  a th in k in g  machine which genera 
g u e s s e s . . . "  *
In s t r u c t io n s  t o  Guessers * V.
The Guess e r ' s In s t r u c t io n s  correspond to those a ti* t o  H iders  
the HP jz d n d  I t l Q n . —  .
"You are going to be the Guesser and the j j f d e r  Is another sub je c t
in the next  r o o m . . . "
©
V
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APPEND IX B
POST-GAME QUESTIONNAIRE \  • J
A  \
'P lease c l r c l ^ t h e  me- response which f i t s  best .
1. Would you-say, t h a t  you played r a t i o n a l l y ?




2.  Would you say t h a t  your  opponent played r a t i o n a l l y ?
a) Yes y
b) Cannot say i
A  ’ ■ c) No ’
(3 .  . Were you t r y i n g  t o  a n t i c i p a t e  and /or  o u t w i t  your opponent?
/ ' a) Yes,  c o n s tan t ly
—  b) Son̂ e o f  the' t ime
c) D e f i n i t e l y  nfft '
4 ,  Do you t h in k  your opponent was t r y i n g  t o  a n t i c i p a t e  and/or  o u tw i t  
you?
a) Yes, co nstan t ly
- b) Some of  j fh e  time 
c) • D e f I n l t e I y  not  ^
5. Were you making your choices a t  random, or .were  you fo l lo w in g  some 
s t r a t e a l c  pI an?
a) I was t r y i n g  to  choose a t  random " .
. b) I was f o l lo w in g  a loose s o r t  of  plan
c) I was f o l lo w in g  a s t r i c t  plan ^
6.  Do you t h i n k  your opponent was making choices a t  random, or  
fo l lo w in g  some s o r t  o f  plan?
a) Choosing a t  random
b) Fol lowing a loose s o r t  of  d I an
c) Fol lowing a s t r i c t  plan
7. When you won, to what did you a t t r i b u t e  your success In general?
a) ■ Jo good luck
'• b) To sometimes luck,  o t h e r  t imes s k i l l  — N ‘
c) To your s k i l l  a t  prob lem-so lv ing
8. , When you l o s t ,  t o  what did you a t t r i b u t e  your  f a i l u r e  in general?
a) To bad luck
■b) To sometimes luck,  o t h e r  t imes s k H I
c) To your opponent 's  s k i l l  a t  problem-solving
108
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
10?
9 .  At +t\e very beginning o f  +t\e geme, whom d id  you r e a l l y  b e l ie v e  
you were p la y ing  against?
a I • A naive s u b je c t  l i k e  y o u r s e l f
b) The e xp er im e n te r 's  confederate
c ) j  The experimenter  himself
d) A t h i n k i n g ,  non-hunripn machine o r  automaton of  some s o r t
10. Did you acquire  any suspicions o r  doubts about the real  I d e n t i t y  
o f  your opponent?
a) I became ext remely  suspicious
b) I became somewhat suspicious
c) I became on ly  s l i g h t l y ,  susolclous
d) I never had any doubts
11. I f  you did Jsecome suspicious about your opponent, when did these  
doubts f i r s t  a r ise?
, a) During the f i r s t  50 plays »
b) During th e  second -50 plays ■
c) During the t h i r d  50 plays
d) During the fourth 50 plays
e)  Only Just  now
f
,v„
12 . .  Now t h a t  you have b'een given an o p p o r tu n I ty  t o  se r io u s ly  conslde  
the quest ion,  whom.do you now t h i n k  yo.u were pTaylng against?
a) A naive s u b je c t  l i k e  y o u r s e l f
b) The exp er im en te r 's  confedera te  „
c) The exper imen ter  h im sel f
d) A th ink lTlg,  non-human machine o r  automaton of  some s o r t
13. Describe In as much d e t a l I  as you can, your game-strategy over  
the e n t i r e  200 p lays .
CJ
' t - ■ ■
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APPENDIX C




B F l + l DT, + i D F M
BT,
CXG)' (YH) OXG) ( I - YH ) ( f - X G ) . ( M H ) ( l - X G )  f T - Y H )
BF, CYG) C I - X PH ) (YG)  (XPH) ( I - Y G )  ( I - X P H ) ( I - Y G )  (XPH)
DT, ( l - Y P G )  ( XH) C l - Y P G )  ( l - X H ) (YPG)  (XH) (YPG) ( l - X H )
0 F ,
C I - X P G )  ( l - Y P H ) ( I - X P G )  (YPH) •(XPG) ( l - Y P H ) (XPG) (YPH)
A matrix of t ransit ion probabi li t ies Ic onstructed out of the 
appropriate conditional propensities of the players In each game. 
Given are the probabi li t ies of t ransit ions from tile state of the game 
at  play I to the state at  play i + I.
 ̂ I f  the assumption Is made that the probabi li ty of being In a 
state at'-play 1 is equal to the probabi l i ty of  being In that sta,te on 
the next play, play l+ l ,  then the transit ion matrix can be solved for 
I ts f ixed point. That Is assuming that:
BT| = BT,+|
BFI = BFI + t 
DT, -  DT,+ |
and DFj = DF,+,
results In a system of four l inear equations In four unknowns, which
can be solved as three equations In three unknowns since the unknowns
ftsum to I .
110
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
BT-BT CXG) CYH) + BF (Y G K l^ P H ) .  + UT ( l -YPGUXH ) + DP ( I tO$PGKI->YPH)
BF=BT (XG)CI-YH) + BF (Y6HXPH) + .DTCI-YPG)( I-XH) + DF( I-XPG)(YPH)
DT=BT . CI -XG) ( YH) + BF Cl »>YG) (. IvXPH) + DT (YPG)CXH) + DF (XPG) ( I -YPH)"
DF=I-BT-BF-DT )
!
BT, BF, DT, and DF are  c a l l e d  the steady s t a t e  frequencies  o f
the  system because they  represent  the frequencies w ith  which the system
v i s i t s  each s t a t e  In the long run,  regard less  of  the I n i t i a l  s t a t e  of
*
the system, The>e steady s ta t e s  can be compared f o r  goodness o f  f i t  
w it h  t h e  observed frequencies  over  200 plays of  t h e  game, CBT), (BF) ,
( D T ) , and ( D F ) . ' • ‘
\  .
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